DICTIONARY
OF
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

INCLUDING
MANY OF THE PRINCIPAL CONCEPTIONS OF ETHICS, LOGIC, AESTHETICS, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, MENTAL PATHOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, BIOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, AND EDUCATION

AND GIVING
A TERMINOLOGY IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND ITALIAN

WRITTEN BY MANY HANDS
AND EDITED BY
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WITH THE CO-OPERATION AND ASSISTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF CONSULTING EDITORS

IN THREE VOLUMES
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND EXTENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHIES

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EDITOR’S PREFACE

I.

It may be well, before proceeding to define the scope and present some of the
features of this work, to indicate the objects which were entertained in preparing
it. It may be said, in general, that two purposes are combined in it, which may
be distinguished without attempting to decide which was more important in the
execution: first, that of doing something for the thinking of the time in the way
of definition, statement, and terminology; and second, that of serving the cause
of education in the subjects treated.

As to the former of these intentions, the details of the contents of the work, as
described below in this introduction, may give some preliminary light; especially
in the way of securing judgment from the reader on what is attempted rather than
on what is not. In all attempts to improve terminology or to settle the meanings
of terms, one finds oneself in the presence of manifold pitfalls, that the
assumption of failure is commonly made from the start. And this assumption is
just, when made with reference to attempts of certain types. If one aims at
securing the adoption of new meanings or of new terms, one is in most cases doomed
to failure. If one presumes to settle arbitrarily the relative claims of conflicting
usages, one’s failure is well-nigh as sure. If one attempts to reach a consensus of
authoritative opinions, that does not succeed, for the minority may after all be those
who establish the future course. So evident is all this that it requires some
hardiness to set out on such an undertaking at all; and the change of coming off
with reasonable success seems to be in proportion to the unimportance of what
is attempted.

We, therefore, eschew none of these things. Our task has not been to
originate terms or to make meanings; not to enlarge our vocabulary or to
suppress synonyms. We are, on the contrary, undertaking a more moderate and,
withal, a more reasonable task,—a task, which, as regards the use of terms, is
twofold: to understand the meanings which our terms have, and to render them
by clear definitions,—this on the one hand; and to interpret the movements of
thought through which the meanings thus determined have arisen, with a view to
discovering what is really vital in the development of thought and term in one,—
this on the other hand. So much may be said without presenting a dissertation on
the philosophy of language, or suggesting the outline of a would-be science of
Semantics. In most cases, the success of this attempt depends upon the state
of discussion of the subject-matter, here or there. Often we have found, for
instance, that there were real distinctions, which clear definition failed to
disclose, justifying both of two usages, or making it plain that one of them
rested on a misapprehension. Again, it often happens that an older term has been
erroneously accorded a mistaken assertion of novelty by a writer unacquainted,
or by its indiscriminate use with a meaning slightly at variance with the
earlier. These instances may be taken as typical of the sorts of ambiguity and
irrelevancy which the student of this subject is constantly meeting, and which
may often be cleared away by concise and authoritative definitions.

Authoritative, it should be said: for despite the fact that authority may not
keep usage true, nevertheless it is often authority which makes usage false; and
All the thought which defines, estimates, devises methods, and sets categories for science—which, to use a comprehensive term, "justifies" knowledge and life, together with all the ways of coming into relation to things other than by knowledge—will be involved with the matter of science. If there is a dispensation about the function of philosophy, it arises, we take it, through two main ways of regarding the conception of philosophy: of which the one makes philosophy a rethinking and deeper and authority of results safely come to by a process, and of which the other makes philosophy the criticism—in Herbert's phrase, the 'refinement'—of the conceptions upon which science proceeds, and upon which, with all its values and importance, rests life so no less knowledge. The one assumes knowledge, and aims to systematize it; the other criticizes knowledge, and aims to idealize it. The one begins with facts, with things as they are, and aims to understand them so thoroughly that one insight will cover them all; the other lays claim to the insight, the ideal, the universal, and says: 'Whatever things may seem to be to science and for experience, this is what, for good and all, they really are and mean.'

