JAMES'S PSYCHOLOGY. I

The Principles of Psychology.


Upon this vast work no definitive judgment can be passed for a long time; yet it is probably safe to say that it is the most important contribution that has been made to the subject for many years. Certainly it is one of the most weighty productions of American thought. The directness and sharpness with which we shall state some objections to it must be understood as a tribute of respect.

Beginning with the most external and insignificant characters, we cannot much admire it as a piece of bookmaking; for it misses the unity of an essay, and almost that of a connected series of essays, while not attaining the completeness of a thorough treatise. It is a large assortment of somewhat heterogeneous articles loosely tied up in one bag, with tendencies towards sprawling.

With an extraordinarily racy and forcible style, Prof. James is continually wresting words and phrases of exact import to unauthorized and unsuitable uses. He indulges himself with idiosyncrasies of diction and tricks of language such as usually spring up in households of great talent. To illustrate what we mean, we will open one of the volumes at random, and we come upon this: "A statement ad hominem meant as part of a reduction to the absurd." Now a reductio ad absurdum is a species of demonstration, and as such can contain no argumentum ad hominem, which is merely something a man is obliged by his personal interests to admit. On the next page, we read: "This dynamic (we had almost written dynamics) way of representing knowledge! On the same page occurs this phrase, "If unextended, it is absurd to speak of its having space relations at all," which sounds like a general attack on the geometry of points.

Prof. James's thought is highly original, or at least novel; but it is originality of the destructive kind. To prove that we do not know what it has been generally supposed that we did know, that given premises do not justify the conclusions which all other thinkers hold they do justify, is his peculiar function. For this reason the book should have been preceded by an introduction discussing the strange positions in logic upon which all its arguments turn. Even when new theories are proposed, they are based on similar negative or sceptical considera-

tions, and the one thing upon which Prof. James seems to pin his faith is the general incomprehensibility of things. He clings as passionately to that as the old lady of the anecdote did to her total depravity. Of course, he is materialistic to the core—that is to say, in a methodological sense, but not religiously, since he does not deny a separable soul nor a future life; for materialism is that form of philosophy which may safely be relied upon to leave the universe as incomprehensible as it finds it. It is possible that Prof. James would protest against this characterization of his cast of mind. Brought up under the guidance of an eloquent apostle of a form of Swedenborgianism, which is materialism driven deep and clamped on the inside, and educated to the materialistic profession, it can only be by great natural breadth of mind that he can know what materialism is, by having experienced some thoughts that are not materialistic. He inclines towards Cartesian dualism, which is of the true strain of the incomprehensibles and modern materialism's own mother. There is no form of idealism with which he will condescend to argue. Even evolutionism, which has idealistic affinities, seems to be held for superficial. It is his meter to subject to severe investigation any doctrine whatever which smells of intelligibility.

The keynote of this is struck in the preface, in these words:

"I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space within which these exist and which (3) they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable, but the discussion of them (as of other elements of experience) is the province of physics, and falls outside the province of this book. This book, 'assuming that thoughts and feelings exist, and are the vehicles of knowledge,' therupon contends that Psychology, when she has ascertained the empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought and feeling with definite conditions of the brain, can go so far—can go no farther—that is, as a natural science. If she goes farther, she becomes metaphysical. All attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities (whether the latter be named Soul, 'Transcendental Ego,' 'Ideas,' or 'Elementary Units of Consciousness') are metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality."

This is certainly well put—considered as prettication. But when we remember that a natural science is not a person, and consequently does not "decline" to do anything, the argument evaporates. It is only the students of the science who can "decline," and they are not banded together to repress any species of inquiry. Each investigator does what he can; and declines to do a thousand things most pertinent to the subject. To call a branch of an inquiry "metaphysical" is merely a mode of obfuscation, which signifies nothing but the author's personal distaste for that part of his subject. It does not in the least prove that considerations of that sort can throw no light on the questions he has to consider.
Indeed, we suspect it might be difficult to show in any way that any two branches of knowledge should be allowed to throw no light on one another. Few can see the question scientific and metaphysical. How can be shown that no one branch of knowledge is more enlightening than the other.

