WHAT DOES ANSCHAUUNG MEAN?

Mr. Spencer's erroneous statement that Kant conceives space and time as forms of thought instead of forms of intuition induces me to make a few explanatory remarks concerning the term *Anschauung*.

Kant means that space and time are immediately given in experience and not inferences drawn from the data of experience; they are not thoughts, but objects of direct perception.

Sense-impressions are data, they are prior to ideas, the latter being constructions made out of sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are facts, but ideas are of an inferential nature; they are (to use Lloyd Morgan's excellent term) constructs. Now Kant claims that space and time are in the same predicament: they also are immediately given, they also are *Anschauungen*. Kant did not trouble himself much to prove that they are forms; he seems to have taken that for granted. But he was very careful to show that they are not ideas, not thoughts, not abstractions, not generalisations, but that they are as direct data as are sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man has by directly facing the object of knowledge "*Anschauung*."

The conclusion which Kant draws from this may be characterised as follows:

Sensations are not things but appearances; they are subjective, not objective, they are not the objects themselves but what our sensibility makes of objects. Space and time being *Anschauungen*, Kant argues that they are of the same kind as the sense-data of knowledge, that they are inherent in our nature. Thus Kant maintains:
"Sensations are the products of our sensibility, and space and time are the forms of our sensibility."

The word *Anschauung* has been a *crux interpretum* since translations have been made from Kant, and it is quite true that no adequate word to express it, exists in English. I enjoyed of late a discussion on the subject with Mr. Francis C. Russell who called my attention to several notes in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. The following is from the pen of Dr. W. T. Harris (Vol. II, p. 291):

"Through a singular chance, the present number of the *Journal* contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word *Anschauung*. Mr. Kroeger holds that the word *Anschauung* as used by Fichte and also by Kant, denotes an act of the Ego which the English word *intuition* does not, at all express, but for which the English word 'contemplation' is an exact equivalent. Mr. Peirce says that no person whose native tongue is English will translate *Anschauung* by another word than *intuition*. Whether there is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German on the other, the editor does not care to inquire. It is certain that while intuition has been adopted generally as an equivalent for the word under consideration both by English and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb *intuiere* (at least in the Dictionaries), and the reader will find that the verb used by Meiklejohn in *the translation of Kant's *Critique* for it, is *contemplate*, and the same rendering is given by Smith in his excellent translation of Fichte's *Popular Works* (London, 1899)."

Mr. Charles S. Peirce says:

"No person whose native tongue is English will need to be informed that contemplation is essentially (1) protracted (2) voluntary, and (3) an action, and that it is never used for that which is set forth to the mind in this act. A foreigner can convince himself of this by the proper study of English writers. Thus, Locke (Ed. say concerning Human Understanding, Book II., chap. 19, § 3) says: 'If it [an idea] be held there [in view] long under attentive consideration, 'tis contemplation'; and again, (ibid., Book II., chap. 10, § 3) 'Keeping the idea, which is brought into it [the mind] for some time actually in view, which is called contemplation.' This term is therefore unfitted to translate *Anschauung*; for this latter does not imply an act which is necessarily protracted or voluntary, and denotes most usually a mental presentation, sometimes a faculty, less often the reception of an impression in the mind, and seldom, if ever, an action.

'To the translation of *Anschauung* by intuition, there is, at least, no such insufferable objection. Etymologically the two words precisely correspond. The original philosophical meaning of intuition was a cognition of the present manifold in that character; and it is now commonly used, as a modern writer says, 'to in-

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"What does *Anschauung* mean?"

What does *Anschauung* mean? Certainly, all the products of the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties: every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual thing, act, or state of mind, presumed under the condition of distinct existence in space and time. Finally, we have the authority of Kant's own example for translating his *Anschauung* by *Intuition*; and, indeed, this is the common usage of German writing Latin. Moreover, *intuition* frequently replaces *anschauen* or *anschauet*. If this constitutes a misunderstanding of Kant, it is one which is shared by himself and nearly all his countrymen (ibid., p. 152 et seq.).

Mr. Peirce adds the following explanation concerning the term intuition in another note (ibid., p. 101):

"The word *intuitio* first occurs as a technical term in St. Anselm's *Monologium*. He wished to distinguish between our knowledge of God and our knowledge of finite things (and, in the next world, of God, also); and thinking of the saying of St. Paul, *Vidimus non per speculandum in imaginem, non autem faciem in eum*, he called the former *speculation* and the latter *intuition*. This use of *speculation* did not take root, because that word already had another exact and widely different meaning.

In the middle ages, the term *intuitive cognition* had two principal senses, 1st, as opposed to abstractive cognition, it meant the knowledge of the present as present, and this is its meaning in Anselm; but 2d, as no intuitive cognition was allowed to be determined by a previous cognition, came to be used as the opposite of discursive cognition (see Scotus. In sentent., lib. 2, dist. 3, q. 9). This is nearly the sense in which I employ it. This is also nearly the sense in which Kant uses it, the former distinction being expressed by his *einem* and *nun-seinem*.

(See Werke, herausg. Rosenkranz, T. 6, p. 771, 31, 41, 100, u. s.w.)

"An enumeration of the meanings of intuition may be found in Hamilton's *Reid* p. 759."

