Paul Janet and Hegel.

at understanding Hegel, however, he is not in a fair way to conceive a spirit in whom the identity between subject and object is more perfect than in Hegel. "What hinder" is his own culture, his own self; "Du gleichst dem Geist den du begriffs, nicht wir," said the World-spirit to Faust.

He asks, (p. 374): "What did the "pure act", commence to? From Eternity; it always commences, and is always complete, says Hegel. "According to Hegel, God is made, from nothing, by means of the World."

Instead of this, Hegel holds that God is self-created, and the world eternally created by him (the Eternally-begotten Son). "What need has God of Nature?" God is Spirit; hence conscious; hence he makes himself an object to himself; in this act be creates nature; hence Nature is His reflection. (P. 328): "The Absolute in Hegel is spirit only on condition that it thinks, and thinks itself; hence it is not essentially Spirit, but only accidentally."

So to "think itself" is to be conscious, and, without this, God would have no personality; and hence if Hegel were to hold any other doctrine than the one attributed to him, he would be a Pantheist. But these things are not mere dogmas with Hegel; they appear as the logical results of the most logical of systems. "But in Plato, God is a Reason in activity, a living thought." M. Janet mentions this to show Plato's superiority; he thinks that it is absurd for Hegel to attribute thinking to God, but thinks the same thing to be a great merit in Plato. (P. 302): "Behold thy-Platonic deduc-" in for dialectic; being given a pure idea, he shows that this idea, if it were all alone, [i.e. made universal, or placed in selfrelation, or posited as valid for itself,] would be contradictory of itself, and consequently could not be. Hence, if it existed, it is on condition that it mingles with another idea. Take, for example, the multiple: by itself, it loses itself in the indiscernible, for it would be impossible without unity." This would do very well for a description of the Dialectic in Hegel if he would lay more stress on the positive side of the result. Not merely does the "pure idea mingle with another"—i.e. pass over to its opposite—but it returns into itself by the continuation of its own movement, and thereby reaches a concrete stage. Plato sometimes uses this complete dialectical movement, and ends affirmatively; sometimes he uses only the partial movements and draws negative conclusions.

How much better M. Janet's book might have been—we may be allowed to remark in conclusion—had he possessed the earnest spirit of such men as Yera and Hutchinson Stirling! Stimulated by its title, we had hoped to find a book that would kindle a zeal for the study of the profoundest philosophical subject, as treated by the profoundest of thinkers.
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SUN-CLEAR STATEMENT

To the Public at large concerning the true nature of the Newest Philosophy. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding.

Translated from the German of J. O. Fichte, by A. E. Kirkeby.

THIRD CONVERSATION.

R. I believe that I have now fully grasped your opinion concerning the Science of Knowledge, and that, historically, I know quite well what you mean. Moreover, when I accept the mere similarity of your science with the demonstration of a mechanical work of art, I can think the possibility of it quite well, and in a general way. But as soon as I reflect on the necessary distinction of both, and the characteristic differences of their several objects, a science like the one you describe appears to me to be utterly impossible.

The conception of the systematic connection of the manifold in a work of art with the view to produce a prearranged result has been in the mind of the artist long before the work of art existed; which work has indeed been produced only after this conception and according to it. We others do nothing but reconstruct that conception of the artist, or reinvest his work of art. Hence, it is here very significant to say, that there is a systematic connection in the manifold. This systematic connection is in the conception of the artist, and of all those who think as artists.

But tell me, does your assertion of a systematic connection in the manifold of consciousness signify likewise, that this consciousness has been prepared by some artist according to the conception of such a conception, and that the teacher of the Science of Knowledge can only be determined as the original and true conception? What is this artist? And how and in what manner has he produced consciousness?

A. Supposing it is not to signify this, and that the comparison is not to be extended so far? Supposing that ambiguous propositions is to signify no more than the following: we may view—amongst other manners of viewing—the manifold of consciousness as systematically connected; or there are two ways of viewing the determinations of consciousness: one immediate way, by immediately surrendering ourselves to them, and thus finding them as they present themselves; and another way, through mediation, or by systematically deducing them as must necessarily present themselves in consequence of this systematic connection? In which case the latter view could be realized only after actual consciousness had already existed, and on no account in advance of the existence of consciousness. Nor could the latter view exist for any but such as with arbitrary freedom might take hold of it. Hence, the teacher of the Science of Knowledge, and he alone, would be the artist of the transcendental object, to be termed an intuition.

