Analysis of Hegel's Aesthetics.

IV. Music.—Art represents, under different forms, the development of spirit. It is, accordingly, the degree of spirituality in the mode of expression which assigns to each of the arts its rank, its pre-eminence, and which serves to fix its relations.

Architecture is the most imperfect art, expressing thought in a vague manner only, through forms borrowed from inorganic matter. Next, Sculpture represents spirit, but still as identified with the body, and only so far as corporeal form allows. Painting expresses the innermost and profoundest side of the soul, passion, and moral sentiment. Hence it rejects matter, in order that it may confine itself to surface. It employs visible appearance and color as a richer, more varied and more spiritual mode of expression. Nevertheless this appearance is always borrowed from the visible, extended, and permanent form.

There is in the soul a necessity for signs, for materials, more in conformity with its nature, presenting nothing fixed and extended, and where the material side wholly disappears. This need is supplied in Music. Its end is to express the soul in itself, the inner sentiment, by a sign which no longer offers anything extended or material, by a sign invisible, rapid and fleeting as the movements of soul itself. This sign, which is, however, still produced by means of matter, no more recalls extension and its forms, but is sound, the result of the undulatory vibration of bodies.

As music abandons visible forms, it addresses itself to a new organ, to the hearing, a sense more spiritual, though less contemplative, than vision. The ear perceives this unextended sign, the resultant of that vibration which leaves no trace after it, and vanishes in its expression.

By thus divesting itself of external and material form, sound is eminently fitted to be the echo of the soul and of sentiment. Accordingly, the problem of music will be to awake the innermost chords of the soul, and to reproduce all its movements and emotions. Thereby, also, its effects are explained. Its aim is to reach the utmost limit of sentiment; it is the art of sentiment. Between art and sentiment there exists so intimate a union that they seemingly fuse together.

In Music, also, the material is reduced to its essence, and only the sound exists. The voice is the body of body or material in Music. Hence the poetic properties of the latter.

If we compare Music with the other arts, we find, in the first place, that it exhibits certain real analogies with Architecture. If
WHAT IS MEANT BY “DETERMINED.”

[The following discussion, which is a continuation of the one in a former issue called “Nemesis and Realism,” may serve a good purpose to clear up my confusion regarding some of the important technical expressions employed.—Enron.]

To the Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.

Sir:—Your remarks upon my inquiries concerning Being and Nothing are very kind and courteous. Considered as replies, they are less satisfactory than they might have been had I succeeded better in making my difficulties understood.

I suspect that there must be some misunderstanding between us of the meaning of the terms “determinate” and “determined.” Perhaps, therefore, I shall do well to state more fully than I have done before the manner in which I understand Hegel (in common with all other logicians) to use them. Possibly, the original signification of determinate was “settled by vote”; or it may have been “pitched to a key.” Thus its origin was quite different from that of “determined”; yet I believe that an philosophical terms their equivalence is exact.

In general, they mean “fixed to be this” (or that); in contradiction to being this, that, or the other (or in some way or other).—When it is a concept or term, such as is expressed by a concrete noun or adjective, which is said to be more determinate than another, the sense sometimes is, that the logical extension of the former concept or term is a part of only a part of that of the latter; but more usually the sense is, that the logical complement of the former is a part and only a part of that of the former.

In my former letter (page 60, column 2) I sufficiently expressed my own understanding of “determinate” as applied to a concept or term such as is expressed by that word. Determinate is also used either in express application or with implicit reference to a second intention or term of second determination. In such an acceptation, we may speak either of a singular as indeterminate, or of a concept of Being, in general, as determinate. Every singular is in one sense perfectly determinate, since there is no pair of contradictory characters of which it does not possess one. Yet if the extension of the term be limited, not by additions to its comprehension, but by a reflection upon the term itself—namely, that it shall denote but one—it is called an indeterminate singular. In this sense, “some one horse” is an indeterminate individual, while “Dexerit” is a determinate individual. In a somewhat similar way, every universal conception of Being is quite indeterminate in the sense of not signifying any particular character. Yet if the reflection is explicitly made (gestet) that every thing to which it applies has its particular character, it is called by Hegel, determinate being. Hegel teaches that the whole series of categories or universal conceptions can be evolved from one—that is, from Syn—by a certain process, the effect of which is to make actually thought that which was virtual in the thought.