We are inadequate this distinction may be to reflect the ways of approaching the world in the name of philosophy, it may illustrate our understanding of the philosophy, that is, science, and of the philosophy that criticizes and transforms science with a view to the demands of life. In either case, however, the data of science, broadly conceived, are there with their claims. We treat both of the philosophy that is science, and of the philosophy that criticizes and transforms science with a view to the demands of life. In either case, however, the data of science, broadly conceived, are there with their claims. We treat both of the philosophy that is science, and of the philosophy that criticizes and transforms science with a view to the demands of life.

Some of these things is the weakness of many a contemporary writer on philosophy. Such a one criticizes a science which he does not understand; he fails to see the significance of the inroads science is making into the territory which has so long seemed to be exempt. Note that science is based on biological principles, in however modified form, to psychological facts; the transition to moral phenomena by statistical methods; and the gradual retreat of the notion of purpose before the naturalist, with the revised conception of teleology which this makes necessary. And these things are but examples. We have aimed, therefore, to present science—physical, natural, moral—with a fullness of detail, and an actory not before undertaken in a work of this kind. In the selection of the topic, in the form and length of treatment, in the bibliographical list, this emphasis will be found throughout. Furthermore, the newer advances in scientific method have been made, and the subject of life has been a reference to the topic Variation—where the statistical treatment of biological phenomena is explained—or to the topic Probability, will show. Both these topics are becoming of special importance to the psychologist, the moralist, and the student of life.

An additional and more positive reason for the wide inclusion of science is to be found in the present state of psychological studies, of which more is said below. As to philosophy proper—the discipline which calls itself by that name—we are not at the point of view; this is one of the distinguishing features of the work. They trace historically movements when this is necessary for the exposition or justification of the definitions made or the usages recommended; and the bias of thought is comprehensively illustrated through the selection of topics over the whole vocabulary of philosophy. Yet no one of these things has been made an end in itself; rather have we aimed at truth to history, and fair appreciation of the spirit of historical research. More particularly, also, is it the history of
conceptions rather than that of terms that has concerned us. Lexicographical and linguistic determinations are largely foreign to our task. Meanings, with their historical development, together with the terms which have expressed them and their variations—these are the essentials of our quest.

And secondly, we have subjected ourselves to another very definite and evident limitation on the side of exclusion. It would be useless to attempt in any comprehensive, or even independent work as large as this, to make a Dictionary of Greek and Scholastic Philosophy. It should be done; it is much needed; but we have not attempted it. We include special articles on Greek and Latin Terminology, with select glossaries of representative terms; and it will be found that many of the finer distinctions of scholastic as well as of ancient thought are brought out in connection with the terms which in our modern vocabulary express or represent them. Yet when all is said, the student of scholastic thought, as of Greek thought, will find so many gaps that it is only just to our limited purpose to warn him of them at advance. It is a change which has come into the subject,—this facing of philosophy towards science and modern life, instead of towards logic and ancient life,—and in consciously accepting the change we accept as well the inevitable criticism it will bring upon us.

As to the prominent place given to psychology, no further justification of it is required than the statement that this is what we set out to do,—to prepare a work devoted to philosophy and psychology. The association of these two subjects is traditional and, as to their content, essential. Psychology is the halfway house between biology with the whole range of the objective sciences, on the one hand, and the moral sciences with philosophy, on the other hand. The chain to this place laid by psychology to-day is no more plain than is the proof of it which the results of that department make good. The rise of experimental and physiological psychology has caused the science to bulk large towards the empirical disciplines, as it always has towards the speculative; and the roads made by psychological analysis and investigation into the domains where the speculative methods of inquiry, spoken of above, were once exclusively in vogue, render permanent and definite the relation on that side as well. In biology, in sociology, in anthropology, in ethics, in economics, in law, even in physics, the demand is for sound psychology; and the criticism that is making itself felt is psychological criticism. How could it be otherwise when once it is recognized that science is the work of man, and that the explaining principles by which any science advances beyond the mere cataloguing of facts are abstract conceptions made by processes of thought?

It will be found, therefore, that it is upon the psychology of this work that most of its lines converge; and it is in its psychology that many of the hopes of its producers centre. That the psychology be found less adequate than it might be, and that it be found less adequate than it should be,—that is the judgment we wish most of all to escape.