Now, it is plainly one thing to have an intuition and another to know intuitively that it is an intuition, and the question is whether these two things, distinguishable in thought, are, in fact, invariably connected, so that we can always intuitively distinguish between an intuition and a cognition determined by another. Every cognition, as something present, is, of course, an intuition of itself. But the determination of a cognition by another cognition or by a transcendental object is not, at least so far as appears obvious at first, a part of the immediate content of that cognition, although it would appear to be an element of the action or passion of the transcendental ego, which is not, perhaps, in consciousness immediately; and yet this transcendental action or passion may invariable determine a cognition of itself, so that, in fact, the determination or non-determination of the cognition by another may be a part of the cognition. In this case, I should say that we had an intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from another cognition.

There is no evidence that we have this faculty, except that we seem to have it. But the weight of the testimony depends entirely on our being supposed to have the power of distinguishing in this feeling whether the feeling be the result of education, old associations, etc., or whether it is an intuitive cognition; or, in other words, it depends on presupposing the very matter testified to. Is this feeling infallible? And is this judgment concerning it infallible, and so on, ad infinitum? Supposing that a man really could shut himself up in such a faith, he would be, of course, impervious to the truth, "evidence-proof."

But let us compare the theory with the historic facts. The power of intuitively distinguishing intuitions from other cog-
Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man.

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The above theory of space and time does not conflict with that of Kant so much as it appears to do. They are in fact the solutions of different questions. Kant, it is true, makes space and time intuitions, or rather forms of intuition, but it is not essential to his theory that intuition should mean more than ‘individual representation.’ The apprehension of space and time results, according to him, from a mental process of generalization. ‘Synthesis in general’ is the common theme for universal and necessary propositions. The synthesis of space and time is the synthesis of the concepts of extension and duration. The principles of the transcendental aesthetic are contained in two principles. First, that universal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. Second, that universal and necessary propositions are not determined by the conditions of experience. By a universal proposition is meant one which asserts something of all of a kind, not necessarily one which all of us believe. By a necessary proposition, is meant one which asserts what it does, not merely of the actual condition of things, but of every possible state of things; it is not meant that the proposition is one which we cannot help believing. Experience, in Kant’s first principle, cannot be used for a proof of the objectivity of the transcendental aesthetic. The content of the aesthetic idea is not contained in the idea of the object, but it must be taken for the first impressions of sense with consciousness conjoined and worked up by the imagination into images, together with all which is logically deducible therefrom. In this sense, it may be admitted that universal and necessary propositions are not given in experience. But, in that case, neither are any inductive conclusions which might be drawn from experience, given in it. In fact, it is the peculiar function of induction to produce universal and necessary propositions. Kant points out, indeed, that the universality and necessity of scientific induction are but the analogies of philosophic universality and necessity; and this is true, in so far as it is never allowable to accept a scientific conclusion without a certain indeterminate check. But this is owing to the insufficiency in the number of the instances; and whenever instances may be had in as large numbers as we please, all in fact, a truly universal and necessary proposition is infallible. As for Kant’s transcendental aesthetic, it is nothing more than the principle of induction. I go to a fair and draw from the fair of the bags two packages. Upon opening them, I find that every one contains a red ball. Here is a universal fact. It depends, then, on the condition of the experience. What is the condition of the experience? It is solely that the bag be the contents of packages drawn from that bag, that is, the only thing which determined the experience, was the drawing from the bag. I infer, from the principle of Kant, that what is drawn from the bag will contain a red ball. This is induction. Apply induction not to the sum of all human experience and you have the Kantian philosophy, so far as it is correctly de...
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Pure apperception is the self-assertion of the ego; the self-consciousness here meant is the recognition of my private self. I know that I (not merely the I) exist. The question is, how do I know it? by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined by previous cognitions?

Now, it is not self-evident that we have such an intuitive faculty, for it has just been shown that we have no intuitive power of distinguishing an intuition from a cognition determined by others. Therefore, the existence or non-existence of this power is to be determined upon evidence, and the question is whether self-consciousness can be explained by the action of known faculties under conditions known to exist, or whether it is necessary to suppose an unknown cause for this cognition, and, in the latter case, whether an intuitive faculty of self-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be supposed.

It is first to be observed that there is no known self-consciousness to be accounted for in extremely young children. It has already been pointed out by Kant, that the use of the very common word "I" with children indicates an imperfect self-consciousness in them, and that, therefore, so far as it is admissible for us to draw any conclusion in regard to the mental state of those who are still younger, it must be against the existence of any self-consciousness in them.

