This page highlights instances where Charles S. Peirce has been referenced in the literature. New passages are added as they become available.
Where do new hypotheses come from? In the nineteenth century, the philosopher C. S. Peirce coined the term "abduction" to refer to the formation of explanatory hypotheses, and computational research on abduction is growing rapidly (Josephson, Chandrasekaran, Smith, and Tanner 1987; O'Rorke, Morris, and Schulenberg 1990; Peng and Reggia 1990; Pople 1977; Thagard 1988).
Although Hegel's epistemological and historical views influenced thinkers as diverse as Karl Marx and C. S. Peirce, his account of concepts seems to have had little effect.
The problem of inference to explanatory hypotheses had a long history in philosophy and a much shorter one in psychology and artificial intelligence. Scientists and philosophers have long considered the evaluation of theories on the basis of their explanatory power. In the late nineteenth century, C. S. Peirce discussed two forms of inference to explanatory hypotheses: hypothesis, which involved the acceptance of hypotheses, and abduction, which involved merely the initial formation of hypotheses (Peirce 1931-1958; Thagard 1988)
When Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions first appeared in 1962, it lit a bonfire under the philosophy of science and has easily been the most widely read work in the field over the past decades. Credit is due Kuhn (along with others such as N. R. Hanson and Stephen Toulmin) for redirecting philosophy of science away from the arid logical analyses of scientific concepts toward greater consideration of the dynamics of science as seen in its history. Kuhn helped to revitalize the study of conceptual change in science that had lain dormant in Anglo-American philosophy since the great nineteenth-century thinkers William Whewell and C. S. Peirce.
As we saw in Chapter 3, C. S. Peirce used the term "abduction" to refer to the formation of explanatory hypotheses.
In the late 19th century, Charles S. Peirce discovered the truth-functional interpretation of classical sentential logic. He also discovered two binary truth functions each of which is sufficient alone to express all others.
Peirce first considered joint denial. (Page 310)
Peirce's Law: ((A→B)→A)→A (Page 316)
Combinatory Logic: Pure, Applied and Typed
In late June 1942, Mills wrote to Daniel Bell at the New Leader, asking to review Paths of Life by Charles W. Morris, which had just been published by Harper and Brothers. Mills, who was spending the summer in Madison, explained that he was then immersed in pragmatic literature. In an earlier letter to Bell, dated June 18, 1942, Mills described his doctoral dissertation: “I think I told you that I am finishing up this fall, maybe, a sociology of knowledge of pragmatism: from Peirce thru Dewey to Mead. I'm on page 570 and my wife is yelling to stop it, as she is the only one who can read my handwriting (typing). Anyway in this I trace Dewey's stands (political) down the line and, in conjunction with the position on logic, and theory of valuation, impute him socially. Pan-logism is a type of formal left wingism; its formality is what is at issue politically and it is this which must be explained in terms of the whole situation of American ‘progressivism.’ ”(Page 49)
My formal training at the University of Texas was primarily in American philosophy and modern logic. I took an M.A. degree in these fields. The men with whose work I spent my time at Texas were the pragmatists, especially Charles S. Peirce and G. H. Mead. (page 80)
C. Wright Mills: Letters and Autobiographical Writings
Introduction by Dan Wakefield
University of California Press
"Before this, there had always been individual souls who had gone their own way and found their own heaven, no matter how solitary the path or unfashionable the destination: Hawthorne, Melville, Ryder, Eakins, Newman, Blakelock, Peirce, Emily Dickinson, Henry James; outcasts, recluses, exiles, leading lives of almost monastic devotion to their art."
Lewis Mumford - from My Works and Days: A Personal Chonicle - page 244
"That the creative minds of the Brown Decades were necessarily recluses, almost goes without saying: the cloister was a condition of their survival. Illness, testy recalcitrance, spiritual alienation were the price that they paid for their bare existence. Even if they raised their voices they could not be 'heard' by their contemporaries; or, if occasionally heard, like Charles Peirce, they could not be understood."
Lewis Mumford - from My Works and Days: A Personal Chonicle - page 254
"Had Spingarn risen to that opportunity, he would not have been alone. William James had recently uttered his diatribe against the Ph.D. octopus; Thorstein Veblen was soon to attack the Higher Learning; Patrick Geddes in Britain was calling for the 'University Militant.' What I am saying, I suppose, is that when Spingarn withdrew from the university it was still open to him to become another Nietzsche, another Charles Peirce, another Whitehead; to demonstrate by his own example the meaning of creativity, not only in literature or painting but in every realm that the mind could reach."
Lewis Mumford - from My Works and Days: A Personal Chonicle - page 511
"The solution to the riddle is to see that merely possible qualities are lacking in individual definiteness. There are no possible individuals, but only possible kinds of individuals, possibilities for further individuation. As Peirce insisted, possibility is in principle general rather than determinate. It is in some degree indefinite, and so, since value lies in harmonized contrasts and the more definite a thing is the richer the contrasts it can involve, it follows that possible worlds, really worldly possibilities or incompletely definite sorts of worlds, are less rich as objects of knowledge than actual worlds. Thus God does not possess actually all possible value simply by knowing all possibilities."
Charles Hartshorne - from A Natural Theology for Our Time, page 73
"The only twentieth-century philosopher who recalls Plato to any striking degree, Whitehead, returns to this vision, but frees it from the corruptions which 'Platonism' subjected it to, and makes far clearer in what the 'self-motion' or creativity of mind or soul consists, and far clearer that and how all motion of singular individuals, mere aggregates apart, is of this kind. The problem of 'matter' and 'space' ( or the 'receptacle' ) which Plato honestly admits deeply puzzles him, and which Aristotle seems to have thought he had intellectually mastered so far as this could be done, but which only a long painful process of collective inquiry could really illuminate, has at last proved not hopelessly recalcitrant to a genuinely platonic solution. Souls are indeed 'self-moved' ( which in Greek really meant, self-changed, i.e., creative ), and when ( with Leibniz ) we distinguish clearly between singulars or true individuals and aggregates, we can, as Plato apparently wished to do, see all motion as soul motion. We can also (with Fechner, Lequier, Varisco, Peirce, Bergson, Whitehead) see all causality as involving a kind of transcendence of merely mechanical order---some injection, however slight, of strictly unforeseeable novelty of concrete form, which will subsequently influence all future changes."
Charles Hartshorne - from A Natural Theology for Our Time, page 115