So that this reflection which constitutes Deyg in reality the same process as that of Syn, and is by explicitly evolving it from Syn that Deyg is evolved from Syn. (Hegel’s Werke, Bd. 3, S. 107.) The term “What is” has reference to pure Syn only; the term “What is somehow” has reference to Deyg. This is my understanding of the term “determinate.” It must differ from yours, or you would not say that animality, in general, is determined in respect to human: so when you say that animality and humanity, in general, underdetermined with the exception, they would be identical, I take the example of, “the sensation of pitch in general” and “loudness of sound in general,” and I conclude again that we are taking the word “determinate” in different senses. May I ask you to reprimise my 4th question? (p. 60)

You have apparently understood me as applying the term “abstract” to any concept the result of abstraction. But, as I intimated (p. 57), I adopt that acceptation in which “whiteness” is said to be abstract and “white” concrete. For this use of the terms, I refer to the following authorities: Andrews and Stoddard’s Latin Gram-
Intuition vs. Contemplation.

Through a singular chance, the present number of the Journal contains two notes from two contributors on the proper translation of the German word Anschauung. Mr. Krueger holds that the word Anschauung, as used by Fichte and other idealists, is equivalent to the German word Intuition. Whether there is a failure to understand English on the one hand or German on the other, the Editor does not care to inquire. It is certain that while Intuition has been used by the English and French translators, yet it was a wide departure from the ordinary English use of the term. Besides this, we have no English verb Indoible (at least in the queries related was a professed defence of Hegelian doctrine.

I am sorry to learn that I have done you injustice in saying that you profess to be self-contemplative. Yet I do not see in what sense you object to the remark. To say that a man is self-contemplative is, of course, but a way of saying that what he believes is self-contemplative. You believe that "finite things conflict in themselves"; that is, I understand it, that contradictions exist. Therefore, what you believe in, appears to be self-contemplative. Nor can I see how a person "escapes self-contemplation by not attempting to set up non-contemplation as the first principle of things"; that is, by not professing to be otherwise than self-contemplative.

† Of course, our correspondent would not consider a "defence of Hegel" as identical with a championship of the Hegelians. It is the latter, only, that we object to, for the reason mentioned in the article on "Hegel," viz., that the term is used so vaguely as to include those who differ essentially from Hegel — Edmund.

‡ We hasten to assure our correspondent that we do not "believe in the self-contemplator". We are sorry we are so unhappy in our expressions as to convey such a meaning. The word of the Total Process is not self-contemplative, neither is it an abstract identity, but is (as we described it p. 34, 30 of this volume) "self-identical through self-distinction." The self-determining is what we believe in, and it alone exists, while the fleeting show whose reality rests on contradiction is (and this is not Hegelian merely, but rather than Platonic mingling of Being and Non-Being. One who sets up the principle of contradiction in the terms of the present debate is one who is himself in that which he tries to avoid — Edmund.

§ If any point is involved in question 5th that is not as well understood in the discussion of the other queries, we fail to seize it. — Editor.

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SECOND PART OF GOETHE'S FAUST.

Translated from ROSENBTHAHL'S "Deutscheh Literatur," by D. J. SNIDER.

