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SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the NEWEST PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

(Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.)

FIFTH CONVERSATION.

A. That which the Science of Knowledge deduces is to be a faithful and complete picture of fundamental consciousness. Can its deductions then contain more or less or anything else than what occurs in actual consciousness?

R. By no means. Every deviation from actual consciousness would be a sure proof of the incorrectness of the deduction of that science.

A. Hence, according to all our previous results, the total consciousness of a finite rational being can involve only the following:

FIRSTLY—The primary and fundamental determinations of consciousness, or common consciousness, or immediate experience, or whatever else you choose to call it.

These determinations form in themselves a complete system, which is altogether the same—apart from its exclusively individual determinations—for all rational beings. We have called this system common consciousness, or the first degree of consciousness.

SECONDLY—The reflection and representation of this common consciousness, the free separating, composing, and infinite judging of it; which, being dependent upon freedom, varies according to the different use made of that freedom. This we have called the higher degrees of consciousness—the middle region of our mind, as it were. It is to be remembered that nothing can occur in these

higher degrees which has not occurred previously in common consciousness, at least in its elements. The freedom of the mind has the power infinitely to separate and compose that which is given in fundamental consciousness, but it cannot create anything anew.

THIRDLY AND FINALLY—A complete deduction of all that which occurs in common consciousness—without any relation to actual experience—from the mere necessary manner of acting of the Intelligence in general; precisely as if that common consciousness were the result of this manner of acting. This is the Science of Knowledge, as the absolute highest degree, which no consciousness can transcend. In this science, also, nothing can occur which has not occurred in actual consciousness, or in experience, in the highest significance of that word.

According to our principles, therefore, nothing can enter the consciousness of a rational being, in any manner, which does not in its elements occur in experience, and in the experience of all rational beings, without exception. All have received the same gifts, and the same freedom further to develop these gifts; and no one can create something of his own. Our philosophy is, therefore, most decidedly favorably disposed towards common sense, and secures its rights, as we asserted at the beginning; and

mar, § 26, 5; Scotus, *Super Prædicamenta*, qu. 8; Durandus à Sancto Porciano, *In Sentent.*, lib. 1, dist. 34, qu. 1; Ockham, *Summa Logice*, pars 1, cap. 5; Chauvin, *Lexicon Rationale*, sub. V. *Abstractum*; Mill, *Logic*, Bk. 1, cap. 2, § 4; Trendelenburg, *Elementa Logice Arist.*, 6th ed., p. 117, note; Überweg, *Logik*, § 51 (where Wolff, also, is cited); Hoppe, *Logik*, §§ 256, 257. This misapprehension affects the relevancy of most of your remarks.

I think that I have not, as you suppose, greatly mistaken the sense in which Hegelians use the term Pure Being. At least, my definition seems to be in accord with the explanations of almost all, if not all, the commentators and expositors of Hegel. I would submit respectfully, that your own remarks upon p. 117 of Vol. I. of this Journal contradict, almost in terms, what you say (Vol. II., p. 57) in reply to me.*

Once or twice you use such expressions as "We do not profess to speak for Hegelians," "Hegelians may understand this as they please," &c. Have I been wrong, then, in supposing that the passage to which my

* The passage here referred to is in Chapter III. of the "Introduction to Philosophy," where in there is no reference whatever to the Hegelian use of the term. It is a psychological investigation of the significance of the first predicate which is a determinate somewhat, and "Being" is used in the popular sense of "something" (i. e. a being, and its origin traced to the substantive-making activity of the Ego, which in its first exercise seizes itself as the fundamental basis of all. Just as, according to Kant, Time and Space, the forms of the mind, are made the basis of what the mind sees; so, too, Being as a universal predicate is the pure activity objectified. But the making it substantive, at the same time, determines it.—EDITOR.

INTUITION vs. CONTEMPLATION.

