he can establish, serves the purpose of enhancing his life. Accordingly the most important part of every philosophy will always be its pragmatical aspect, and this is a truth which has been recognized since time immemorial, except that now and then it is forgotten. The easiest way to reconstruct the several philosophies of past ages will be to point out the needs of the generation, the duties with which it was confronted, the tasks which had to be performed, and if we bear these practical points in mind we are not likely to misunderstand if in one period emphasis is placed on one special aspect of the truth, while at another the very opposite may come to the fore-ground. And this is true mainly in those branches of philosophy which are of a practical nature, ethics, pedagogy, religion, the policy of the churches, political economy, etc. Pragmatism as a philosophy is an evidence of this. In emphasizing the practical significance of truth, it goes so far as even to deny the value of theory, of consistency, systematization, etc., and when taken to task, Professor James naively declares that the old definition of truth has to be taken for granted.

Editor.
CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

A GERMAN CRITIC OF PRAGMATISM.

Ludwig Stein of Berne, editor of the Archiv für systematische Philosophie, publishes a criticism of pragmatism in a recent number of his periodical (XIV, Part II). His summary of the history of the word will be interesting both to pragmatists and to people in general who are interested in pragmatism, for he points out that pragmatism is not even "a new name for some old ways of thinking, but that both the pragmatic method and the name in its most modern sense are ancient." He says (pp. 143-5):

"The expressions _pragma_ and _pragmateia_ occur in Plato's dialogue Cratylus, but especially in the logical writings of Aristotle (see the Aristotelian Index of Bonitz) as frequently as they are rare in post-Aristotelian, particularly in the pre-Socratic, philosophy. The meaning of the word _pragma_ varies between 'thing,' 'object' and 'reality'....

"According to Aristotle the linguistic phonetic symbol_ bears the same relation to the concept_ as the name_ bears to the object._ In this case the word _pragma_ means the concrete individual object. Aristotle shows perfectly the distinction between figures and phonetic symbols (De soph. elench., cap. I, p. 165a, 7). He says that we can never cognize things (_pragma_), but we only utilize names as symbols of things. Therefore we erroneously confuse the name and the thing it stands for in that when performing calculations as in the cryptic code we substitute the name for the thing. In the logic of Aristotle the object, _pragma_, plays an important rôle in opposition to the name _onoma_. The Aristotelian Index of Bonitz enumerates dozens of passages under the catch-words _pragma_, _pragmateia_, and _pragmatesthai_. Once even the expression _pragmatologism_ appears (1439b 20). The opposition between _pragma_ and _onoma_ seems to have been familiar in Socratic circles presumably even as early as in the time of the Sophists....

"However, with Aristotle we find the expression _pragma_ used also in the very same meaning which Peirce and James assign to the word to-day. Aristotle sometimes understands by it the real empirical fact in opposition to that which is merely thought, that is to say, pure thought-entities (_entia rationis_). In his logical writings and in the Metaphysics Aristotle distinguishes repeatedly between the ideal and the real._

On page 148 Professor Stein criticizes James's etymology of the term _praxis_ as "at least one-sided." He goes on to say:

"This is the definition given by the greatest leader of the Stoics, Chrysippus, according to Laertius Diogenes (VII, 94); good is that which is morally useful, and evil is that which is morally harmful. The question of the _telos_ is the central point of their ethics. Every good, we read, (loc. cit. VII, 98) is profitable. We call that profitable which is of use to us._ Since Aristotle had made the statement that in nature there is nothing useless and nothing happens in vain, the Stoics caricature this utilitarian principle to the point of absolute folly. In Chrysippus utility degenerates to a farce. According to Cicero (De Natura Deorum 13, 37), everything exists in the world only for the sake of the gods and man: the horse for riding; the ox for plowing; the dog for hunting and watching. The gradation of creatures is equally utilitarian with a view toward the benefit of the human race which comprises the center of the universe, as the human community itself is derived and founded for purely utilitarian ends (Cicero, De Finibus, III, 20, 67). And so accordingly the real founder of pragmatism, Peirce, refers to the connection of his ideas with those of the Stoics.