Goethe began nothing if the whole of the work did not hover before his mind. By this determinateness of plan he preserved a most persevering attachment to the materials of which he had been so long his core; they were elements of his existence, which for him were immortal, because they constituted his inmost being. He could put off their execution for years, and still be certain that his love for them would return, that his interest in them would animate him anew. Through this depth of conception he preserved fresh to the end his original purpose; he needed not to fear that the fire of the first enthusiasm would go out; at the most different times he could take up his work again with youthful zeal and strength. Thus in the circle of his poetic labours, two conceptions that are in internal opposition to one another, accompanied him through his whole life. The one portrays a talented but fickle man, who, in want of culture, attaches himself to this person, then to that one, in order to become spiritually independent. This struggle carries him into the breadth of life, into manifold relations whose spirit he longs to seize and appropriate; such as Wilhelm Meister. The other is the picture of an absolutely independent personality that has cultivated its lordly power in solitary loftiness, and aspires boldly to subject the world to itself; such is Faust. In the development of both subjects there is a decisive turning-point which is marked in the first by the "Travels"; in the second, by the Second Part of the Tragedy. Up to this point, both in Wilhelm Meister and in Faust, subjective conditions prevail, which gradually purify themselves to higher views and aims. For the one, the battled with Natalia closes the world of wild, youthful desire; for the other, the death of Margaret has the same effect. The one steps into civil society and its manifold activity with the earnest endeavor to comprehend all its elements, to acquire and preserve and adorn itself, and to assist in illuminating and ennobling social relations; the other takes likewise a practical turn, but from the summit of Solitude, from the stand-point of the State itself. If, therefore, in the "Apprenticeship" and First Part of the Tragedy, on account of the excess of subjective conditions, a closer connection of the character and a passionate pathos are necessary, there appears, on the contrary, in the Travels and Second Part of the Tragedy's thoughtfulness which moderates everything — a cool desirousness;
secondary place. After having finished its independent career, it becomes an obscure satellite of science and philosophy, in which are absorbed both religion and art. This thought is not thus definitely formulated, but it is clearly enough indicated. Art, in revealing thought, has itself contributed to the destruction of other forms, and to its own downfall. The new art ought to be elevated above all the particular forms which it has already expressed. "Art ceases to be attached to a determinate circle of ideas and forms; it consecrates itself to a new worship, that of humanity. All that the heart of man includes within its own imminence—its joys and its sufferings, its interests, its actions, its desolations—become the domain of art." Thus the content is human nature, the form, a free combination of all the forms of the past. We shall now consider this new eclecticism in art.

Hegel points out, in concluding, a final form of literature and poetry, which is the unequivocal index of the absence of peculiar, elevated and profound ideas, and of original forms—that sentimental poetry, light or descriptive, which to-day floods the literary world and the drawing-rooms with its verses; compositions without life and without content, without originality or true inspiration; a commonplace and vague expression of all sentiment, full of aspirations and empty of ideas, where, through all, there makes itself recognized an imitation of some illustrous geniuses themselves misled in false and perilous ways; a sort of current money, analogous to the episodical style. Everybody is poet; and there is scarcely one true poet. "Whatsoever the faculties of the soul and the forms of language have received a certain degree of culture, there is no person who cannot, if he take the fancy, express in verse some situation of the soul, as any one is in condition to write a letter."

Such a style, thus universally diffused, and reproduced under a thousand forms, although with different shadings, easily becomes fastidious.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER II.

We hope to see those necessities of thought which underlie all Philosophical systems. We hope to see the truths that are common to all the diversities of opinion, and to see identity in the world of thought. But necessity in the realm of thought may be phenomenal. If there be anything which is given out as fixed, we must try its validity.

Many of the "impossibilities" of thought are easily shown to rest upon ignorance of psychological appliances. The person is not able because he does not know how—just as in other things. We must take care that we do not confound the incapacity of ignorance with the necessity of thought. (The reader will find an example of this in Sir William Hamilton's "Metaphysics," p. 227.) One of these "impossibilities" arises from neglecting the following:

Among the first distinctions to be learned by the student in philosophy is that between the imaginative form of thinking and pure thinking. The former is a sensuous grade of thinking which uses images, while the latter is a more developed stage, and is able to think objects in and for themselves. Spinoza's statement of this distinction applied to the thinking of the Infinite—his "Infini- tum imaginationis" and "Infiniitum actu vel rationis"—has been frequently alluded to by those who treat of this subject.