III.

Coming now to more particular features of the work, we may make certain explanations. The Editor has had responsible charge, and, in the negative sense of control, nothing in these volumes is outside of his responsibility. He has used this responsibility freely. He has assigned and reassigned articles, supplemented articles, rewritten articles, rejected articles. But it has been his universal rule—departed from only in cases of trivialities or of cosmic obstacles like those of time and space—to exercise these prerogatives under the checks and controls supplied by the board of consulting editors. This board has been an indispensable part of the Dictionary organization. Certain of the members have read the articles of one another and of the other writers, either in manuscript or in proof; they have passed and repassed suggestions, criticisms, and emendations; they have laboured on definitions, equivalents, literature, with a patience and self-denial which leads one to accept Aristotle's high estimate of philosophers. Accordingly there is hardly anything in the work which has not the supervision of the men of the highest authority. This should be remembered by the single writer or student who finds this or that point unsatisfactory. He is one; we are many. And this, the co-operative feature, has been a leading—if not the leading—methodical feature of the work from its first inception.

It has been the especial function of the consulting board to supply the recommendations as to foreign equivalents for all the terms defined in the work. The undertaking, while extremely difficult, has been on the whole gratifyingly successful. Of course, the developing state of philosophical terminology makes conventions effective, notably as between different languages,—to say nothing of the artificial character of convention as such in matters linguistic; but it is our hope and belief that in this feature, thanks to the enormous pains and toil devoted to it by our consulting editors and contributors, we are making a measure of gain for international science and philosophy. The thanks of all readers of the book are due in the fullest measure—not at all to underwith any of the others—to Professor Morelli and Professor Fleurnoy, members respectively of the Italian and French committees.

As to the preparation of the articles, more specifically, the plan has been as follows. Two authorities determined upon the terms in a given department in the first instance, and divided the topics between them. As their work advanced, they exchanged their manuscripts for suggestion and consultation. After this, the important articles of research were submitted to other authorities also especially versed in these topics. Passing then through the hands of the editor, the copy went in those cases in which matters of detail remained still unsettled, to one or other of the consulting editors; for his opinions and counsel, and to the foreign boards for their revision, and especially for the consideration of the foreign equivalents and the supplementing of the select literature lists. Further than this, the editors have gone both to the authors—in most cases of joint authorship to all of the authors—and to the foreign editors. Of course, after all this, much has remained for the Editor to decide, notably in the matter of conclusion and of style; for he has been obliged to use his best judgment. Whenever he has been mistaken, it has been his purpose that it should be so, and he has been as far as lay in his power to lay the blame elsewhere. The editors have been as far as lay in their power to make the work a self-sustained whole. This is the more to be said, seeing that it has not been possible in every case to achieve the alternatives in the text, or to indicate the authorities pro and con by name. Yet in cases of important controversy, second proofs were sent to the writers. So far, however, actual authorship goes, the writers' names are in all cases appended.

The distribution of responsibility in cases of joint signature conforms to the rules which follow.

When an article is signed by one set of initials only (A.B.C.), the author is responsible for the whole article, except the recommendations as to foreign equivalents; though possibly the same as those originally suggested by the writer of the article, are nevertheless inserted as recommendations of the board of consulting editors. In cases in which a recommendation of a distinctly original or novel usage is given by any one of the staff, or is taken from a printed authority, the source, whether personal or public, is indicated, in connection with the latter
recommended, in the form: Elevation (P. J.). When lacking this indication, a topic-term is itself due to the writer who assigns the article, e.g., Autotelic, signed (J.M.B.).

In cases of actual joint authorship of an article or part of an article, two cases will be found: either—and where possible—each contributor's initials are added to his section of the article, or the two sets of initials, joined by a hyphen, are set at the end, thus: (A.B.C.—X.Y.Z.). In most cases of signature indicates that the article was originally written by A.B.C. (the signature standing first), but has undergone more or less important modification to meet the criticisms or suggestions of X.Y.Z. In many cases the contribution of X.Y.Z. is decidedly less than that of A.B.C.; but in all cases it was judged sufficient to justify the citing of the article as the product of the two writers together. The articles by President and Pro-Fessor Herrick are all of joint authorship, and are signed (H.H.).