On the other hand, children manifest powers of thought much earlier. Indeed, it is almost impossible to assign a period at which children do not already exhibit decided intellectual activity in directions in which thought is indispensable to their well-being. The complicated trigonometry of vision, and the delicate adjustments of coordinated movement, are plainly mastered very early. There is no reason to question a similar degree of thought in reference to themselves.

A very young child may always be observed to "think its own body with great attention. There is every reason why this should be so, for from the child's point of view this body is the most important thing in the universe. Only what it touches has any actual and present feeling; only what it sees has any actual color; only what is on its tongue has any actual taste.

No one questions, when a sound is heard by a child, that he knows of himself as hearing, but of the bell or other object as sounding. How when he tells a story, or tales? Does he then think of himself as desiring, or only of the table as fit to be moved? That he has the latter thought, is beyond question; that he has the former, must, until the existence of a self-consciousness is proved, remain an arbitrary and baseless supposition. There is no good reason for thinking that he is less ignorant of his own peculiar condition than the angry adult who denies that he is in a passion.

The child, however, must soon discover by observation that things which are thus fit to be changed are not actually to undergo this change, after a contact with that peculiarly important body called Willy or Johnny. This consideration makes this body still more important and central, since it establishes a connection between the fitness of a thing to be changed and a tendency in this body to touch it before it is changed.

The child learns to understand the language; that is, to say, a connection between certain sounds and certain facts becomes established in his mind. He has previously noticed the connection between these sounds and the motions of the lips of bodies somewhat similar to the central one, and has tried the experiment of putting his hand on these lips and has found the sound in that case to be smoother. He thus connects that language with bodies somewhat similar to the central one. By efforts, so unenergetic that they should be called rather insincere, perhaps, than tentative, he learns to produce those sounds. So he begins to converse.

It must be about this time that he begins to find out that what these people about him say is the very best evidence of fact. So much so, that testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than the facts themselves, or rather than what must now be thought of as the appearances themselves.

(I may remark, by the way, that this remains so throughout life; testimony will convince a man that he himself is mad.) A child, bearing it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness.

But, although usually appearances are either only confirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by testimony. These are those predicates which are known to be emotional, but which do distinguish themselves from the objects of that central person, himself, (the table was moving, etc.) These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest.

Thus, he adds to the conception of appearances as the actualization of fact, the conception of it as something private and valid only for one body. In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible.

Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception.

Now, the theory of error, for the sake of perspicuity, has thus been stated in a specific form, may be summed up as follows: At the age at which we know children to be self-conscious, we know that they have been made aware of ignorance and error; and we know them to possess at that age the powers of understanding sufficient to enable them to infer from ignorance and error their own existence. Thus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions known to exist, would rise to self-consciousness. The only essential defect in this account is that, while we know that children exercise as much understanding as is here supposed, we do not know that they exercise it in precisely this way. Still the supposition that they do so is infinitely more supported by facts than the supposition of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind.

The only argument worth noticing for the existence of an intuitive self-consciousness is this. We are more certain of our own existence than of any other fact; a premise cannot determine a conclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our own existence cannot have been inferred from any other fact. The first premise must be admitted, but the second premise is founded on an exploded theory of logic. A conclusion cannot be more certain than that some one of the facts which support it is true, but it may easily be more certain than any one of those facts. Let us suppose, for example, that dozen witnesses testify to an occurrence. Then my belief in that occurrence rests on the belief that each of those men is generally to be believed upon oath. Yet the fact testified to is made more certain than that any one of those men is generally believed. In the same way, to the developed mind of man, his own existence is supported by every other fact, and is, therefore, incomparably more certain than any one of these facts. But it cannot be said to be more certain than that there is another fact, since there is no doubt perceptible in either case.

It is to be concluded, then, that there is no necessity of supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness may easily be the result of inference.

Questions 3. Whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions.

Every cognition involves something represented, or that of which we are conscious, and some action or passion of the self whereby it becomes represented. The former shall be termed the objective, the latter the subjective element of the cognition. The cognition itself is an intuition of its objective element, which may therefore be called, also, the immediate object. The subjective element is not necessarily immediately known, but it is possible that such an
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intuition of the subjective element of a
cognition of its object, whether that of
perceiving, imagining, conceiving, be-
lying, etc., should accompany every cog-
nition. The question is whether this is so.

