it represent a uniform process, that it has been built up into a fixed belief as a result of the experimental method, and that it be significant for the direction of rational conduct.

The system is thus opposed to a pure sensationism or voluntarism, but it would restrict the field of metaphysics to problems capable of solution by experimental methods.

What is the significance in this system of immediate experience and purpose? The test of a concept, at least, is that it be absolutely general, that it be indifferent to special purposes or circumstances, and the test of belief and so of truth is that it be fixed as a result of a process which is destined and is uninfluenced by individual aberration. If the reviewer correctly interprets certain forms of Pragmatism as making the criterion of truth significance for present purpose and not purpose in general, we would apparently have here a point of difference. If this process of fixation is to be absolute, must not all problems be settled before we can have a fixed belief, and so truth, and so reality of this type? Since belief tends to become unconscious as it becomes fixed, would not our text not only be in the future instead of the present, but also point to a condition of things in which experience itself had ceased to have significance and even to exist?

Reality is defined in terms of independence of what you or I may think about it, and fixed belief and so truth is said to represent reality. Probably Mr. Peirce does not intend to imply a correspondence test of truth, but if not, we still seem to have the difficulty cited above in regard to the test requiring a transcendence of individual and possibly of all experience.

Henry A. Ruger.

The Herbert Spencer Lecture. Delivered at Oxford. March 9, 1905, by

Though Mr. Harrison is not a Spencerian, but a Positivist, this lecture was not intended to be controversial. By universal agreement Spencer must be rated a great philosopher; and, further, as a man with a purpose in life, from which he could not be distracted, and in which he persevered through an unrelenting pressure of physical ailments, a character of a very noble type. He is the only English synthetic philosopher. How much of his system, then, can be taken as permanent?

Spencer's definition of philosophy is correct. Philosophy is the generalization of all the sciences into their ultimate coordination. And synthesis means coordination. So far Spencer and Comte agree. Evolution (not in a sense commensurate with Darwinism) is Spencer's synthetic principle. But is philosophy the science of the sciences; is such a correlation of human knowledge either possible or needful? The vogue of Spencer, the craving of the mind for some coherent system, would indicate that an ultimate generalization of human science is possible.

But, again, is Spencer's generalization the correct one, and destined