"In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, II, 383, under the catch-word "Pragmatism" the originators of the term, Peirce and James, give their position. Etymologically the following derivation is given: 'Pragmatism (Gr. _pragmatikos_; versed in affairs). This derivation as shown above is historically untenable. Only _pragma_ and _pragmateia_ are customary terms, not _pragmatikos_. Then, too, _pragma_ in Plato and Aristotle never means 'versed in affairs,' that is to say, versatile, skilful, intelligent, ex-
experienced: but first of all it means an object or thing in opposition to a name or phonetic symbol. In post-Aristotelian philosophy indeed the expression pragma or pragmateia disappears from use. In the <i>Doxographi Graeci</i> of H. Diels this expression occurs in only half a dozen passages in all. The later the word pragma is used the more the emphasis is laid upon the practical meaning which has been pushed to the foreground by Peirce and James, and in general the post-Aristotelian philosophy shifts the center of gravity from theory to practice; from logic and physics to ethics. The good is no longer referred to the true but the true is referred to the good. And this is the kernel of the pragmatism of Peirce and James.

"Consequences" are the decisive epistemological viewpoint of Peirce and James. Exactly as we have recognized an ethics of consequence ever since the first utilitarians, the Cynicans or hetairoi, that is to say, the ethics of utility, later so called by Bentham and Mill, there lies in pragmatism an attempt to formulate a logic of consequence. Let James's definition be placed side by side with that above given by Peirce (Peirce has repeated his definition in "Haldane's Dictionary s. v. 'Pragmism'). Pragmatism is, according to James, "the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of the conception expresses itself in practical consequences" (the italics are mine). Consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in that of experience to be expected, if the conception is true...

"The expression 'pragmatic' had a historical sound long before Peirce used it. The 'pragmatic sanction' of Charles VI established the Aristotelian succession according to the requirements of utility in the interest of principles which served the public welfare, and even in German usage an intelligent foresighted and able person is called a pragmatic fellow (<i>ein pragmatischer Kopf</i>) without any evil secondary meaning. Moreover, the 'pragmatic method' has been naturalized in historiography much longer than Peirce and James imagine. The 'Text Book of the Historical Method' by Ernst Bernheim devotes an entire section to the instructive pragmatic method of history (Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, p. 17 ff.). Bernheim defines the essence of pragmatic historiography as follows: 'At this stage matter does not appear desirable for its own sake alone, but on account of definite practical applications; man must learn something for practical purposes from events of the past.' The first conclusive representative of the pragmatic standpoint is Thucydides. Polybius introduced the term 'pragmatic history'" (Hist. I, cap. 2). The mistakes of the pragmatic method of historiography are subjectivity and a tendency against objectivity. And these are also the reefs along which the philosophical pragmatism of a James or Schiller must steer carefully, as we will show later...