At first one might suppose that when finite things are the subject of thought, it would make little difference whether the first or second form of thinking is employed. This is, however, a great error. The Philosopher must always "think things under the form of eternity" if he would think the truth.

Imagination pictures objects. It represents itself only the bounded. If it tries to realize the conception of Individuata, it represents a limited somewhat, and then Reflection or the Understanding (a form of thought lying between Imagination and Reason) passes beyond the limits and assimilates them. This process may be continued indefinitely, or until Reason (or pure thinking) comes in and solves the dilemma. Thus we have a dialogue resulting somewhat as follows:

- Imagination. Come and see the Infinite just as I have pictured it.
- Understanding [keeping cautiously about it]. Where is your frame? Ah! I see it now clearly. How is this? Your frame does not include all. There is a "beyond" to your picture. I cannot tell whether you intend the inside or outside for your picture of the Infinite; I see it on both.
- Imagination. [tries to extend the frame, but with the same result as before]. I believe you are right! I am well nigh exhausted by my efforts to include the unlimited.
- Un. Ah! you see the Infinite is merely the negative of the finite or positive. It is the negative of those conditions which you place there in order to have any representation at all.

While the Understanding proceeds to deliver a course of wise saws and moral reflections on the "inability of the Finite to grasp the Infinite," setting apart upon its biped—for tripod it has none, one of the legs being broken—it self-complacently and oracularly rhinocerizes the human mind to cultivate humility; Imagination drops her brush and pencil in confusion at these words. Very opportunely Reason steps in and takes an impartial survey of the scene.

- Reason: Did you say that the Infinite is unknowable?
- Un. Yes. "To think is to limit, and hence to think the Infinite is to limit it, and thus to destroy it."

- Reason: Apply your remarks to Space. Is not Space infinite?
- Un. If I attempt to realize Space I conceive a bounded, but I at once perceive that I have placed my limits within Space, and hence my realization is inadequate. The Infinite, therefore, seems to be a beyond to my clear conception.

- Reason: Indeed! When you reflect on Space, do you not perceive that it is of such a nature that it can be limited only by itself?
- Un. Yes, that is the difficulty.
- Reason: If Space can be limited only by itself, its limit continues it instead of bounding it. Hence it is universally continuous or Infinite.
- Un. But a mere negative.
- Reason: No, not a mere negative, but the negative of all negation, and hence truly affirmative. It is the exhibition of the utter impossibility of any negative to it. All attempt to limit it, continue it. It is thus its own other. Its negative is itself. Here, then, we have a truly affirmative infinite in contradistinction to the negative infinite—the "infinite progress" that you and Imagination were engaged upon when I came in.

What you say seems to me a distinction in words merely.

- Reason: Doubtless. All distinctions are merely in words until one has learned to see them independent of words. But you must go and mend that tripod on which you are sitting; for how can one think at ease and have exhaustion when all the time propelling up his basis from without?
- Un. I cannot understand you. [Exit.]

Note.—It will be well to consider what application is to be made of these distinctions to the mind itself, whose form is consciousness. In self-knowledge or consciousness, the subject knows itself—it is its own object. Thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative Infinite. The subject is its own object—continued by its other or object. This is merely suggested here—it will be developed hereafter.

CHAPTER III.

In the first chapter we attained—or at least made the attempt to attain—some insight into the relation which Mind bears to Time and Space. It appeared that Mind is a Transcendent, i.e., something which Time and Space inhere in, rather than a somewhat, conditioned by them. Although this result agrees entirely with the religious instincts of man, which assert the immortality of the soul, and the unsubsstantiality of the existence of Time and Space, yet, as a logical result of thinking, it seems at first very unreliable. The disciplined thinker, indeed, the distinctions "a priori" and "a posteriori" inadequately treated; but his emendations will only make the results there established more wide-sweeping and conclusive.

In the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of attempting to realize in our minds the results of thought. If we have always been in the habit of regarding Mind as a property or attribute of the individual, we have conceived it not according to its true nature, but have allowed Imagination to mingle its activity in the thinking of that which is of a universal nature. Thus we are prone to say to ourselves,
Introduction to Philosophy.