Another case is the signature by two persons with a comma—not a hyphen—between them: (A.B.C., X.Y.Z.). This indicates that the article was written by A.B.C. and accepted without alteration by X.Y.Z., who thus adds the weight of his authority to it. This feature has not in general been deemed explicitly necessary, but is limited to cases of positive teaching on disputed points or of topics about which combined authority is considered, for any other reason, of great importance. A case in point is the article on Heredity, in which positive views are expressed over and above the scientific definition. Throughout the range of topics in general psychology many such double signatures will be found. In this latter subject, a detailed and prolonged series of conferences has led to the formulation of a series of definitions and expositions to which both of the writers at work have found it possible to add their joint signatures in one or other of the two forms here explained. And the experimental psychology has been treated with equal care.

The treatment is primarily, as has been said, that of a dictionary; not that of an encyclopedia. The articles are of three sorts: first, concise definitions; second, such definitions with the addition of certain historical and expository matter, running to several hundred words; third, articles called 'special,' on topics which seemed, in view of either of the general purpose set forth above, to call for extended treatment. These last are of encyclopedic character, varying in length from 1,000 to 5,000 words. Important movements in the history of philosophy, the general divisions of the topic Philosophy itself, and select subjects in all of the general departments of science, have this special treatment. In most cases these select articles have the further justification that they are written with a view to gathering in a generalization and resume many of the subordinate topics treated in a more detailed way in their respective places. The article Vision may be cited in illustration both of the nature and the use also of the utility of this feature.

A closer examination of the relative importance given to each of the departments represented—whether calculated from the average length of the articles or from the entire space devoted to the subject—will show that there is more or less logical and intentional adjustment about the central subjects Psychology and Psychology. The figure given below presents in a rough way an idea of the adjustment. The vertical ordinates 1, 2, 3, &c., vary in length from the centre outwards in both directions. It will be seen that Philosophy and Anthropology, for example, have generous treatment; this for the practical reason—that from other justification—that the topics have not been well written up for the student of philosophy or the student of anthropology, and that the sources are scattered and relatively unavailable. In these and other subjects the intention has been to emphasize what the student of philosophy ought to know, rather than what he does know. On both sides the curve is low, and it is only by the good fortune that Dr. Rand had them already largely prepared that we were able to secure them. This fact

Biography is not made a prominent feature—quite the reverse. Only the outstanding biographical facts are recorded, which any reader of philosophy should know, or know where to find, if he is to be educated. Sealing that the volume of bibliographies is arranged by authors' names, the titles of their works are not given in the bibliographies; and seeing that in the articles on the important movements of thought the names of prominent thinkers are given, separate accounts of authors' views are not generally attempted. There has resulted, therefore, simply by reason of this incidental division of the material commodity, a certain measure to look at the biographies, which is sure to strike the reader.

The bibliographical feature, on the contrary, has been given excessive pains and care. The plan is to include the best references—both magazines articles and select books—under the topic in each case, even though in many instances this repeats the entries of book titles made in the volume (iii) of general bibliographies. Yet the fact that the titles of all such independent publications are given in full and with due this form of publication, in the separate volume devoted to it, makes it unnecessary that the same details should be given in the select lists. Thus some inconsistency in the details of citation (as of dates), and some lack of uniformity in the references to catalogues, will be found in the select lists. They have been printed very largely as originally in by the writers, except cases where abbreviations have been reduced to the form given in the lists tabulated at the beginning of this volume (i). When the writers include dates of publication, these are allowed to stand, although they are also given in Vol. iii, for whatever saves the reader time and trouble is, in so far, good, and consistency should not be made a catch.

The place of publication, however, has not been given in the select lists, except in departments, notably Neurality, which are not represented in the general bibliographies. The writers' direct responsibility for these select lists is, however, not the same as for the articles: for the Editor and his associates have taken a free hand in supplementing and completing them. The references in the volumes (i and ii) of text made in the form 'see Bullnoo, A. 1, c.' are to the general bibliographies of Vol. iii.

