negative terms; it, in denying that a thing is a virtue, we intend to call it a vice, then our universe is moral qualities; if it may perhaps be an intuition, then our universe is probably all mental qualities; if we take into account the possibility of its being a tadpole or a musical note, then our universe probably is the whole real world.

The connected questions of the existence of terms and of a limited universe are hence intimately connected with a marked simplification of logical procedure, and are therefore of more importance than it would seem at first sight. Recent English writers on logic are in the habit of discussing them from a narrower point of view; and in the handsome volume which Miss Constance Jones has just given to the logical world she does not rise above this narrow point of view. She says, for instance, on the question of existence: It seems to me, in making the assertion, “All albinos have pink eyes,” not only that one would not be naturally conscious of a doubt as to there being any albinos living at the present moment, but also that the presence of the doubt in the mind is not even apparent on reflection. This sentence betrays a twofold misapprehension of the position of her opponents on the part of Miss Jones. In the first place, it does not follow, from saying that universal propositions do not, by their form, necessarily imply the existence of the subject, that one must be in actual doubt of its existence in every particular case. In the second place, Miss Jones forgets that her opponents have a ready means of expressing the fact when it is known that the subject exists—they have merely to say that it exists. Their position is simply this: They ask that when they say, e.g., “Who breaks, pays; and there are some who break,” they shall not be considered to have said over again in the second part of the sentence what they had already said once in the first; and they ask this for the weighty reason, among others, that it enables them to assimilate the treatment of compound propositions to that of simple ones.

Miss Jones has very acute reasoning powers, a great deal of boldness and originality, and uniting patience in tracking out minute distinctions in terms and in propositions. It is a pity that she has not taken a less mechanical, a larger and more common-sense, view of a number of debatable questions. She makes, for instance, too much of the distinction between adjectives and nouns. All names are abstractions. The difference between adjectives and nouns, as far as logic is concerned, is simply that adjectives are more abstract than nouns, and that on account of their having hardly any attributes predicable of them, they have little occasion to stand as subjects of propositions. Miss Jones is in error in saying that Mill distinguishes between attributes and subjects of attributes. Mill says plainly that Logic, at least, has no concern to postulate any substratum for attributes to be attached to; that, for Logic, attributes are not only all we know, but all we need to know. It is true that language is not sufficiently elastic to enable him always to speak strictly in the terms of this theory; but when he uses the word thing, he means nothing different from a congeries of attributes. Substance-names are constantly being coined out of adjectives when demand arises; as in “The outs were in ill-humor,” “Blue and green are cold colors.”

KETNER AND COOK—CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

Nor does Miss Jones make out a good case against Mill’s view of the nature of induction. The difficulties which she feels have been well set forth and met by Venn in his recent book on “Empirical Logic.” They are difficulties of a kind not altogether dissimilar to that of the old Greek quibble—that a thing cannot move, where it is, and cannot move where it is not, and hence that proposition cannot move at all. Although Miss Jones seems to us not to have made her case good in a great many of the questions which she discusses, her book is nevertheless a noteworthy contribution to Deductive Logic.

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Locke.


CSP. identification: MS 1365; Haskell, Index to the Nation. See also: Burks, Bibliography; Fisch and Haskell, Additions to Cohen’s Bibliography.

Alexander Campbell Fraser (1819-1914) was an English philosopher and clergyman. He was educated at Edinburgh University, and was ordained to the Free Church ministry in 1844. From 1846 until 1856, he served as professor of logic and metaphysics in Edinburgh Free Church theological college, and from 1856 until 1896 held the same position at Edinburgh University. He was the Gifford Lecturer for the 1894-1896 term. He has been characterized as a stimulating teacher, whose philosophical standpoint was theism based on moral faith.

Mr. Galton’s researches have set us to asking of every distinguished personality, what were the traits of his family; although in respect, not to Mr. Galton’s eminent persons, but to the truly great—those men who, in their various directions of action, thought, and feeling, make such an impression of power that we cannot name from all history more than three hundred such—in respect to these men it has not been shown that talented families are more likely than dull families to produce them. The gifts of fortune, however, are of importance even to these. It is not true that they rise above other men as a man above a race of intelligent dogs. In the judgment of Palissy the potter (and what better witness could be asked?), the majority of geniuses are crushed under adverse circumstances, John Locke, whose biography by Berkeleyan Professor Fraser is at our hand, came of a family of small gentry, his mother being a tradesman’s daughter. The family had shown good, but no distinguished ability, and no remarkable vitality. The philosopher, John, the eldest child of his parents, was born (1632) two years after their marriage; there was one other child five years later. John Locke himself never contemplated marriage.

He resembled not in the least a genius of the regulation pattern—a great beast, incapable of self-control, self-indulgent, not paying his debts, subject to hallucinations, half-mad, absent minded. He did not even, like the popular hero, attribute all that distinguished him to his mother’s influence. He called her “pious and affectionate,” but rarely mentioned her. On the other hand, he often spoke of his father with strong love, with respect for his character, and with admira-
tion for his "parts." That father gave him all his instruction up to the age of fourteen years; and since he alone of Locke's teachers escaped the bitter malodictions of his later life for their pedantry and "verbal learning," the father it doubtless was who first taught our philosopher to think for himself.