It would appear, at first sight, that there is
an overwhelming array of evidence in favor
of the existence of such a power. The
difference between seeing a color and im-
inging it is immense. There is a vast
difference between the most vivid dream
and reality. And if we had no intuitive
power of distinguishing between what we
believe and what we merely conceive, we
never, it would seem, could in any way dis-
inguish them; since if we did so by rea-
oning, the question would arise whether
the argument itself was believed or con-
cieved, and this must be answered before
the conclusion could have any force. And
thus there would be a regressus ad incol-
mum. Besides, if we do not know that we
believe, then, from the nature of the case,
we do not believe.

But it is noted that we do not intuitively
know the existence of this faculty. For it is
an intuitive one, and we cannot
intuitively know that a cognition is intuitive.
The question is, therefore, whether
it is necessary to suppose the existence of
this faculty, or whether then the facts can
be explained without this supposition.

In the first place, then, the difference
between what is imagined or dreamed and
what is actually experienced, is no argu-
ment in favor of the existence of such a
faculty. For it is not questioned that
there are distinctions in what is present
to the mind, but the question is, whether
independently of any such distinctions in
the immediate objects of consciousness,
we have any immediate power of distin-
guishing different modes of consciousness.

Now, the very fact of the immense dif-
ference in the immediate objects of sense and
imagination, sufficiently accounts for our
distinguishing those faculties; and instead
of being an argument in favor of the
istence of an intuitive power of distin-
guishing the subjective elements of con-
sciousness, it is a powerful reply to any
such argument, so far as the distinction of
sense and imagination is concerned.

Passing to the distinction of belief and
conception, we meet the statement that the
knowledge of belief is essential to its exis-
tence. Now, we can unquestionably dis-
guish a belief from a conception, in
most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling
of conviction; and it is a mere question of
words whether we define belief as that
judgment which is accompanied by this
feeling, or as that judgment from which a
man will act. We may conveniently call
the former sensational, the latter active
belief. That neither of these necessarily
involves the other, will surely be admitted
without any recital of facts. Taking
belief in the sensational sense, the
intuitive power of reorganizing it will
amount simply to the capacity for the
sensation which accompanies the judgment.
This sensation, like any other, is an
object of consciousness; and therefore the
capacity for it implies no intuitive recog-
nition of subjective elements of conscious-
ness. If belief is taken in the active
sense, it may be discovered by the obser-
vation of external facts and by inference
from the sensation of conviction which
usually accompanies it.

Thus, the arguments in favor of this po-
cular power of consciousness disappear,
and the presumption is again against such
a hypothesis. Moreover, as the immediate
objects of any two faculties must be ad-
mited to be different, the facts do not
render such a supposition in any degree
necessary.

Question 4. Whether we have any pow-
er of introspection, or whether our whole
knowledge of the internal world is derived
from the observation of external facts?

It is not intended here to assume the
reality of the external world. Only, there
is a certain set of facts which are ordi-
narily regarded as external, while others
are regarded as internal. The question is
whether the latter are known otherwise
than by inference from the former. By
introspection, I mean a direct perception of
the internal world, but not necessarily a
perception of it as internal. Nor do I mean
to limit the signification of the word to
intuition, but would extend it to any knowl-
dge of the internal world not derived from
external observation.

There is one sense in which any percep-
tion has an internal object, namely, that
every sensation is partly determined by
internal conditions. Thus, the sensation
of redness is just, owing to the consti-
tution of the mind; and in this sense it is
a sensation of something internal. Hence,
we may derive a knowledge of the mind
from a consideration of this sensation, but
that knowledge would, in fact, be an in-
ference from redness as a predicate of some-
thing external. On the other hand, there
are certain other feelings—the emo-
tions, for example—which appear to arise
in the first place, not as predicates at all,
and to be referable to the mind alone. It
would seem, then, that by means of these,
a knowledge of the mind may be obtained,
which is not inferred from any character
of outward things. The question is
whether this is really so.

Although introspection is not neces-
sarily intuitive, it is not self-evident that we
possess this capacity; for we have no in-
tuitive faculty of distinguishing different
subjective modes of consciousness. The
power, if it exists, must be known by
the circumstance that the facts cannot be
explained without it.