As to the general bibliographies, an editorial word may well be added; to the effect that the Editors' responsibility for them is not the same as for the matter in the other volumes. It was not a part of the original plan to compile such extensive bibliographies; but it was only by the good fortune that Dr. Rand had them already largely prepared that we were able to secure them. This fact
made it impossible for the editorial management to bring them entirely within the scheme of execution of the whole. So far as possible, they have been made an intrinsic part of the work, and in their terminology and general character they maintain it form consistently. But the special character of that effect—so to said these given respects relatively fulfilling, the division of topics, the form of citation, &c., were determined independently in the first instance, and to change them in a material way would have been the liberal means to make the lists over. They are, therefore, more largely the independent work of one man.

In regard to future bibliographies, we may say that it is intended to continue the issue of the Psychological Index in its present form both as a part of the Psychological Review and as a supplement to this Dictionary. The issues beginning with that of April, 1901 (No. 7), incorporate certain changes in classification made by arrangement with the foreign journals Zeitschrift für Psychologie and Annale Psychologie, which publish the main lists;—changes which make the Index, as respects both terminology and divisions, identical with the scheme printed in this work under the topic Psychology. This scheme of classification, resulting as it has from the long experiences of professional workers, and gradually improved by international co-operation, is recommended to librarians and bibliographers generally. Other bibliographical annals are the excellent lists printed by the Archiv für systematische Philosophie and the Revue Vio-Néo-Scéptique.

IV.

In matters of lexicography, use has been made, by permission, of both the Century and the Standard Dictionaries; in the derivations the Century has generally been followed. The rules of composition and orthography of the Clarendon Press, for which Dr. Murray, editor of the New English Dictionary, is largely responsible, have been adopted, except in certain specific matters, and the results are thus in general accord with the recommendations of this last-named work. Indelibility should also be achieved by Einleitung der philosophischen Begeister, which by reason of its plan of giving large numbers of quotations (though mainly from German authors), and its comprehensive scope and recent appearance, has been more available than any other list of literature.

IV.

Other indications are made by the individual writers themselves of the sources found by them respectively to be most available; and very frequent references will be found to the good uniform work by Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie of Professor Eucken. Useful earlier books, which, in this feature or that, cover our territory, and on which we have drawn, are Nøkle's Philologisch-gelehrtes Lexicon (1847), and Ebeling's Worterbuch der philosophischen Begeister, which contains, in the preface, a bibliographical note on earlier attempts at Dictionaries of Philosophy; and the Vocabularies devoted to particular authors, certain of which are named in the articles on the terminologies of the great philosophers (Kant's, Hegel's, Greek Terminology, and the Scholastic Terminology). Additional references to the sources of Scholastic usage are to be found in the article on Patristic Philosophy and in that on St. Thomas.

As in the case of most works of this kind, it has been found impossible to keep all the threads equally taut as the manufacture has proceeded; and certain evidences of this will be open to the eye of the careful observer. In particular, it has been found advisable to keep the 'polls open' as long as possible in the matter of recommendations as to equivalents, &c.; and in order to do this the term Terminology has itself been made a topic in its alphabetical place. Under various sections of that article—German, French, &c.—discussions are to be found of certain terms which present difficulty. The recommendations therein made will not be found a unities there be special declination to that effect—so to said these given respectively under the main English topics. They serve the rather to supplement them, and to settle points left indefinite or undecided in the earlier issues. The resources which this procedure enables available is openly resorted to in many instances. Further, the development in the plan of the Dictionary made incidental changes necessary in one or two departments—as, e.g., the expansion of certain subjects after articles upon them had already been written. The Editor recognizes particularly the goodness of Principal Lloyd Morgan and Professor Pickering for permitting this in connection with certain of their topics. After these explanations, no doubt, some one will say that this is not a Dictionary of Philosophy; and if it would help matters to call it rather a 'dictionary for philosophers,' it that there would be no objection. What we care to make plain is that we do not wish to be considered as having prepared a work in support of any specific view of philosophy, but rather, as having wished to present materials and definitions which workers in philosophy and science generally might find useful and reliable.

