SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT
To the Public at Large concerning the True Nature of the NEUROPTIC PHILOSOPHY. An attempt to force the Reader to an Understanding.

(Translated from the German of J. G. Fichte, by A. E. Kroeger.)

FIFTH CONVERSATION.

A. That which is the Science of Knowledge deduces itself to be a perfect and complete picture of fundamental consciousness. Can its deductions then contain more or less or anything else than what occurs in actual consciousness?

B. By no means. Every deviation from actual consciousness would be a sure proof of the incorrectness of the deduction of that science.

A. Hence, according to all our previous results, the totality of the finite rational being can involve only the following:

1. The primary and fundamental determinations of consciousness, or common consciousness, or immediately experience, or whatever else you choose to call it.

2. These determinations form themselves a complete system, which is altogether the same—apart from its exclusively individual determinacies—for all rational beings. We have called this system common consciousness, or the first degree of consciousness.

B. Therefore, the reflection and representation of this common consciousness, the free separating, composing, and infinitely judging of it; which, being dependent upon freedom, very according to the different mode of that freedom. This we have called the higher degrees of consciousness—the middle region of our mind, as it were. It is to be remembered that nothing can occur in these higher degrees which has not occurred previously in common consciousness, at least in its elements. The freedom of the mind has the power infinitely to separate and compose what is given in fundamental consciousness, but it cannot create anything anew.

THIRDLY AND FINALLY—A complete deduction of all that which occurs in common consciousness—without any relation to actual experience—from the mere necessary manner of acting of the intelligence in general; precisely as if that common consciousness were the result of this manner of acting. This is the Science of Knowledge, as the absolute highest degree, which no consciousness can transcend. In this science, also, nothing can occur which has not occurred in actual consciousness, or in experience, in the highest significance of that word.

According to our principles, therefore, nothing can enter the consciousness of a rational being, in any manner, which does not in its elements occur in experience, and in the experience of all rational beings, without exception. All have received the same gifts, and the same freedom further to develop these gifts; and no one can create something of his own. Our philosophy is, therefore, most decidedly disposed towards common sense, and secures its rights, as we asserted at the beginning; and
INTUITION vs. CONTEMPLATION.

Through a singular channel, the present number of the Journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word Anschauung. Mr. Kroeger holds that the word Anschauung, as used by Fichte and also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word Intuition does not fail to understand English on the other hand, the word Intuition does not fail to understand. It is certain that while Intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word Intuition considered under both English and French translators, it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb Intuition (at least in the

queries related to a peresion doctrine of Hegelianism.

I am sorry to learn that I have done you injustice in saying that you profess to be self-contradictory. It is not for me to devise your object to the remark. To say that a man is self-contradictory is, of course, but a way of saying that what he believes is self-contradictory. You hope, Hegel, that you do not wish to be self-contradictory. Nor can it be seen how a person escapes self-contradiction by not attempting to set up non-contradiction as the first principle of things; that is, by not professing to be otherwise than self-contradictory.

I do not see that you notice query 3.

* Of course, our correspondent would not consider "a defence of Hegel" as identical with a championship of the Hegelians. It is the latter, only, that we object to, for the reason mentioned in the article on "Hegel," that the term is used vaguely as to include those who differed essentially from Hegel—Brougham.

We hasten to assure our correspondent that we do not "believe in the self-contradictory." We are sorry we are so unhappy in our expressions as to convey such a meaning. The defense of the True Idea is not self-contradictory, neither is it an abstract identity, but it is accurately described by what we have called "self-identical through self-distinction." The self-determinacy which is the true idea, and is the name of the volume, is self-identical through self-distinction. The self-determinacy which is the true idea, and is the name of the manual, is self-identical through self-distinction. The self-determinacy which is the true idea, and is the name of the volume, is self-identical through self-distinction. The self-determinacy which is the true idea, and is the name of the manual, is self-identical through self-distinction. The self-determinacy which is the true idea, and is the name of the volume, is self-identical through self-distinction.

If any point is involved in question 3 it is not in the discussion of the other queries, we fail to seize it.—Brooks.