If we have to choose between the two translations "intuition" and "contemplation," we should with Mr. Peirce decidedly prefer the word "intuition." The word contemplation corresponds to the German *Betrachtung* and all that Mr. Peirce says against it holds good. But we must confess that the term intuition (as Mr. Peirce himself seems to grant) is not a very good translation either. The term intuition has other meanings which interfere with the correct meaning of *Anschauung* and was actually productive of much confusion.

The English term *intuition* is strongly tinged with the same meaning that is attached to the German word *Intuition*. It means an inexplicable kind of direct information from some supernatural sources, which mystics claim to possess as the means of their rev-
relations. In this sense Goethe characterizes it satirically in Faust (Scene XIV). Mephistopheles describes the process as follows:

A blessing drawn from supernatural fountains,
In night and day to lie upon the mountains;
All Heaven and Earth in rapture penetrating,
Thyself to Godhood haughtily inflating:
To groan with yearning force through Earth's dark marrow,
Compress the six days' work within thy bosom narrow.
To taste, I know not what, in haughty power.
Thine own ecstatic life on all things shower.
Thine earthly self behind thee cast.
And then the lofty intuition [with a gesture] at last.

The satire is good on Intuition but it would not apply to Anschauung, for the latter word excludes rigidly any mysticism or supernaturalism which the former essentially involves. To employ the term "intuition" for both ideas must necessarily weaken the meaning of Anschauung.

Besides we should bear in mind that the German Anschauung is vernacular and should find a correspondent Saxon word. Such Latin words as intuition convey in English as much as in German the impression of being terms denoting something very abstract. Vernacular terms much more strongly indicate the immediateness and directness which is implied in Anschauung. In my conversation with Mr. Russell, we tried to coin a new word that should cover the meaning of Anschauung as an act of "at-sight" and the word "at-sight" readily suggested itself.

The word "at-sight" is an exact English equivalent of the German Anschauung. It describes the looking at an object in its immediate presence. At the same time the word is readily understood, while philosophically considered, its formation is fully justified by the existence of the words "insight and foresight."

One of the most important of Kant's doctrines is the proposition that all thought must ultimately have reference to Anschauung, i.e. to at-sight. Through at-sight only the objects of experience can be given us. All speculations not founded upon this bottom rock of knowledge are mere dreams. This is the maxim of positivism and it is the basis of all sound philosophy. Says Kant in the "Anhang" to his Prolegomena (in reply to a critic who had misunderstood his idealism) as a summary statement of his views:

"Der Satz aller echten Idealisten, von der deutschen Schule an bis zum Bischof Berkeley, ist in dieser Formulierung: alle Erkenntnis durch Sinne und Erfahrung ist nichts als deuter Schein, und nur in dem Unverstand und Vernunft ist Wahrheit."

"Der Grundbegriff der meinen Idealismus durchwegs gegen und bestreut, ist dasjenige: als Erkenntnis von Ding, aus bloßem reiner Verstande, ohne Versuch, ist nichts als deuter Schein, und nur in der Erfahrung ist Wahrheit."

"The doctrine of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic School down to Bishop Berkeley is contained in this formula: All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but illusion; and in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason alone is truth.

"The principle, however, that rules and determines my idealism throughout is this: All cognition out of pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but mere illusion and in experience alone is truth."

Kant then proposes in order to avoid equivocation to call his views "formal or critical idealism," adding that his idealism made any other idealism impossible. Criticism truly is the beginning of philosophy as an objective science. It gives the coup de grace to those worthless declamations which still pass among many as philosophy. Says Kant:

"So viel ist gewiss: war einmal Kritik, gehörte zum Schalt auf einen alles dogmatische Gewinde."

"That much is certain: He who once tasted critique will be forever disgusted with all dogmatic riddles."

It is strange that in spite of Kant's explicit declaration, which leaves no doubt about the positive spirit that pervades the principles of his philosophy, he is still misunderstood by his opponents, no less than by those who profess to be his disciples.

There is no occasion now to treat the subject exhaustively, but it may be permitted to add a few remarks on Kant's proposition that space and time are at-sights.

We must distinguish three things:

1) Objective space.
2) Space as atsight; and
3) Space-conception.

Space as atsight is the datum. It is the immediate presence of relations among the sensory impressions. This, however, is not as yet that something which we generally call space. That which generally goes by the name of space is a construction built out of the relational data that obtain in experience and we propose to call it space-conception. Our space-conception, accordingly, (and here I include the mathematician's space-conception) is based upon space as atsight, but it is more than atsight. It is an inference made therefrom, it is the product of experience. Space-conception, however, is as are all legitimate noumena, no mere subjective illusion, it possesses objective validity; it describes some real existence and this real existence represented in space-conception is what may be called objective space.

Objective space is the form of reality. Space as atsight is the form of sensibility. Space as space-conception is a construct of an abstract nature and serves as a description or plan of the form of reality.

The same is true of Time. Time as atsight is the relation of succession obtaining in the changes of experience. Time as time-conception is the noumenon constructed out of these data to represent that feature of reality which may for lack of a better term be called objective time.

Briefly: Space and Time are not things, not essences, not entities, but certain features of existence. They are the forms of reality. When existence finds a representation in the feelings of a sentient being, time and space appear as their forms, and these forms furnish the material out of which are built the conceptions of Space and Time.