V.

Obligations of so extensive a character, extending over seven years, have been contracted by the Editor and his associates, that only a general declaration of habitual and generous gratitude can reach all to whom it is due. In particular, speaking for themselves, the contributors desire to thank each of those who have given advice to them or made suggestions. The department of anthropolog aty extends more specific thanks to Professor F. Boas, of Columbia University. The Editor finds himself, apart from his great obligation to the consulting editors, grateful to those contributors of special articles who have generously given their work without financial compensation. Some of the longest and most important articles in the work have thus been given without remuneration. To Professor Warren he owe thanks for unasked and unstinted aid in many matters; and to Mr. Baldwin, who supplemented the corrected proofs and gave much general assistance. During the progress of our work we have lost the presence and active aid of Professor Henry Sidgwick, from whose active co-operation we gained much, and whose counsel we had learned to look. He gave his time ungrudgingly to the criticism and revision of the articles in ethics, at the same time requesting that what he did should be counted as editorial, and so should not be set off with his name. The writers in ethics, as well as the Editors, sought his advice in many matters besides, felt in an especial way the loss of his masterly thought, and miss his genial and kindly personality. He illustrated at its fullest the spirit of judicial inquiry and fair criticism which the Editors have aimed to make the ideal of our work; and his going is a loss not only to us, but to the whole philosophical world.

The Editor finds it a peculiarly pleasant task to acknowledge the many personal, no less than professional, courtesies extended to him during his year of residence at Oxford for the printing of the Dictionary at the Clarendon Press. Of the personal, it is not here the place to speak; but for the very unusual arrangements to meet his needs and to facilitate his work made by the Librarians, the late Sir Henry Acland, and the other authorities of the Radcliffe Library,—extending to the prompt delivery of large purchase of books which he required,—and by the Controller of the Press in the many ways in which the resources of such an editorial undertaking may be made more available,—for these things he is sincerely grateful. It may
EDITOR'S PREFACE.

be taken to show, perhaps (not in any way to intimate that this sort of thing is unusual in Oxford and in England, or on this side of the water in the case of men from the other side), that the idea of international co-operation which the Dictionary embodies extends not alone to the tasks in hand, but finds confirmation in a large spirit of recognition and encouragement. The Cambridge people, with the lamented Henry Sidgwick and with James Ward at their head, responded in the same spirit; and it may not be judged a violation of the proprieties of a preface to suggest to any literary Christian who is bearing a pack—say an editorial pack, which is the heaviest of all—that if he go to Oxford or Cambridge he will find his yoke made easy and his burden light in a very material way. While being no personal, the Editor may also be allowed to extend the reference to his own University, and to thank President Patton and the Board of Trustees for the leave of absence for a year, granted expressly for the prosecution of this work.

Finally, the Editor must express verbally his apologies for the evident shortcomings of the book. No one man, of course, could compass the field mapped out for the Dictionary; the present Editor least of all. He has been the mouthpiece of his collaborators in their respective specialties, and the work is as much theirs as his. His opinion has counted only as one among many; it has been sacrificed often probably more than that of any one else; and it has changed time and again, as the consultations have advanced. May the future Dictionary of Philosophy profit somewhat by our labours, and if it profit also by our mistakes, that will be no less a point of justification for our endeavour.

It is intended to issue the remainder of the text—completing the alphabetical treatment of topics—together with full indices of Greek, Latin, German, French, and Italian terms, in Vol. ii, and to devote Vol. iii exclusively to the general bibliographies. Short prefatory notes are to be found at the beginnings of Vol. ii and Vol. iii.

Readers are requested to send to the Editor, at Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., corrections or suggestions of alterations of any sort, with a view to the possible issue of another edition, if the sale of the work should justify it. And to those who adopt the recommendations of the text it may not be too much to suggest that a note be printed in their publications saying that they follow in whole or part the scheme of terminology recommended in the Dictionary. Editors of Journals often find uniformity of usage desirable on the part of their contributors; and in case the Dictionary system prove an advance in the matter, it would seem but fair recognition of the work and encouragement to the publishers, who have generously taken upon themselves the cost of publication and the payment of the contributors, to request their writers to conform, so far as may be possible, to the usages here suggested. The recommendations of foreign equivalents have been made in part to meet the urgent needs of translators—a need which the most competent are the first to feel—and in cases in which the renderings here given are followed, it may not be improper to ask that a note be printed to that effect. The same suggestion in kind may be made also concerning the lists of Abbreviations immediately following the Table of Contents; they have been prepared on the basis of earlier schemes, and in a conservative spirit.