"Where Peirce has picked up the word 'pragmatism,' whether in Kant or in Aristotle, he himself is not aware. The expression apparently was in the air. Peirce himself informs us that thirty years previously in his above mentioned publication he had set in motion the subject although not the word of pragmatism. He had only used this expression in oral conversation until James, who was not acquainted with him when he wrote, The Will to Believe, had appropriated it and put his stamp upon it as a philosophical term. In my book <i>Leibniz und Spinoza</i> (Berlin, Reimer, 1890) I have made the statement that Leibnitz had the same experience with his term 'monad.' It is true he met occasionally with the term in Plato, but it was not until his intercourse with the younger van Helmont at the court of Queen Sophia Charlotte that he definitely appropriated and set in circulation this term whose meaning had been heightened by van Helmont. However, not only did Peirce happen upon the expression 'pragmatism' as a designation of his theory of activity but simultaneously, although quite independently, it was coined by the French thinker Maurice Blondel, the advocate of a 'philosophy of action.' André Lalande in his treatise 'Pragmatism and Pragmatism' (Revue Philosophique, 1906, p. 125) relates how Blondel had answered his question about the discovery of the term pragmatism as follows: 'I proposed the name of pragmatism to myself in the year 1888, and I am conscious of having invented it as I never before had met with the term, etc.' In his work 'Action' he analysed the difference between <i>praxis</i>, <i>pragma</i> and <i>poiesis</i>, and decided upon the expression pragmatism at a time when Peirce had used it only in oral discourse. This duplication of the incident is not surprising, especially since this designation was made obvious by the pragmatic historiography then in vogue. Yet as early as the year 1867 Conrad Herrmann wrote a 'History of Philosophy Treated Pragmatically.' In this Herrmann expresses his opinion on the..."
subject of the pragmatic method in the science of the history of philosophy, that the impression of the pragmatic seemed to him the most suitable for his style of historical representation (Preface, p. viii): 'The expression of the pragmatic indicates in and for itself only the simple real or properly actual in things, and it apparently coincides with the concept of a merely narrative or purely empirical presentation of history' (loc. cit., p. viii). In this connection Herrmann sets himself in conscious opposition to the speculative method of Hegel (p. 463 ff.): 'Pragmatism is the only true scientific principle for the treatment of historical material. The essence of all historical pragmatism is to eliminate chance from history and to place in its stead causative necessity. The pragmatic method should have the individual data to combine in a whole system. Pragmatic historiography should not work with principles but with facts.' In a special essay 'The Pragmatic Sequence in the History of Philosophy,' Conrad Herrmann had previously laid down his program according to which all historical pragmatism should have a definite practical point.' Exactly this 'practical point' James has evidently adopted. He did not need to give a new name to 'old methods,' especially the methods which arose under Thucydides and those theorists among the sophists who advocated the right of might, but the name itself had had a historical ring since the time of Polybius and a philosophical ring ever since Plato and Aristotle.'

According to Stein the trend of pragmatism is a teleological view of the world in contrast to the aetiological view of science now commonly accepted by naturalists. Says Stein (p. 156):

"The kernel of the pragmatic method consists in referring the logical to the teleological. Every method of classifying a thing, says James (The Will to Believe, p. 76) is only a method of applying it to some particular purpose. Concepts and classes are teleological instruments."

Professor Stein says on page 146, that pragmatism is practically neither more nor less than a theory of truth. It proposes a new criterion of truth which gives life and color to this philosophical movement that is spreading with lightning speed. He says:

"This criterion of truth which is found in pragmatism—the utility of cognition, its suitability, its efficiency or power to work—C. S. Peirce himself has formulated clearly and tersely in a later essay ('What Pragmatism Is,' Monist, April 1905, p. 171): 'Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have; then your con-
ception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.' Some years earlier Georg Simmel, whom James indeed claims as a typical pragmatist (with incomparably greater right moreover than R. Eucken whose theory of activity follows Fichte much more closely than Mill and Spencer) in the first volume of the Archiv für systematische Philosophie (1895) found a much terser wording without even knowing the name pragmatism or having in mind this tendency which even then lay potentially in embryo. The treatise, über eine Beziehung der Selektionsstheorie zur Erkenntnistheorie, concludes with the following words which might be placed as a motto for pragmatism: 'The utility of cognition produces at the same time the objects of cognition' (p. 45).

'Simmel sees in the utility of cognition the primary factor which matures certain methods of procedure so that 'originally cognition was not first called true and then useful, but first useful and afterwards true.' This criterion of truth by its tendency towards an act of selection receives from Simmel that biological bent which has prevailed since the appearance in the field of Avenarius and Mach. The thought is essentially Leibnizian. Leibnitz concedes true existence only to that which works (quod agit). In England and America, this criterion of truth has been given the epithet 'instrumental' in contrast to 'normative.'

The tendency is in the air, but Professor James has made himself the standard bearer of the movement. Stein says:

"At first pragmatists sailed under various flags. Those who were of an especially logical turn, originally called themselves 'intentional' or 'instrumental.' James was called a 'radical empiricist' before he brought forward the word in the year 1898 in a lecture before Professor Howison's philosophical union at the University of California, and made a special application of it to religion. (Cf. Pragmatism, p. 47.) F. C. S. Schiller was called 'humanist' before he joined James and adopted the designation pragmatism for his world-conception. And so summing up we can well say that the same struggle which took place in the last decade in Germany between psychologists and logicians—the polemical pamphlet of Melchior Palagi the gives the best account of the situation—on the other side of the water takes the form of a skirmish between pragmatists and spiritualists or idealists, pur sang. Protagoras is the model of the one party (Schiller professes to follow Protagoras as perhaps also Laas and Mach), Plato that of the other. A new wine in old bottles. The sentimentalism of the pragmatism of
James comes from Protagoras, but on the other hand he owes both method and expression to Aristotle.

