KETNER AND COOK—CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

51 [18 September 1890] 234

Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions.


Attributed to Peirce by Fisch in First Supplement (internal evidence). This review is unsigned in Haskell's Index to The Nation, vol. 1.

Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones (1848-1922) was a British logician. She was vice-mistress at Girton College, Cambridge, and also resident lecturer in moral sciences from 1884 until 1903. Miss Jones was governor of the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth, member of the Aristotelian Society, and of the Society for Psychical Research. Among her other publications are A Primer of Ethics (1909) and A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings (1911).

Prof. Schroeder, in the preface to his important work on 'Die Algebra der Logik,' the first volume of which has recently appeared, says that the chief advance which has been made in late years in exact Logic is due to the labors of the American, Charles S. Peirce, and his school. The inmost secret of this advance, the luminous guiding principle to which it is due, is the fact that attention is concentrated upon thought-relations, and not upon the words in which they may happen to be expressed. The meaning of this may be made clear by an example. The older logicians said that in every proposition the copula is is (or are), and that it can be nothing else. The newer school looks upon this series of affirmations-

All men are mortal,
Every man is mortal,
Any man is mortal,
Being a man implies being mortal,
If any one is a man, he is mortal.

That one is a man implies that he is mortal—as indicative one and all of the same state of things, as expressive one and all of the same kind of relation, and hence as properly subject one and all to exactly the same formal treatment. In other words, it is concerned, to use again the language of Prof. Schroeder, with the canon of logical thought, and not with an analysis of the psychological processes of actual thinking. The above unification alone, for instance, makes it possible to do away with the distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions, and also with the distinction between the application and the signification (or extent and intent) of words; in any proposition the terms may be taken in either sense at pleasure without necessitating the slightest change in the formal method of procedure.

The last four of the above affirmations do not contain any very strong implication that there are any such things as men; hence, for the sake of unity, it is desirable to assume that the statement "All a is b" may still be taken as true when it is not known whether there are any a's or not. When it is said that there may not be any a's, it is not meant that the term a is logically inconceivable, but that it is perhaps not contained in an (understood) limited field of thought (what De Morgan has called the universe of discourse). How large the field of thought is at any moment may be gathered from the application which we attribute to our