THE EDITOR.

Princeton University, June, 1901.
ABBREVIATIONS

I. ABBREVIATIONS OF TERMS OCCURRING IN TITLES OF JOURNALS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Abbreviations

English

A. The American Journal of Anthropology
B. The American Journal of Psychology
C. The American Journal of Sociology
D. The American Journal of Psychology
E. The American Journal of Nutrition
F. The American Journal of Education
G. The American Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

B. The British Journal of Psychology
C. The British Journal of Sociology
D. The British Journal of Education
E. The British Journal of Nutrition
F. The British Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Australasian Journal of Psychology
B. The Australasian Journal of Sociology
C. The Australasian Journal of Education
D. The Australasian Journal of Nutrition
E. The Australasian Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Australian Journal of Anthropology
B. The Australian Journal of Psychology
C. The Australian Journal of Sociology
D. The Australian Journal of Education
E. The Australian Journal of Nutrition
F. The Australian Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Canadian Journal of Anthropology
B. The Canadian Journal of Psychology
C. The Canadian Journal of Sociology
D. The Canadian Journal of Education
E. The Canadian Journal of Nutrition
F. The Canadian Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Chinese Journal of Anthropology
B. The Chinese Journal of Psychology
C. The Chinese Journal of Sociology
D. The Chinese Journal of Education
E. The Chinese Journal of Nutrition
F. The Chinese Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Croatian Journal of Anthropology
B. The Croatian Journal of Psychology
C. The Croatian Journal of Sociology
D. The Croatian Journal of Education
E. The Croatian Journal of Nutrition
F. The Croatian Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Danish Journal of Anthropology
B. The Danish Journal of Psychology
C. The Danish Journal of Sociology
D. The Danish Journal of Education
E. The Danish Journal of Nutrition
F. The Danish Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Dutch Journal of Anthropology
B. The Dutch Journal of Psychology
C. The Dutch Journal of Sociology
D. The Dutch Journal of Education
E. The Dutch Journal of Nutrition
F. The Dutch Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The East European Journal of Anthropology
B. The East European Journal of Psychology
C. The East European Journal of Sociology
D. The East European Journal of Education
E. The East European Journal of Nutrition
F. The East European Journal of Economics

Abbreviations

A. The Eastern Journal of Anthropology
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C. The European Journal of Sociology
D. The European Journal of Education
E. The European Journal of Nutrition
F. The European Journal of Economics
I. ABBREVIATIONS OF TERMS

Prop. = Program, Programmer's
       = Psych., Psychologie, Psyche
Psyeh. = Psychologie
Physiol. = Physiological
Psychiat. = Psychiatry
P., 1. = Physiologist
Psychol. = Psychology
Publ., publ. = Publications, published
Quar. = Quarterly
Quoted. = Questionnaire, Questions
Quot. = Questionable
R. = ReaL (Ital.)
Rec. = Record, Record's
Ref. = Reference, Refered
Ref. = Reference, Recommended
Rendit. = Rendition
Report. = Reporter
Rep. = Report
Rev. = Review, Review's
Rev. = Revised
Riv. = Rivista
Riv. = Rivista
Ser. = Series
Schild. = Schild, Schillah's
Schl. = Schlafr, Schlaf's
Sci. = Science
Sci. = Scientific
Sci. = Science
Seminaries, Seminars
Semin. = Seminary
Selbständ. = Selbständiges
Sitzungsbericht
Sitzungsberichte
Sitzungsberichte
Sitzungsberichte
Smithson. = Smithsonian
Soc. = Society, Social
Soc. = Society, Social
Soc. = Society, Social
Soc. = Society, Social
Soc. = Society, Social
Soz. = Sociology
Spanish
Spektrum
Spektrum
Spektrum de Italian
Spektrum
Staat. = Staatliches
Stat. = Statistische
Stud. = Studies, Studenten
Suppl. = Supplement, Supplements
Surg. = Surgery, Surgical
Syst. = System
System.
Theory, Theories
Therapy, Therapeutic
Therapeutics, Therapeutics's
Tijdschrift
Tijd. = Tijd, Dutch
Tr. = Translations
Trans. = Transactions
Tran,. = Trans., (Eng. &c.)
Trav. = Travel, Travels
Trav. = Travels
Tribe.
Troca.
Tri.
II. ABBREVIATIONS OF TITLES