Whether Professor Stein is right in regarding pragmatism as opposed to "spiritualism or idealism pur sang" is rather doubtful, for we must remember that Professor James himself and many of his adherents have vigorously defended some of the most disputed facts of spiritualistic seances. It is well known that Professor James still believes in the genuineness of occult phenomena and communications from the dead to the living.

Pragmatism is a strange compound of many contradictory conceptions and it is probable that Professor Stein systematizes it more than the pragmatists themselves would approve. Pragmatism is in a word sentimentalism, that is to say, it places all reality in sentiment. This is done also by Mach in so far as Mach deems sensations to be the ultimate realities. Yet for all that, James draws other conclusions and incorporates in his conception of sentiment many things which Mach would cut out as illusions. There is an unmistakable kinship between Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and James as pointed out by Professor Stein. He says:

"The kernel of the whole matter is the supremacy of the will, practical reason as Kant would say; over thought. Therefore James also is a much stricter voluntarist or activist than, say, Wundt; he approaches more nearly the theory of the supremacy of feeling over understanding as it was prevalent in the English sentimentalist philosophy of the eighteenth century, and is to-day in the psychological school of Th. Ribot in France and in the 'world-conception theory' of H. Gomperz in Vienna. The voluntarism of Schopenhauer receives in James as well as in Ribot the Hamann-Jacobi tendency which Goethe once expressed in the terse formula 'sentiment is everything' (Gefühl ist alles). Quite without justification James leads a passionate polemic against Herbert Spencer in whom he sees his opposite pole with relation to the theory of cognition, while Spencer in his latest works teaches entirely and without reserve supremacy of feeling as much as James and Ribot. Whoever reads Spencer's treatise 'Feelings versus Intellect' in his last work Facts and Comments (1902) will find the following sentences which appear literally in Duns Scotus, but which are no less decisive than those of James: 'The chief component of mind is feeling' (p. 25) . . . 'emotions are the masters and intellect the servant' (p. 30). That is the James-Ribot form of the voluntarism of Schopenhauer..."
and Schiller have to-day established, represents pretty well the first step to the knowledge of truth.

"The utilitarian is the undertone of the pragmatic, and exactly this pragmatic utilitarian *sous entendu* is as great a discord to the ear of the German idealist of Königsberg as it is sweet harmony flattering the ear of the 'smart' American. For Kant utility is a counter-argument to absolute moral worth, hence the pragmatically useful method of observation or treatment is only in value orientating, as indeed catalogue or alphabetical arrangement is to the librarian, for these are always better as rules of wisdom than absolute disorder. But such a pragmatic arrangement is in the most favorable instance an artificial, even though ever so useful, classification of the schools, but not a classification made by nature. The distinction between pragmatic classification and the accuracy of the classification according to nature is according to Kant a fundamental one (*Werk*, VI, 315); the classification of the schools has only one purpose, namely to bring created things under their proper title, the classification according to nature endeavors instead to bring them under laws."

Professor Stein's tendency to systematize appears in the following comment. He says:

"Heinrich von Stein in his 'Seven Books on the History of Platonism' has produced the convincing proof that philosophical thought has vibrated back and forth in constant rhythm for two thousand years between Plato and Aristotle. This is true as well of the twentieth century as of its predecessors. Half a century ago Trendelenburg brought Aristotle again to our knowledge. The neo-Kantianism under the leadership of Cohen on the other hand helped Plato to victory. Just now Aristotle is again on top by the roundabout way via Leibniz. Those thinkers who are interested in biological considerations are to-day grouping themselves again around Aristotle just as those who tend in a mathematically logical direction cluster around Plato. In Germany this dissension appears under the slogans, Psychologism against Logism, Vitalism against Mechanicism, and Positivism against Idealism. In America and England it has coined the formula, Pragmatism against Transcendentalism. *Tout comme chez nous*. The French maxim: *plus que ça change, plus c'est la même chose* is true of philosophical controversies, schools, party designations, and catch words."