"I no sooner perceived myself in the world," says Locke, "but I found myself in a storm." When he was ten years old, the Civil War broke out, and the house was near Bristol, one of the centres of operations. His father at first joined the Parliamentary army, but returned within two years. Such events made food for reflection and doubtless suggested toleration.

At fourteen he was put to Westminster school, under stern Dr. Bushby, whose pedantry he detested; at twenty sent torippatetic Oxford, and was still thoroughly discontented. He had not been a precocious boy, and was quite unconscious of superior power. At first he only read romances, and probably never studied very hard. He was awakened by the books of Deseartes, whose system he did not embrace, but whose lucidity encouraged him to believe himself not a fool. "This same John Locke," says Anthony à Wood, "was a man of turbulent spirit, clamorous and discontented; while the rest of our club took notes deferentially from the mouth of the master, the said Locke scorned to do so, but was ever prating and troublesome." But this is the distortion of hatred, such as that which later prompted the lie that caused Charles II. to order Locke's expulsion from his studentship. The envious tribe said to infest colleges must take everything it could in the reflection that efforts like theirs expelled John Locke from Oxford, and almost stifled the Essay concerning Human Understanding.

Two years before the Restoration, he took his master's degree, and was afterwards appointed to that life studentship, to lectureships in Greek and rhetoric, and to a censorship in moral philosophy. At a later date, he took the degree of Bachelor in Medicine. His father and brother died in 1661, leaving him about half enough to live upon. In 1666, being thirty-four years old, he made the acquaintance of Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, grandfather of the author of the 'Characteristics.' This nobleman took up Locke and formed him into a man of business, a man of the world, and a politician, fit to become, as he did become, the philosophical champion of the Glorious Revolution.

Locke falsifies the maxim that he who has done nothing great at twenty-seven years of age never will. His first publication (barring a few early verses) at double that age consisted of two anonymous articles in an encyclopaedia. He never learned to write a good style. His great 'Essay' appeared three years later, May, 1689, though he had been at work upon it for nearly twenty years. He only lived fifteen years more, during which he was much engaged in public business, so that the time of his active authorship was brief.

Locke's was a frail and diminutive figure, with sloping shoulders, a gracefully set head, a forehead appearing low because cut off below by strong eyebrows rising to an angle over a nose long, pointed, and high-ridged. His eyes were prominent, his mouth well-formed, his chin strong. He must have resembled a little the late E. H. Palmer. His health was always delicate; he was a great sufferer from asthma.

That great observer, Sydenham, many years before Locke became famous, wrote of him as "a man whom, in the acuteness of his judgment and in the simplicity—that is, the excellence—of his manners, I confidently declare to have amongst the men of our own time few equals and no superiors." That Locke's manners should have made so powerful an impression upon Sydenham bespeaks magnetism if not greatness. A fascinating companion, gay, witty, observant, shrewd, thoroughly in earnest in his convictions, he added to his good fellowship the air of meaning to get himself all the happiness out of life he could, and to impart it to those about him. He maintained he had the sanction of 2 nature in living for enjoyment, and the great pleasures he pursued were, he tells us, these five: health, reputation, knowledge, the luxury of doing good to others, and the hope of heaven. Few men have had so many warm friends; and to these friends he was devoted with a passion strong as a lover's.

At the same time he was no mean diplomatist, knew well enough how to play upon weaknesses, and no one more that he possessed the art of turning men inside out. Many little maxims on this head are scattered through his writings. He himself was impenetrable. "I believe there is not in the world," said one who had tried a lance with him, "such a master of taciturnity and passion." He confesses himself to be choleric, though soon appeased; but, in fact, self-control is the characteristic mark of his thoroughly well-regulated life. His personal economy was strict. He was methodical in his business to a fault. His prudence was carried to the point of excessive caution. He was moderate in everything, and probability was his guiding star. He was deeply religious; but it was public spirit, the benevolent wish to improve the condition of his country and the world, which was the mainspring of his life and he inspired all who wrote.

Hence, the vast influence which Locke's philosophy exerted upon the development of Europe for more than a century. If it be said that in truth no such force was exerted, but that Locke only happened to be the mouthpiece of the ideas which were destined to govern the world, can there after all be anything greater than so to anticipate the vital thought of the coming age as to be mistaken for its master? Locke's grand word was substantially this: "Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception. Men must see out of their own eyes, and it will not do to smother individual thought—the only thought there really is—beneath the weight of general propositions laid down as absolute and infallible, but really only traditional—oppressive and unwelcome heritages from a barbarous and stupid past." When we think of the manner in which the Cartesians, Spinoza, and the others had been squeezing out the quintessence of blindness from "First Principles," and consider to what that method was capable of lending itself, in religion and in politics, we cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke's thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.

