as they shall occur to us, although previously we may never have thought of those particular combinations as possible numbers. We have, then, in a sense a mastery through science over infinite details, with which, as details, we are entirely unacquainted. It is not the universality of facts, which are indeed infinitely numerous, but the universality of principles, which are infinitely unific and simple, which Mr. Spencer claims to have discovered and exhibited.

Whether the method of discovery be scientific or not is of no consequence. The only question to be considered is, Does it "get there"? I think it does, but not with both feet, as many of the admirers of Mr. Spencer believe. Of course, Mr. Spencer does not claim to possess photographs of the parents of matter, nor to have discovered a way to materialize space, let alone to bag the unknowable, as "outsider" seems to imagine. The temptation is great, however, to ask with "outsider" whether Mr. Spencer thoroughly understands his own theory? In my humble opinion the late Stephen Pearl Andrews has left a more formal scientific statement of the general character of evolution than that formulated by Mr. Spencer. According to Mr. Andrews there are only three fundamental principles in the universe. These are unism, duism, and trinism, because they are derived from and stand definitely related to the numbers one, two, and three respectively. The first two of these three principles, unism and duism, crop out and reappear under many forms, and in the absence heretofore of any sufficiently compendious generalization they have received a variety of namings. Thus, unism is called unity, sameness, centralizing or centrifugal tendency, gravitation, arrival, conjunction, thesis or synthesis, integration, combination, contraction, generality, simplicity, &c. It is the tendency to unite or toward unity, or the manifestation of the presence or results of that tendency in thousands of modes, in every sphere of being.

Duism is called diversity, difference or variety, decentralizing or centrifugal tendency, repulsion, departure, separation, antithesis, differentiation, diffusion, expansion, specialization, complexity, &c. It is the tendency to dispersing or dividing, or the manifestation of the presence or results of that tendency in thousands of modes, in every sphere of being. By its nature it not only departs from the unism, but it also bifurcates or divides in departing into two (or more) branches, like the tines of a fork, and in all senses manifests an inherent alliance with plurality, and primarily or typically with the number two.

Trinism is the principle symbolized by the totality of being, or of any particular being. It is composed of unism and duism as factors, constituents or elements like the handle of the fork, which is one, on the one hand, and the tines of the fork, which are two, (or more,) on the other hand. Trinism, therefore, the type or representation of the whole fork or other compound and resultant object, and so of all concrete or real being—unism and duism being abstract elements of being merely, or, as it were, parts not united in any whole.

NEW YORK, Tuesday, April 8, 1890.

H. L. P.
WHERE SPENCER FAILS.

THE FUTILITY OF ANY ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE SCIENCE AND RELIGION--THEIR ABSOLUTE DISSIMILARITY.

To the Editor of the New-York Times:

In response to your courteous request for a free and fair discussion of Herbert Spencer's philosophy, I should like to say a few words from a point of view which has hitherto been taken, either by "Outsider" or by his numerous opponents. It is my intention to attack the position of Mr. Spencer, and also to show that the ground taken by "Outsider" is essentially indefensible. To this latter fact, viz., that your contributor's attack was, though professedly and unfaith, it is due, I think, that you have not, as you say, been able to get a fuller expression of opinion from those thinkers who differ squarely with the conclusions of the Spencerian philosophy. To any fair-minded man the article by "Outsider" was primarily a misstatement of Mr. Spencer's principles, and secondarily a presumptuous series of questions which might very easily have been answered by a somewhat casual perusal of his writings. As to the misstatement in regard to Mr. Spencer's principles, I refer any one to "Outsider"'s peculiar conclusion that Mr. Spencer believes that truth is to be deduced from mere opinions. It has been amply proved by one of your contributors of last Sunday that Mr. Spencer is, in the paragraph quoted by "Outsider," merely emphasizing the fact that, as he says, "we too often forget that not only is there a soul of goodness in things evil, but very generally also a soul of truth in things erroneous." Does this not make it plain that "Outsider" has done Mr. Spencer a great disservice in representing his teaching to be that truth is a sort of being down and skimming of opinion, in which the belief of the Fiji Islander and that of the learned college professor would have an equal influence?

As to the long series of questions asked of Spencer's defenders, it is hard for me to see how their answers could in any way throw light upon the question of who is a philosopher or his adherents point blank "if his system is logically put together," or to ask "if he fully understands his own theory," seems to me about as logical as to ask a man if he is a fool or a knave. In the same way the other questions asked of Spencer's opponents--with one exception--would only bring forth a statement of their opinions without touching upon the matter of soundness or unsoundness. In fact, toward the very end of his article, "Outsider" himself seems to tire of his fruitless quest and exclaims, "enough of these questions?" and then goes on to say that any thing which can possibly bring light upon the subject of what Spencer means--a demonstration that Spencer will bear the test--the application of that "touchstone of a scientific theory," "successful prediction." Hence it is true "Outsider" approaches the legitimate realms of philosophical discussion and proves by his own article the soundness of Mr. Spencer's dictum that there is a soul of truth in things most erroneous.

Let us now turn our attention to Mr. Spencer. If as a scientific theory or as the statement of such we are to judge his work by its fruits in the shape of verified predictions, in what way are we to judge of that work when regarded as true for the fact of its application? It is in the answer to this question that the vital interest of the subject lies. It must be emulated that as a statement of scientific theory, and especially of the theory of evolution, Spencer's philosophy has no equal. Its scientific predictions have been fulfilled. Its statement of scientific fact, its classification of social, moral, and physical phenomena have been more useful, more generally accepted and more complete than that of any other modern thinker. But it is not here that we must look for the most important feature of his originality which, if sound, renders him the great original thinker of the age is his "reconciliation of science and religion" on a basis which may be accepted by both. And here it is that Mr. Spencer fails.