It is an act of identification: "I am myself": the subject is, as predicate, completely known, or dissolved back into the subject. I cognize myself as myself; there is no alien element left standing over against me. Thus we are able to say that there must be an a priori category in order to render possible any act of knowing. All the same, we see that this category must be identical with the Ego itself, for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time a recognition; it predicates only what it recognizes. Thus, fundamentally, in knowing, Reason itself knows itself. Such a genus or primitive category, the Ego itself, in its simplest activity as the "is" (or pure Being, if taken substantively), is the activity of the Ego itself, and it is the (Ego's) first self-externalization (or its first becoming object to itself: its first act of self-consciousness). The essential activity of the Ego is in recognizing itself, and this involves self-separation, and then the annulment of this separation in the same act. In knowing myself as an object I separate the Ego from itself, but, in the very act of knowing it, I make it identical with myself. Here are two negative processes involved in the separation, and these are indivisible: first, the negative act of separation; secondly, the negative act of the annulment of the separation by the act of recognition. That the application of categories to the external world is a process of self-recognition, is now clear: we know, in self-recognizing predicates, in the object, we say, "The Rose is red, it is round, it is fragrant," &c. In this we separate what belongs to the Rose from it, and place it outside of it, and then, through the act of predication, unite it again. For a Rose contains merely the recognition of being: but being is separated from it, and joined to it in the act of predication. Thus we see that the fundamental act of self-consciousness, which is a self-separation and self-identification united in one act of recognition, we see that this fundamental act is repeated in all of knowing. We do not know even the rose without separating it from itself, and identifying the two sides thus formed. This contains a deeper thought, which we may suggest here. That the act of knowing puts all objects into this crucible, is an intimating thought; for no one can possess true, abiding being without this ability to separate itself from itself in the process of self-identification. Whatever cannot do this is no essence, but may be only an element of a process in which it ceaselessly loses its identity. But we shall recur to this again.

Douglas could follow this activity through various steps, and deduce all the categories of pure thought. This is what Plato has done in part, what Fichte has done in his Science of Knowledge ("Wissenschaftslehre") and Hegel in his Logic. A science of these pure intelligibles unless the secret of the Universe, it furnishes that "Royal Road" to all knowledge; it is the far-famed Philosopher's Stone that alone can transmute the base dross of mere talent into genius.

Every act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown somewhat into a known, as a scholar translates a new language into his own. If he did not already understand one language, he could never translate the new one. In the act of knowing, the object becomes known to us so far as I am able to recognize predicates as belonging to it. This is red; unless I know already what red means, I do not cognize the object by predicating red of it. Likewise I say, "I am," but unless I know what being means, I have not said anything intelligible. I have not expressed an act of cognition. The object becomes known to us in so far as we recognize its predicates and hence we could never know anything unless we had already the time and the knowledge, or conception, with which to commence. If we have one predicate through which we cognize some object, that act of cognition gives us a new predicate for it, has dissolved or translated a somewhat that was unknown into a known, into a "I am," and has, to that extent, annihilated the "me." Without predication to begin with, all objects would remain forever outside of our consciousness. Every consciousness itself would be impossible for the very act of self-identification implies that the predicate "me" is well known.
CHAPTER IV.

Philosophos usually begin to construct their systems in full view of their final principle. It would be absurd for one to commence a demonstration, if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove. From the final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in the philosophos mind before he can commence his demonstration. Usually, the order of demonstration which he follows is not the order of discovery; in such case, his system proceeds by external reflections. All mathematical proof is of this order. One constructs his demonstration to lead from the known to the unknown, and uses many intermediate propositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result. With another theorem, they might be used for steps to that, just as well. But there is a certain inherent development in all subjects, when examined according to the highest method, that will lead one on to the exhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein. This is called the dialectic. This dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic instrument, unless one has seen the whole system of Science; if this is not the case, the dialectic will prove merely destructive, and not constructive. It is therefore a mistake, as has been before remarked, to attempt to introduce the beginner of the study of Philosophy once into the dialectic. The content of Philosophy must be first presented under its sensuous and reflective forms, and a gradual progress established. In this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again the ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general manner as Mind. We will use the method of external reflection, and demonstrate the propositions: 1. There is an independent. 2. That being is self-determined; 3. Self-determined being is in the form of personality, i.e. an Ego.

