THE OPEN COURT.

thinking" or of free enquiry, but an unconditional devotion to truth. Does science demand free thinking? Perhaps the answer may be "yes," and there can be no objection provided that free-thinking means free enquirv and the absence of all compulsion. But the free-thinking that is demanded by science means at the same time an absolute obedience to the laws of thought. The same free-thinking, which is at the same time an unconditional surrender to truth, is the cardinal demand of religion. The great reformer Martin Luther called it the freedom of conscience and considered it as the most precious prerogative of a Christian.

The Open Court does not propound science with certain Christian or Moslem or Buddhist doctrines. This would be absurd and such an undertaking would justify a severe criticism, for it would be truly a predetermined conclusion in the sense that our critics intend. It would "imply a defect of intellectual integrity and undermine the moral health." Autocracy and individualism are reconcilable, but socialism and individualism are reconcilable. Order and liberty are not such deadly enemies as may appear at first sight. Superstition and science are reconcilable, but religion and science are not reconcilable. Indeed, the history of religious progress is a constant conciliation between science and religion.

Religion and science, it is maintained, must "seek each a self-development in its own interest." Certainly it must, but this does not preclude that which we deem to be religious truth being constantly examined before the tribunal of science, and that which we deem to be scientific truth being constantly referred to religion. Our critics seem to have no objection to religious truth and science coming into accord, but he proposes to wait until they approach completion. If this maxim were universally adopted, there would be no progress in the development of religion. Is it a "completion" a very relative state? Waiting for completion would be about equivalent to stopping all social reform until mankind has reached the millennium. Every social reform is a step onward along the path to the millennium, and every conciliation between science and religion is a step onward in the revelation of living truth.

The religion of the middle ages was a religion of dualism, it proposed the duality of truth. The religion of the future will be a religion of Monism; and what means Monism? Monism means unity of truth. Truth is indivisible. It never contradicts itself, for there is but one truth and that one truth is eternal.

A SHEEPISH TAX.

The : i is a good deal of romance about the shepherd with his pipe and crook. Our American shepherd's crook, however, throws too heavy a burden of taxation upon our people; and we pay him exorbitantly for piping the tune to which we all have to dance. How badly the poor are fleeced to enrich the wool-grower, was shown in my previous article, and I now wish to show how the tax for his benefit is actually collected, and also what effect it has upon the prosperity of manufactures and on rates of wages in factories.

This duty, in the case of merino and other fine wool, such as is used for clothing, is ten cents a pound for grades not worth more than thirty cents a pound; for more costly grades the rate is twelve cents; and the average increase of price in consequence is fifty per cent. Coarse wool, used for carpets, is taxed two and a half or five cents a pound, according to value; and in this case the duty amounts on the average to about twenty-five per cent. The result is higher prices of American as well as foreign wool, and also of all woolen goods, wherever manufactured. This is precisely the way in which the duty was meant to be set, and if it did not work so, it would be abolished at once. The duty on wool was intended for the benefit of the grower; and the only way it can help him is by keeping up the price of his fleece. His gain is his neighbor's loss. Even protectionists admit that "protection raises prices," and they would not want it if it did not.

It is estimated that one-half of all the wool used in America is imported, partly in the form of woollen cloth. In taxing the half which is imported, government raises the price of the half which is grown here also, and of all the woolen goods sold in America. Every dollar thus raised by the government costs the people two dollars, one of which goes as an extra profit to the wool grower, who could not be protected otherwise. This makes the tax on wool twice as oppressive as if it were laid on articles not produced in this country, like rough diamonds. They come in free of duty; but every dollar taken from our people by taxing them would go straight to the government. It must also be noticed that this tax on wool is not intended to protect the manufacturer in the least; and its actual effort is to make him pay twenty-five or fifty per cent. more for his wool than his rivals do abroad. Every other nation which has factories lets them have wool and other raw materials free of duty.

Our National Association of Wool Manufacturers complained, some years ago, that they were thus put under "disadvantages from which our foreign competitors are safely exempt;" and the Wool Consumers' Association, largely made up of owners of factories in New England, has asked in vain of Congress, that American industry may be relieved from this un-
condition of our nerve-activity. It is not the cause of a man's will, but it is the expression of a certain state of mind. Still, as conditions, wills will be followed by an act of will, be it a real muscular movement or a spoken word, which of course is muscular motion in this case.

Every idea considered not as mere feeling but as a brain-structure fitted to serve as an irritation to action—will, let us say—will, if not inhibited, pass into an act, whether it be correlated with consciousness or not. Consciousness itself is, then, the motion that causes all the effects of nervous irritation, it is not the agency that discharges the inner

for contracting the muscles. It is a phenomenon of the physiological process of a nervous transmission through the ganglia. It is not the shadow that makes our body move; it is the motion of the body. And the shadow accomp-
sames the movement. It is the tickling of the pendulum that sets the wheels of the clock in motion, but the swinging of the motion of this clock is produced by the weight of the mass which is trans-
ferred to the pendulum in the form of vibrations. The motion of our limbs is caused through the transmission of a nervous perturbation, setting free a part of the potential energy stored up in our motor nerves and in our muscles; but there is, properly speaking, no consciousness of our "will," no change of "feeling" into "motion."