Prof. Fraser's is the fourth life of Locke drawn more or less from unprinted sources. It cannot be said to be a sympathetic account of him. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming. The
account of Locke's writings is, however, unusually good; and the insufferable sophistry of T. H. Green is well disposed of in a paragraph. Prof. Fraser pleads for a new edition of Locke's works, and it is very true that this great man, whose utterances still have their lessons for the world, with wholesome influences for all plastic minds, should be studied in a complete, correct, and critical edition.

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NOTES

Attributed to Peirce by Fish in his Third Supplement (internal evidence). This note is unassigned in Haskell's Index to The Nation, vol. 1.

—Many minds nowadays are turning towards high philosophy with expectations such as wide-awake men have not indulged during fifty years of Hamiltonianism, Millism, and Spencerianism; so that the establishment of a new philosophical quarterly which may prove a focus for all the agitation of thought that struggles to-day to illuminate the deepest problems with light from modern science, is an event worthy of particular notice. The first number of the Monist (Open Court Publishing Company) opens with good promise, in articles by two Americans, one Englishman, three Germans, two Frenchmen. Mr. A. Binet, student of insular psychology, treats of the alleged physical immortality of some of these organisms. In the opening paper, Dr. Romanes defends against Wallace his segregation supplement to the Darwinian theory, i.e., that the divergence of forms is aided by varieties becoming incapable of crossing, as, for instance, by blossoming at different seasons. Prof. Cope, who, if he sometimes abandons the English language for the jargon of biology, is always distinguished by a clear style, ever at his command in impersonal matters, gives an analysis of marriage, not particularly original, and introduces a slight apology for his former recommendation of temporary unions. Prof. Ernst Mach has an "anti-metaphysical" article characteristic of the class of ingenious psychologists, if not quite accurate thinkers, to which he belongs. Mr. Max Dessor recounts exceedingly interesting things about magic mirrors considered as hypnotizing apparatus. Mr. W. M. Salter and M. Lucien Arreatt tell us something of the psychology of Höfling and of Fouillée. Among the book-notices, a certain salad of Hegel and mathematics excites our curiosity and provokes an appetite for more of this sort. The writer makes much ado to state Dr. F. E. Abbot's metaphysics, certainly as easily intelligible a theory as ever was.

—It remains to explain the name Monist. Dr. Carus, the putative editor, says: "The philosophy of the future will be a philosophy of facts, it will be positivism; and in so far as a unitary systematization of facts is the aim and ideal of all science, it will be Monism." But this is no definition of monism at all; in fact, the last clause conveys no idea. The search for a unitary conception of the world, or for a unitary systematization of science, would be a good definition of philosophy, and, with this good old word at hand, we want no other. To use the word monism in this sense would be in flagrant violation at once of usage and of the accepted principles of philosophical terminology. But this is not what is meant. Monism, as Dr. Carus himself explains it in his 'Fundamental Problems,' p. 256, is a metaphysical theory opposed to dualism or the theory of two kinds of substance—mind and matter—and also conceiving itself to be different both from idealism and materialism. But idealism and materialism are almost identical: the only difference is that idealism regards the psychical mode of activity as the fundamental and universal one, of which the physical mode is a specialization; while materialism regards the laws of physics as at the bottom of everything, and feeling as limited to special organizations. The metaphysicians who call themselves Monists are usually materialists sans le savoir. The true meaning attaching to the title of the magazine may be read in these words of the editor: "We are driven to the conclusion that the world of feelings forms an inseparable whole together with a special combination of certain facts of the objective world, namely, our body. It originates with this combination, and disappears as soon as that combination breaks to pieces. . . . Subjectivity must be conceived as the product of a cooperation of certain elements which are present in the objective world. . . . Motions are not transformed into feelings, but certain motions, . . . when cooperating in a special form, are accompanied with feelings."

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Our Dictionaries, and Other English-Language Topics.


CSP, identification: MS 1365. See also: Burks. Bibliography. This notice is unassigned in Haskell's Index to The Nation, vol. 1.

This little book is mainly taken up with notes upon the use of a few words. The hasty dictum of Dr. E. A. Freeman, that the non-ecclesiastical use of metropolis is "slang," is easily and amply refuted. Mr. Williams well says that, "for more than two hundred years the secular meaning has been the prominent one," and the only reason for not extending the statement is that Elizabethan secular writers were not fond of the Greek forms. They often alluded to London as the "mother towne" of England.

The account of "our dictionaries" could not well be flimsier; but a discriminating guide to books of reference, useful as it would be, can hardly be looked for from American publishers. "The examples collected by Johnson," says Mr. Williams, "have formed the main stock of the citations used by subsequent dictionary-makers." This, of course, does not apply to Richardson, to say nothing of Murray. The Century Dictionary has as many quotations as Johnson and Richardson together. It is no wonder that the fraction of the population which has not been engaged in the production of this world of words, has included every person capable of supervising the quotations in a really masterly way; for there was no possibility of competing with Murray and his 1,100 readers. Still, most of the Century citations are judicious and unexceptionable; and if the treatment of them is less severely scientific, it is more agreeable than that of the philosophical Society's vast collection.