Through a singular chance, the present number of the Journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word *Anschauung*. Mr. Kroeger holds that the word *Anschauung*, as used by Fichte and also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word *Intuition* does not at all express, but for which the English word "contemplation" is an exact equivalent. Mr. Pierce suggests that no person whose native tongue is Eng-

lish will translate *Anschauung* by another word than *Intuition*. Whether there is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word under consideration both by English and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb *intuite* (at least in the

queries related was a professed defence of Hegelian doctrine?*

I am sorry to learn that I have done you injustice in saying that you profess to be self-contradictory. Yet I do not see in what sense you object to the remark. To say that a man is self-contradictory is, of course, but a way of saying that what he believes is self-contradictory. You believe that "finite things contradict themselves"; that is, as I understand it, that contradictions exist. Therefore, what you believe in, appears to be self-contradictory. Nor can I see how a person "escapes self-contradiction by not attempting to set up non-contradiction as the first principle of things"; that is, by not professing to be otherwise than self-contradictory.†

I do not see that you notice query 3.‡

* Of course, our correspondent would not consider "a defence of Hegel" as identical with a championship of the Hegelians. It is the latter, only, that we object to, for the reason mentioned in the article on Janet, viz., that the term is used so vaguely as to include those who differ essentially from Hegel.—EDITOR.

† We hasten to assure our correspondent that we do not "believe in the self-contradictory." We are sorry we were so unhappy in our expressions as to convey such a meaning. The *Alidino* or the Total Process is not self-contradictory, neither is it an abstract identity, but is (as we described it on p. 54, 2d col. of this volume) "self-identical through self-distinction." The self-determining is what we believe in, and it alone exists, while the fleeting show whose reality rests on contradiction is (and this is not Hegelian merely, but older than Plato) a mingling of Being and non-Being. One who sets up the principle of contradiction ignores one side of the process, and thus involves himself in that which he tries to avoid.—ED.

‡ If any point is involved in question 3d that is not answered in the discussion of the other queries, we fail to seize it.—EDITOR.

Dictionaries), and the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn (in the translation of Kant's *Kritik*) for it is *contemplate*, and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent translation of Fichte's *Popular Works* (London, 1849).

Perhaps the following passage from Fichte himself (*Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 1, p. 342) will enable the reader to decide for himself this question: "Such an act is called *contem-*

plation (or *intuition—Anschauung*). The Ego contemplates (intuites) a non-ego. In the contemplation (intuition) the Ego posits itself as absolutely independent of the non-Ego—contemplates (intuites) it because it does so—without outward force. It posits by its own activity, and with the consciousness of its activity, each of the characteristics of the non-ego (*ein Merkmal nach dem andern*).

BOOK NOTICE.

TABLETS: By A. Bronson Alcott. Published by Roberts Brothers, Boston, 1868.

This book, which has been looked for a long time, takes its readers somewhat by surprise. They find in it what they had not expected: not a mere collection of fragmentary paragraphs and sentences mostly embodying audacious paradoxes, but a connected series of delightful, serene, contemplative, sunshiny essays, perfumed with choice quotations from the best writers and with poetic gems from his own muse. This at least so far as "Part I, Practical," goes. "Part II, Speculative," however, will doubtless afford material to justify in some degree the first expectation. A careful reading will, we think, remove all difficulty on this score also. It is next to impossible for one who has thought the "solvent word" of the universe to think or write otherwise than systematically. If he be a poet, the unity will appear as a kind of "organic unity" and give to his productions an art-form. If he be a philosopher, he will, in each sentence, expressly or by implication, show the relation of his theme to the Whole. For it is the study of philosophy that continually disciplines the mind in the habit of viewing a subject comprehensively and exhaustively. This will explain how it is that a book with very few threads of relation visible super-

ficially, may become the deepest and most vital unity. And such has been our experience with this book of Mr. Alcott's, that, starting out with a prejudice against its method—and this prejudice partly created and fostered by Mr. Alcott's own confessions—we have come to think it one of the most systematic and exhaustive. We found at first a few obvious suggestions in the chapter on *Genesis*, and following these out we were astonished to find a certain consequence in the arrangement of the topics of the several sections that could not possibly have originated through accident. And this in turn gave a more profound meaning to the contents of those sections, and we saw that the whole chapter had a presupposition in the chapter on *Mind*. The latter chapter was an enigma to us for a long time. But finally we discovered in it a link to the system of Mr. Alcott which we had all along supposed to be entirely missing in it, and had criticised it as thus defective.

We recommend this book to those who wish to see the problem of the "lapse" and the "return" treated far more satisfactorily than by Plotinus; in brief, where personality is restored to its supremacy as the first principle, and Pantheism replaced by Theism.