For, as James in "consequently rejecting" certain conclusions, against which he has nothing better to object. Nor is it in the least true that physicists confine themselves to such a "strictly positivistic point of view." Students of heat are not deterred by the impossibility of directly observing molecules from considering and accepting the kinetic theory; students of light do not brand speculations on the luminiferous ether as metaphysical; and the substantiality of matter itself is called in question in the vortex theory, which is nevertheless considered as perfectly germane to physics. All these are "attempts to explain phenomenally given elements as products of deeper-lying entities." In fact, this phrase describes, as well as loose language can, the general character of scientific hypotheses.

Remark, too, that it is not merely not chiefly the "soul" and the "transcendental ego," for which incohensibles he has some tenderness, that Prof. James proposes to banish from psychology, but especially ideas which their adherents maintain are direct data of consciousness. In short, not only does he propose, by the simple expedient of declaring certain inquiries extra-psychological, to reverse the conclusions of the science upon many important points, but also by the same negative means to decide upon the character of its data. Indeed, when we come to examine the book, we find it is precisely this which is the main use the author makes of his new principle. The notion that the natural sciences accept their data uncritically we hold to be a serious mistake. It is true, scientific men do not subject their observations to the kind of criticism practised by the high-flying philosophers, because they do not believe that method of criticism sound. If they really believe in idealism, they would bring it to bear upon physics as much as possible. But in fact they find it a wordy doctrine, not susceptible of any scientific applications. When, however, a physicist has to investigate, say, such a subject as the scintillation of the stars, the first thing he does is to subject the phenomena to rigid criticism to find whether these phenomena are objective or subjective, whether they are in the light itself, or arise in the eye, or in original principles of mental action, or in idiosyncrasies of the imagination, etc. The principle of the uncritical acceptance of data, to which Prof. James cling, practically amounts to a claim to a new kind of liberty of thought, which would make a complete rupture with accepted methods of psychology and of science in general. The truth of this is seen in the chief application that has been made of the new method, in the author's theory of space-perception. And into the enterprise of thus revolutionizing scientific method he enters with a light heart, without any exhaustive scrutiny of his new logic in its generality, relying only on the resources of the moment. He distinctly encourages a separate study of the method. "No rules can be laid down in advance. Comparative observations, to be definite, must usually be made to test some pre-existing hypothesis; and the only thing then is to use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be as candid as you can."

The Principles of Psychology.

By William James, Professor of Psychology in Harvard University. [American Science Series, Advanced Course.] Henry Holt & Co. 1890. 2 vols., 8vo, pp. xii + 689, and vi + 704.

We have no space for any analysis of the contents of this work, nor is that necessary, for everybody interested in the subject must and will read the book. It discusses most of the topics of psychology in an extremely unequal way, but always interesting and always entertaining. We will endeavor to give a fair specimen of the author's critical method (for the work is essentially a criticism and exposition of critical principles), with running commentary, to aid a judgment. For this purpose we will select a short section entitled "Is Perception Unconscious Inference?" Perception in its most characteristic features is, of course, a matter of association in a wide sense of that term. If two spots of light are thrown upon the wall of a dark room so as to be adjacent, and one of these is made red while the other remains white, the white one will appear greenish by contrast. If they are viewed through a narrow tube, and this is moved so that the red spot goes out of view, still the white one will continue to look green. But if the red light, now unseemly, be extinguished and we then remove the tube from the eye, so as to take a new look, as it were, the apparent greenness will suddenly vanish. This is an example of a thousand phenomena which have led several German psychologists to declare that the process of perception is one of reasoning in a generalized sense of that term.

It is possible some of the earlier writers held it to be reasoning, strictly speaking. But most have called it "unconscious inference," and unconscious inference differs essentially from inference in the narrow sense, all our control over which depends upon this, that it involves a conscious, though it may be an indistinct, reference to a genus of arguments. These German writers must also not be understood as meaning that the perceptive process is any more inferential than are the rest of the processes which the English have so long explained by association—a theory which until quite recently played little part in German psychology. The German writers alluded to explain an ordinary suggestion productive of belief, or any cognition tantamount to belief, as inference conscious or unconscious, as a matter of course. As German writers are generally weak in their formal logic, they would be apt to formulate the inference wrongly; but the correct formulation is as follows:

A well-recognized kind of object, M, has for its ordinary predicates P1, P2, P3, etc., indistinctly recognized.

The suggesting object, S, has these same predicates, P1, P2, P3, etc.

Hence, S is of the kind M.

This is hypothetic inference in form. The first premise is not actually thought, though it is in the mind habitually. This, of itself, would not make the inference unconscious. But it is on account of it not recognized as an inference.