His scientific religion is no more religion than the religious science of the Middle Ages was science. His reconciliation of the two realms of thought reminds one very forcibly of the reconciliation described by the ancient preacher in his prophecy of the millennium, "the lion and the lamb shall lie down together." No one knows what the lion and the lamb are like, but it is fair to presume that the last will be on the inside. Let us see if this reconciliation is a true one. In order to have a reconciliation it is evidently necessary that there should first exist a real antagonism. Has such an antagonism ever existed? Or has not the antagonism which has always apparently existed between scientific and religious theories been, in fact, the struggle of the inquirer against the scientific and religious forces that were, and have been, the advance of science found its greatest opponent? When has religion met its most powerful foe? The bigot scientist who tenaciously clings to the theories of materialism, the religious fanatic who closes his eyes to the true source of light--are not these yet the two elements the real representatives of that army with which both true religion and true science have been ever at war? It is natural, of course, that in the inanity of speculation there should have been a confusion between the ideas of religion and a materialistic philosophy. It is impossible to say, "Is it a search for a fair definition of what is religion? Is it in an inquiry into the causes of things? Is it in the solution of the mystery of creation? Is it an attempt to explain the nature of good and evil--of happiness and misery? Some people have held it cannot be all of these. It is not what which leads us to ask, Why? or Whither? It is, on the contrary, the inconsiderate acceptance and worship of belief that is the real intelligence than our own. It is the perception unconscious of what we call the intelligent and divine in ourselves and in the operations of the universe. Religion having received thus its foundations from a purely intuitive, involuntary
impression, proceeds to erect upon it a theology which, though partaking of scientific method to some degree, is not, in the strict sense of the word, a science; for it accepts the basis of its structure as taken for granted and does not attempt demonstration by experiment.

On the other hand, what is science? It is an inquiry for explanation; it is a never-satisfied search for fixed relations, whether it be in the mind of man or in the world of matter. It examines all things. It searches even the ground of religious belief, it subjects everything to the crucible, to the scales, and to the senses. It takes nothing for granted except temporarily in the shape of hypothesis and accepts the truth of nothing which may not at any time be demonstrated by experiment. It is this tendency of science to search all things which is perhaps responsible for the prevalent belief that it is hostile to religion. It has often explored the field whence religion was receiving its inspiration, and its own advocates (actuated by what was really a religious impulse) have so often attacked religion, that a mis-conception has arisen.

It has been forgotten that, on account of the inherent differences in the nature of the two realms of thought, it would be an impossible task to express the subject matter of religion in terms of science as it would be to express the perception of beauty in terms of chemistry.

It may be asked, is not science merely the statement of truth, methodically arranged, the legitimate results of accurate observation? And does not religious truth come within its proper domain, therefore? Are we not called upon to dominate religious truths, the materialist asks, and, if we are not, how are we to distinguish the true religion from the false? To this I reply that science proper has for its aim the statement of truth, but not the statement of all truth. It may be perfectly true that the modern lover of child, that the home of one's youth has about it ever a halo of loveliness, that some great palm grove which would strike one with such strength and arouses in us such emotions that we lack words to describe them, but even the mere statement of any of these truths is not a scientific statement. There are lines, however, in which these facts may take on a scientific significance, may be used as the bases of scientific demonstration, it is not, however, on this basis that I conclude that when being used in this way they are entirely the same as when viewed by themselves. They have, as it were, been uprooted and brought into the laboratory, and though science may accurately dissect, diagram, and describe that which its instruments are able to reach, the original reality as it was involuntarily revealed by the mind is too subtle, too delicate in its nature to admit of scientific treatment. Science always laborers with the dead and inert idea. It is obliged to capture the creatures of thought before it can arrive at these conclusions. Religion, on the other hand, receives the initial splendor of the reality as the subject matter of its work, and that reality produces in the receptive mind an involuntary feeling of the outward intelligent cause. Religion follows the bird of thought on the wing—it rests in the bosom of the flower and perceives, or rather receives, that which is beyond the reach of measuring machines.

But, then, how distinguish between the true and the false religion, for it must be admitted that religions differ in their conclusions? And here comes in the method of religious reasoning, the laws of theologic thought, which, as I have already said, partake to some extent of the scientific method. I mean by this, not that there is in reality a scientific element introduced, but that, owing to the limitations of human language and the powerlessness of words to express religious primary impressions, it becomes necessary to use a vocabulary which is tinged with the scientific sense in which it has originally been used. It is also necessary to follow, in using these terms, the technical laws of logic by which they are governed. Thus, abiding in its outward forms of expression by the laws of science, it seems at first sight as if the reasoning of theology by which it is conducted is in religious conclusions in a scientific method. But closer examination will show that it is not so. The real process of the mind by which error is removed from religious speculation is similar to that by which it receives its primary impressions, i.e., by the force of its convictions, and that system of religion must be nearest absolute religious truth from which the element of voluntary conviction is most entirely banished.

I hope I have been able to give some idea of the absolute dissimilarity of religion and science, and therefore of the impossibility of any conflict between them. If, then, there can be rationally no conflict between religion and science, there can be no reconciliation, and any attempt to bring about such a result must be irrational. To gain such an end, it would be necessary either to drag science into the sphere of religion, as was done by early preachers, or to drag religion into the sphere of science, as has been attempted by Mr. Spooner.

We may fairly conclude, then, that he has failed in that one portion of his work which would make him a component as a philosopher and thinker. For, while having contributed to the advancement of science, he has not succeeded in removing the confusion in which religious and scientific thought has been chaoticly mingled. He has simple attempted to annihilate a distinctive entity by casting it into the mass of all-devouring science.

S. D. R.