are abbreviated symbols for the purpose of an easier orientation in the surrounding world. All science thus shrinks into one impression as all deduction according to Mill is only an abbreviation and inverted induction, a memorandum for thought.

"Here we have the proton pseudos" as well of pragmatism as of Hume's positivism and all related tendencies. Quite apart from the fact that the biological method which James and his school would apply to logic is already shattered on the fact that biology itself is still to-day in the condition of fermentation and insecurity and accordingly possesses no suitability for a foundation of the most certain of all sciences, formal logic, pragmatism takes the same course which Hume was not able to escape. Hume refers substance and causality to habits of thought and laws of association; but how have laws of association found entrance into the human brain? Why have all men and animals the same laws of association by contiguity or innate similarity? Hume concludes the validity of the laws of association by means of the laws of association already in effect...

"It is quite clear, however, that pragmatism too has it a priori, that is the telos, and if we jest about the logicism of Kant, that in spite of us man comes into the world with a completed table of categories so let us not forget to consider the beam in our own eye. We are all a priori sinners. Or, does it matter so much if man comes into the world according to Kant with a table of categories, according to Hume with completed laws of association, according to Avenarius and Mach with an automatically functioning economy of thought, and finally according to James and Schiller with an apparatus of utility and selection like an innate scale of values? Let us first of all be honest with ourselves. Pragmatism accomplishes nothing but to set up a teleology of consciousness in the place of a mechanics of consciousness such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Hartley, Priestley, Hume, the naturalists, materialists, and psychologists of association have offered us."

A STUDY IN ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Ever since Professor Ribot published his book on The Diseases of Personality people interested in psychology have been aware of the importance of the remarkable cases enumerated in the book. Among them the most interesting and perhaps the most instructive
A LETTER FROM PROFESSOR JAMES.

Among the philosophers of to-day there is scarcely any more interesting figure than that of Prof. William James of Harvard; and his philosophy, which, adopting an expression of Mr. Chas. S. Peirce, he calls pragmatism, is as broadly before the public as any system of thought. Our readers will therefore be glad to find in the present number an article by Prof. Edwin Tausch on "The Great Pragmatist," which is written in a sympathetic tone, and Professor James himself has perused this psychological analysis of his mental makeup. He gives expression to his sentiments on the subject in these words:

"I have read with great relish your diagnosis of my case.... I am astounded at the knowledge you show of my ipsissima verba, and it gives me a queer feeling to be treated so philologically. I find your account of my evolution instructive, though I am hardly able to criticize it as one might who knew me from without. I can't tell about utilitarianism—I didn't come to it unaided, but was taught it by Chauncey Wright, whose anti-religious teaching, however, I reacted against. I think you overdo my personal mysticism. It has always seemed to me rather a matter of fair play to the various kinds of experience to let mystical ecstasy have its voice counted with the rest. As far as I am personally concerned it is the ordinary sense of life that every working moment brings, that makes me contemptuous of rationalistic attempts to substitute thin logical formulas for it. My flux-philosophy may well have to do with my extremely impatient temperament. I am a motor, need change, and get very quickly bored.

"I say nothing of your general plan of tracing beliefs to temperamental needs. I believe it is in essence quite sound, though hard to rescue from the appearance of superficiality. In sum, I have found the essay extraordinarily competent and interesting."

I will add that we owe the opportunity of publishing Professor Tausch's analysis of "the great pragmatist" to Professor James himself, who advised the author that his article might be a welcome contribution to The Monist, and we wish to express our indebtedness for this suggestion to Professor James publicly. We take it as an evidence that our critical review of pragmatism has not been amiss but is received in the spirit in which it was written.

Editor.