1. Dependent being, implying its complement upon which it depends, cannot be explained through itself, but through what upon which it depends.

2. This being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being, for the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another; all that it has is borrowed. "A chain of depend, one being up to another dependent being." Dependence is not converted into independence by mere multiplication.

3. The dependent, therefore, depends upon the independent and has its explanation in it. Since all being is of one kind or the other, it follows that all being is independent, or a complemental element of it. Philosophos independence exists as an independent including whole, which is the negativeness unity.

Definition.—One of the most important elements of a thinker is the comprehension of negativeness unity. It is a unity resulting from the reciprocal cancellation of elements; e.g. Salt, is the negativeness of acid and alkali. It is called negativeness because it negates the independence of the elements with which it deals. In the negativeness unity Water, the elements oxygen and hydrogen have their independence negated.

II. —The independent being cannot exist without determinations. Without these, it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nothing.

2. Nor can the independent being be determined (i.e. limited or modified in any way) from without, or through another. For all that is determined through another is a dependent something.

3. Hence the independent being can only be a self-determined; if self-determined, it can exist through itself.

Note.—Spinoza does not arrive at the third position, but, after considering the second, arrives at the first one, and concludes, since determination through another makes a somewhat finite, the independence being must be undetermined. He does not happen to discover that there is another kind of determination, to-wit, self-determination, which can consist with independence. The method that he uses makes it entirely an accidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he does—the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination, as we shall see later. It is Hegel's aporia, that we have in the third position; with Spinoza the independence being remained an undetermined substance, but with Hegel it becomes a self-determining subject.

All that Spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary manner; it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes and attributes, nor the contrary. This aporia—that the independent being, i.e., every reality existing separate entity is self-determined—is the central point of speculative philosophy. What self-determination involves, we shall see next.

III. —1. Self-determination implies that the constitution or nature be self-originated. There is nothing about a self-determined that is created by anything else.

2. Thus self-determined being exists dually— it is (a) as determining, and (b) as determined. (a) As determining, it is the active, which contains merely the possibility of determinations; (b) as determined, it is the passive result, the act upon the subject respectively.

3. But since both are the same being, each side returns into itself: (a) as determining or active, it acts only upon its own determining and (b) as passive or determined, it is, as result of the former, the same active itself. Hence its movement is a movement of self-determination—a passing of distinction which is cancelled in the same act.

(In self-determination something is made an object, and identified with the subject in the same act.)

Moreover, the determiner, on account of its pure generality, (i.e. its having no concrete determinations as yet), can only be identity, or can only exist as the Ego exists, in thought; not as a thing, but as a generative entity. The passive side can exist only as the self exists in consciousness— as that which is in opposition and yet in identity at the same time. No finite existence could endure this contradiction, for all such must possess a nature or constitution which is self-determined; if not, each finite could negate all its properties and qualities, and yet remain itself— just as the person does when he makes abstraction of all, in thinking of the Ego or pure self.

Thus we find again our former conclusion:

All finite or dependent things must originate in and depend upon independent or absolute being, which must be an Ego. The Ego has the form of Infinitude (see Chap. II. —The Infinitude is its own Other).

Resume. The first chapter states the premises which Kant lays down in his Transcendental Exposition into the doctrine of the pure reason. The second chapter gives the Spinozian distinction of the Infinitude of the Imagination and Infinitude of Reason. The third chapter gives the logical results which Kant should have drawn from his Transcendental Exposition. The fourth chapter gives Spinoza's fundamental position logically completed, and is in the great fundamental position of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel, with reference to the Absolute.