In reference to the above argument from
the emotions, it must be admitted that if
a man is angry, his anger implies, in gen-
eral, no determinate and constant charac-
ter in its object. But, on the other hand,
it can hardly be questioned that there is
some relative character in the outward
thing which makes him angry, and a little
reflection will serve to show that his anger
consists in his suying to himself, "this
thing is vile, abominable, etc.," and that it
is rather a mark of returning reason to say,
"I am angry." In the same way any emo-
tion is a predication concerning some object,
and the chief difference between this and an
objective intellectual judgment is that while
the latter is relative to human nature or to
mind in general, the former is relative to the
particular circumstances and disposi-
tion of a particular man at a particular
time. What is here said of emotions in
general, is true in particular of the sense
of beauty and of the moral sense. Good
and bad are feelings which first arise as
predicates, and therefore are either predi-
cates of the not-I, or are determined by
previous cognitions (there being no intu-
itive power of distinguishing subjective
elements of consciousness).

It remains, then, only to inquire whether
it is necessary to suppose a particular
power of introspection for the sake of ac-
counting for the sense of willing. Now,
volition as distinguished from desire, is
nothing but the power of concentrating the
attention, of abstracting. Hence, the
knowledge of the power of abstracting
may be inferred from abstract objects, just
as the knowledge of the power of seeing
is inferred from colored objects.

It appears, therefore, that there is no
reason for supposing a power of introspec-
tion; and, consequently, the only way of
investigating a psychologica] question is
by inference from external facts.

Question 5. Whether we can think with-
out signs.

This is a familiar question, but there is,
to this day, no satisfactory argument in the
affirmauve than that thought must precede
every sign. This assumes the impossibility
of an infinite series. But symbols, as a
fact, will overtake the tortoise. How
this happens, is a question not necessary
to be answered at present, as long as it
certainly does happen.

If we seek the light of external facts,
the only cases of thought which we can find
are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other
thought can be unmasked by external
facts. But we have seen that only by ex-
ternal facts can thought be known at all.
The only thought, then, which can possibly
be cognized is thought in signs. But
thought which cannot be cognized does not
exist. All thought, therefore, must neces-
sarily be in signs.

A man says to himself, "Aristotle is a
man; therefore, he is fallible." Has he not,
thought what he has not said to him-
self, that all men are fallible? The an-
swer is, that he has done so, so far as this
is said in his therefore. According to
this, our question does not relate to facts,
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but is a mere asking for distinctness of thought.

From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a sign. This, after all, is but another form of the familiar axiom, that in intuition, i.e., in the immediate present, there is no thought, or, that all which is reflected upon has past. Hine laqueus erde est. That, since any thought, there must have been a thought, has its analogue in the fact that, since any past time, there must have been an infinite series of times. To say, therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in another, or that all thought is in signs.

Question 6. Whether a sign can have any meaning, if by its definition it is the sign of something absolutely inconceivable.

It would seem that it can, and that universal and hypothetical propositions are instances of it. Thus, the universal proposition, "all ruminants are cloven-hoofed," speaks of a possible infinity of animals, and no matter how many ruminants may have been examined, the possibility must remain that there are others which have not been examined. In the case of a hypothetical proposition, the same thing is still more manifest; for such a proposition speaks not merely of the actual state of things, but of every possible state of things, all of which are not knowable, inasmuch as only one can so much exist.

On the other hand, all our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experience. Accordingly, there can be no conception of the absolutely inconceivable, since nothing of that sort occurs in experience. But the meaning of a term is the conception which it conveys. Hence, a term can have no such meaning.

If it be said that the inconceivable is a concept compounded of the concept not and cognizeable, it may be replied that not is a mere syncategorematic term and not a concept by itself.

If I think "white," I will not go so far as Berkeley and say that I think of a person seeing, but I will say that I think of the nature of a cognition, and of anything else which can be experienced. Consequently, the highest concept which can be reached by abstraction from judgments of experience—and that is, the highest concept which can be reached at all—is the concept of something of the nature of a cognition. Not, then, or what 'is other, if a concept, is a concept of the cognizable. Hence, not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept of the form "A, not-A," and is at least, self-contradictory. Thus, ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a knowledge of truth, which latter are of the three cognitions. Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory. In short, cognizability (in its widest sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms.

To the argument from universal and hypothetical propositions, the reply is that though their truth cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may be probably known by induction.

Question 7. Whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous cognition.

It would seem that there is or has been; for since we are in possession of cognitions, which are all determined by previous ones, and those by cognitions earlier still, there must have been a first one, or else our state of cognition at any time is completely determined, according to logical laws, by our state at any previous time.

But there are many facts against the last supposition, and therefore in favor of intuitive cognitions.