Thus we compare consciousness to the ticking of a pendulum, which, while it is a phenomenon that maintains consciousness as superficial and indifferent as the ticking of a pendulum. We merely express in this way our idea of the actual state of mind. Although consciousness is in desistute of motor power, it is in every-

less of paramount importance. There is existing re-
duction, which we are perhaps capable of. The supple-

ficiency in the construction of man's mind?

Consciousness may be compared to a light. It af-

in to utilize the possibilities of the light. The light in a machine will en-

able the attendant engineer properly to regulate the motion of the engine. All the machinery has nootive power upon the wheels and a piston, so as to set the engine into action. If the engineer in his work without light, but the expert knows how to direct the lever even in the dark. The consciousness of mental states is indeed indispens-

able to enable the man to control the world. But it does not possess motor power.

There appears the same time ago in The Open Court an interesting discussion, conducted on both sides with great ability, between Professor E. D. Cope and Dr. Montgomery on the subject "Can Mind move Matter?" Professor Cope answered the question in the affirmative, and Dr. Montgomery in the negative. But it appears that both used the word "mind" in a synonymous manner. Does consciousness enable the mind to control cer-
nal motions of matter? (to Prof. Cope understood the question) we should answer with Professor Cope in the affirmative.

We understand by mind, as the term is generally understood, the mental properties of a man. It is a synecdoche of soul, and the soul. Now mind as understood by a special function of a special function, the faculty of which is the power of consciousness. The expression "soul" appears in this sense.

able, if we think of emotions chiefly, while "mind" is used to signify man's thinking organ, not as mere form pure and simple, nor as mere feeling, as mere consciousness, which as a matter of course exists as an abstract concept only, but as real brain structure, in the sense of living nerve substance of a special form, wrought with potential energy, and representing a special combination of ideas. There can be in that case no doubt about it that mind does move matter. Hence "soul" means the Romm peet, and it is a very old truth. The faculty of planning for itself, of deciding on the end, of controlling circumstances in a way that enables him to control the world.

THE SUPERSCIENTIFIC AND PURE REASON.

Fundamental Problems, we have, been a surprise to a re-

part of the viewer appear to me of sufficient importance to be discussed in detail. This supersedes the ACTIVE THINKING AND THE CONDITIONS OF SCIENCE.

The reviewer says of the book: "The reviewer is looking for an answer to the question of the ultimate nature of the reality of the universe. The reviewer questions the validity of the concept of "absolute" in the sense of the ultimate nature of reality. The reviewer raises the question of whether the concept of "absolute" is not an illusion.

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The reviewer of the book is looking for an answer to the question of the ultimate nature of the reality of the universe. The reviewer questions the validity of the concept of "absolute" in the sense of the ultimate nature of reality. The reviewer raises the question of whether the concept of "absolute" is not an illusion.
Formal thought not only aids us in the manipulation of the data of experience; it also assists in the amplification of knowledge. It is a wonderful quality which makes formal thought so valuable. For the laws of formal thought possess universality and rigidity (a formalization and decontextualization, and again, it is this wonderful quality—apparently mysterious and yet founded in the nature of form—which formal thought does that some old name, "a priori," because we know all formal laws that hold, good under any circumstances. We know that twice two are four and will be four as long as the concepts hold and even longer. A revision of the formal laws is incoercible; for, surely, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the formal laws. They are irrefragable, and all the changes that are taking place around us are nothing but a constant fulfillment of the formal laws.

Lucas did not recognize the all-importance of the formal element in experience—for pure results is nothing but a system of the formalism of experience. Nevertheless, the main principle of his method, viz., that experience is the source of all knowledge, has rather been confirmed than refuted in the further progress of philosophy.

Pure Sensus, or the mental function of formal thought does not mean opposition and still less in contradiction to experience. It has grown from experience and is an integral part of experience in the sense defined above. For we understand by pure reason agreement with the formal laws of existence. The forms of things, the relations among them are also data of experience; they are not shaped by us with arbitrary liberty, they are given to us by experience. We are in them our minds in the forms of our thought; we have abstracted the laws of formal thought by reflection and introspection. The formal element was imputed into our minds together with the sense-impressions. We do not deny that more refined sense-impressions cannot generate knowledge; and we must not look for the causes of the greater relation of sense-impressions, but for the formal and relational element, which is imparted to sensation through a constant expression of sense-impressions of various forms. The formal accordingly is ultimately derived both from sensory sources, but nevertheless from experience. It has been gained by abstraction; i.e., we have arrived at it by omitting in our experience the sensory element and by reducing the formal alone.

CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE DISCUSSION "MUSION IMUNITABLE".

By Dr. Montgomery.

I. I recur the importance of the subject involved in our philosophical passages of arms justifies another round, which I hope you will not decline.

Of course, I did not expect we would come to an understanding regarding fundamental principles. Indeed, it was certain that my old-fashioned view of what Morism should be, could not find favor with your more modern ideas. But I failed to foresee that you would be able so easily to express the absurdity of all my statements in which I endeavored to convey my thought, or rather the conclusion of thought of which you have superabundantly convinced me. No, rather, that, after an unsavory deluge of reproof (Skeptics), I found myself stranded, as you say, "in a vast labyrinth in which I have lost my way"; and, worst of all, without any species of thought saved for future generation.

Often before misgivings overtake me, that, in the philosophical isolation in which I am passing my days, I was losing the guiding thread that leads out of the maze of contradictory opinions in progressive and consistent views. But from time to time kind friends were good enough to reassure me to some extent. Not long