Professor Stein appears to go too far in characterizing the different philosophers as either Platonists or Aristotelians. It is true that there is a contrast between a recognition of the facts upon which our world-conception is based and the theories which furnish the system of its construction. But if he would carefully compare Plato and Aristotle he would find (as has been pointed out from time to time) that Aristotle is a Platonist and Plato is an Aristotelian. Though Aristotle has his fling at the Platonic ideas he practically adopts the theory that there are eternal types, and though Plato is an idealist who believes in the eternal ideas as the modes of things, he does not deny that the phenomenal world is the actual world of sense; and the contrast ir. which these two systems have frequently been placed is a contrast merely produced by more or less of emphasis laid upon two opposed (not contradictory) principles, and the different systems in the history of philosophy are exactly characterized by the way in which they combine the contrast and recognize the truth of these principles. It is true, however, that Professor James carries the principle of pragmatism to such an extreme as to almost entirely obliterate the principle of systematic thought, theory, logic, rationality, etc. Professor James is a romanticizing philosopher in contrast to such stern and strict classical thinkers as Kant and his school. Says Stein: 'The type of thought directly opposed to this logistic classicism is sentimental romanticism. As the former longs for the peace of the conclusive answer the latter seeks the eternal activity of restless questioning,' and further down on page 172: 'Pragmatism gathers together all those tendencies of our age with its fevered philosophical excitement which carry on a common war against the thing-in-itself, against all metaphysics, against transcendentalism, idealism, in short against that Platonizing Kantism which is most conspicuously represented and most appreciately supported by the Marburg school (Cohen and Natorp), under the names Natural Philosophy, Energetics, Psychologism, Positivism, Phenomenalism, Friesian Empiricism, and Relativism.'

Here the onesidedness of Professor Stein's classification appears most pronounced. From the point of view of my own philosophy I would be at a loss in what manner to dispose of it. I am decidedly opposed to the subjectivism of Professor James. I most emphatically uphold the objective significance of truth, and yet I reject the idea of the thing-in-itself and all metaphysics based upon it. My solution of the problem briefly stated runs thus: There are

"For details see my criticism of Kant in my little book *Kant's Prolegomena*; and also my exposition of the problem in my *Seed of Metaphysics* in the chapter 'Are There Things-in-Themselves?'"
not things-in-themselves but there are forms-in-themselves. Professor Stein declares:

"For many years together with certain ones of my pupils I have defended the thesis that Kant did not refute Hume. In my book "The Social Optimism" (Der soziale Optimum, Jena, Costenoble, 1905) I demonstrate that Hume is not a skeptic but the leader of positivism and that Kant has not refuted him in any point. The case is not yet at an end."

I have not seen Professor Stein's exposition of his views on Kant and Hume, but I am inclined to believe that I would agree with him. However, I trust that in the books referred to I have pointed out the weak point of Kant's position; but on the basis of the Kantian conception of the contrast between matter and form, the a posteriori and the a priori, sensation and pure Anschauung with all that it involves, I hope to have answered Hume's question and thus laid a foundation for a-system in which the old contrasts will find a just reconciliation. Here are some paragraphs of Professor Stein's critique of pragmatism:

"A criticism of pragmatism must proceed from the inside outward; that is, from its own hypotheses, and not from the standpoint of idealism, as Münsterberg attempts. There are two different temperaments as James has rightly said, but temperaments are not to be opposed. 'As I see it' now stands as the inscription before every temple, not only the pantheon of art but also the severe cathedral of science. To see in one's own way can never be criticised. The question is only whether a man has seen rightly from his own standpoint, and right here is the starting-point of our objection to pragmatism...

"In place of the two criteria of truth represented by Plato (Aristotle too) and Kant, namely necessity and universal validity, we have here the hedonistic utilitarian criteria of truth, individual utility and general practicability. The true and the good agree with each other; this is the demand of the biologic-teleological foundation of logic as pragmatism states it. In addition, it is true to earlier tendencies of thought, but still with a strongly emphasized personal note."