On the other hand, since it is impossible to know intuitively that a given cognition is not determined by a previous one, the only way in which this can be known is by hypothetical inference from observed facts. But to adduce the cognition by which a given cognition has been determined is to explain the determinations of that cognition. And it is the only way of explaining them. For something entirely out of consciousness which may be supposed to determine it, can, as such, only be known and only adduced in the determinate cognition in question. So that to suppose that a cognition is determined solely by something absolutely external, is to suppose its determinations incapable of explanation. Now, this is a hypothesis which is warranted under no circumstances, inasmuch as the only possible justification for a hypothesis is that it explains the facts, and to say that they are explained and at the same time to suppose them inexplicable is self-contradictory.

If it be objected that the peculiar character of red is not determined by any previous cognition, I reply that that character is not a character of red as a cognition; if there be a man to whom red things look as blue ones do to me and vice versa, that man's eyes teach him the same facts as would if he were like me.

Moreover, we know of no power by which an intuition could be known. For, as the cognition is beginning, and therefore in a state of change, at only the first instant would be intuition. And, therefore, the apprehension of it must take place in no time and be an event occupying no time. Besides, all the cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products are relative. But the cognition of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition not determined by a previous cognition, then, can be known. It does not exist, then, first, because it is absolutely inconceivable, and second, because a cognition only exists so far as it is known.

The reply to the argument that there must be a first is as follows: In retracing our way from conclusions to premises, or from determined cognitions to those which determine them, we finally reach, in all cases, a point beyond which the consciousness in the determined cognition is more lively than in the cognition which determines it.

* This argument, however, only covers a part of the question. It does not go to show that there is no cognition undetermined except by another like it.

Questions concerning certain Faculties claimed for Man.

We have a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of the third dimension than in the latter cognition itself; a less lively consciousness in the cognition which determines our cognition of a continuous surface (without a blind spot) than in this latter cognition itself; and a less lively consciousness of the impressions which determine the sensation of tone than of that sensation itself. Indeed, when we get near enough to the external this is the universal rule. Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A point, havning no length, will, on this principle, represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition represented by that other and which has the same object as the latter. Let the finite distance between two such lines represent that they are two different cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether "there must be a first." Suppose an inverted triangle V to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents another cognition of the same object determined by the former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of the triangle represents the object external to the mind which determines both these cognitions. The base of the triangle before it reaches the water, represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. To say, then, that if there is a state of cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined, there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not determined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by the surface of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in that way. But draw the horizon-
tal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one another. For any such section is at some distance above the apex, otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be a. Then there have been similar sections at two distances \( \frac{a}{2}, \frac{a}{2}, \frac{a}{2} \) above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that it is not true that there must be a first. Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of the Achilles in whatever way you may. I am content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny

**LETTERS ON FAUST.**

*(By H. C. Bruckner.)*

VI.

DEAR X.—In following our theme through the sphere of manifestation, we arrived at the conclusion: "As long as men cannot know truth—has no Reason—he does possess a stomach, a capacity for sensual enjoyment and an Understanding to minister to the same—to be its servant." With this conclusion, we have arrived at the world of Reality—for we have attributed objective validity to the Understanding. It also determines our position in that world. The Understanding—Mephisto—is our guide and servant; the world of Reality a means for individual ends—for private gratification. Whatever higher pretensions this world might make, such pretensions are based upon the supposition that man can know Truth, and are therefore without foundation. Hence, this world of Reality—the Family, Society, and the State—have no right and no authority against the individual inclinations and desires of man. The latter are supreme and find their limitation not in Reason but in the power of the Understanding to supply them with means of gratification. It is true that these means are derived from without, and hence, that the individual, under this view is limited and individual. In this view is limited and individual. But this is where the question of reality, of individuality, and of the validity of the laws of logic.

determined from without, and that external determination is collision and conflict. Besides, whatever our conviction with reference to the world of Reality may be, that world, once for all, is extant with the bold claim of being on the one side the pledge and on the other the very embodiment of the rational existence of the race; and it wields moreover, in that existence, the power of the race. But this is our conclusion, dear friend, which it may be well enough to keep in view, as a species of logical heat-lightning along the horizon, but which has no significance under the conclusion arrived at by Faust. Under it our individual desires and inclinations, however capricious, are the end, and whatever presents itself has value and validity in so far and only in so far as it is a means for this end.

These are the principles of the man before us, who,

"For idle dalliance too old,
Too young to be without desire."

is still professor in a German University. His life falls in the historic period when a knowledge of the natural sciences is not as yet diffused, and many of the results remain remote for individual minds.