"Against this biological logic a series of considerations arise in the meantime even under the foundation of the pragmatic point of departure wherefore I expressly affirm that I will neither repeat the arguments which Husserl in his fundamental 'Logical Investigations' and Münsterberg in his 'Philosophy of Values' (Philosophie der

Worte, Leipsic, Barth, 1908) have arranged in imposing conclusiveness against all psychology. I do not propose to refer here to even the purely polemical literature of the English, French and Italians against pragmatism. It is much more important for me to consider the difficulties of thought which in spite of my sympathetic position towards the fundamental demands of pragmatism I can not suppress. If Méray, James and Schiller will take the trouble to look through my 'The End of the Century' (Wende des Jahrhunderts, Tübingen, Mohr, 1899), 'The Sense of Existence' (Der Sinn des Daseins, ibid., 1904) and 'The Social Optimism' (Der soziale Optimum, Jena, Costenoble, 1905), they will discover now and again almost verbal correspondences in that which I call evolutionary criticism and the optimism of energetics. In case James and Schiller would attempt to claim me as well as Wilhelm Jerusalem in the ranks of pragmatism, I shall have to point out my opinions against methods and results...

"Pragmatism with its genetic theory of truth is only new in that it discards itself as logical evolution. Truth is placed in the stream of practical development. As one of the followers of the Heraclean Cratylos, the teacher of Plato to whom he had dedicated his dialogue of the same name, are jokingly called the 'flowing ones,' pragmatists recognize only one developing truth which will gradually approach the absolute truth or its ideal heights."

Professor Stein takes the underlying principles of pragmatism and systematizes them—in spite of Professor James. The latter may not take the consequences but Professor Stein seems to argue that if pragmatism were consistent Professor James ought to hold the views to be derived from its maxims. We doubt very much whether Professor James would be prepared to regard the ego as "a mere practical unit for a preliminary provisional consideration" (p. 182).

Stein says:

"Mach's definition of the ego as unity of purpose and James's theory of concepts or classes as teleological instruments, arise from the common fundamental conviction that all spiritual life is teleological. The teleological unity of the ego according to Mach rests upon an unanalysed constant. The ego is accordingly a practical unit for a preliminary provisional consideration. The same is the case with concepts of substance, being, doing, matter, spirit. They

"Among the last G. Valensi is of a special importance. See 'De quelques caractères du mouvement philosophique contemporain en Italie.' Revue de metais, 1907.

"of pleasures, i.e., those that are in a constant flux.
are abbreviated symbols for the purpose of an easier orientation in the surrounding world. All science thus shrinks into one impression as all deduction according to Mill is only an abbreviation and inverted induction, a memorandum for thought.

"Here we have the proton pseudo" as well of pragmatism as of Hume's positivism and all related tendencies. Quite apart from the fact that the biological method which James and his school would apply to logic is already shattered on the fact that biology itself is still to-day in the condition of fermentation and insecurity and accordingly possesses no suitability for a foundation of the most certain of all sciences, formal logic, pragmatism takes the same course which Hume was not able to escape. Hume refers substance and causality to habits of thought and laws of association; but how have laws of association found entrance into the human brain? Why have all men and animals the same laws of association by contiguity or innate similarity? Hume concludes the validity of the laws of association by means of the laws of association already in effect.

"It is quite clear, however, that pragmatism too has it a priori, that is the telos, and if we jest about the logos of Kant, that in spite of us man comes into the world with a completed table of categories so let us not forget to consider the beam in our own eye. We are all a priori sinners. Or, does it matter so much if man comes into the world according to Kant with a table of categories, according to Hume with completed laws of association, according to Avenarius and Mach with an automatically functioning economy of thought, and finally according to James and Schiller with an apparatus of utility and selection like an innate scale of values? Let us first of all be honest with ourselves. Pragmatism accomplishes nothing but to set up a teleology of consciousness in the place of a mechanics of consciousness such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Hartley, Priestley, Hume, the naturalists, materialists, and psychologists of association have offered us."

A STUDY IN ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Ever since Professor Ribot published his book on The Diseases of Personality people interested in psychology have been aware of the importance of the remarkable cases enumerated in the book. Among them the most interesting and perhaps the most instructive