Mom. Amer. Acad. Arts and Sci.

Proe. Amer. Acad. Arts and Sci.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sci.</td>
<td>Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sci. of Edu.</td>
<td>Science of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scient. Amor. Suppl.</td>
<td>Scientific American Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sci. Progress</td>
<td>Scientific Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saline Med.</td>
<td>Saline Medical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somarg, mobil mont.</td>
<td>Somarg, mobile mountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitzber. Akad. Wiss. München</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in München</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitzber. Akad. Wiss. Wien</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skand. Arch. f. Physiol.</td>
<td>Scandinavian Archives of Physiology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. and Ed. Interpret.</td>
<td>Society and Education Interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneale</td>
<td>Spontaneous</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stud. in Ed.</td>
<td>Studies in Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stud. Yale Psychol. Lab.</td>
<td>Studies Yale Psychology Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec. Dis. Ety</td>
<td>Special Division of Etymology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syst. d. Philos.</td>
<td>System of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>System. Thed.</td>
<td>Systematic Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas Acad. of Sci.</td>
<td>Texas Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco Med. and Surg. Reg't.</td>
<td>Tobacco Medical and Surgical Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc.</td>
<td>Transactions of the American Philosophical Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc.</td>
<td>Transactions of the American Philosophical Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trans. Canad. Inst.</td>
<td>Transactions of the Canadian Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trib. Med.</td>
<td>Tribes of Medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tubber's Rev. of Psychol. Med.</td>
<td>Tubber's Review of Psychology and Medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twenty Cent. Pract. of Med.</td>
<td>Twenty Century Practice of Medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. Cps.</td>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. Med. Mag.</td>
<td>University Medical Magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. of Cal. Stud.</td>
<td>University of California Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. of Chicago Contrib. to Philos.</td>
<td>University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. of Iowa Stud. in Psychol.</td>
<td>University of Iowa Studies in Psychology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Univ. of Toronto Stud.—Psychol. Ser.</td>
<td>University of Toronto Studies—Psychology Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verbal of Philos.</td>
<td>Verbal of Philosophy</td>
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<td>Vograls Philos.</td>
<td>Vorgrals Philos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vorsch.</td>
<td>Vorschlag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Völk. f. gerichtl. Mod.</td>
<td>Volks for rechtlichen Modus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Völk. f. Wiss. Physiol.</td>
<td>Volks für Wissenschaft der Physiologie</td>
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<td>Wiedl. v. h. med. Tijds. Geneesk.</td>
<td>Wiedl. van de medische Tijdschrift der Geneeskunde</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Reserv. Univ. Med.</td>
<td>West Reserve University Medical</td>
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<td>Westminister Rev.</td>
<td>Westminster Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wien. med. Presse</td>
<td>Wiener medizinische Presse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wien. med. Wochensch.</td>
<td>Wiener medizinische Wochenschrift</td>
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<tr>
<td>Würtz. d. philos. Grundbegriffe</td>
<td>Wurtz der philosophischen Grundbegriffe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Würtz. d. philos. Grundbegriffe</td>
<td>Wurtz der philosophischen Grundbegriffe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zoel. Anz.</td>
<td>Zoological Society of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoel. Jahrb.</td>
<td>Zoological Jahrbuch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeit. Angew. Physiol.</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für angewandte Physiologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeit. Biol.</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Biologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeit. Ethnol.</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Ethnologie</td>
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</table>
modern writings will be found at the beginning of the successive chapters of Harley's Economicus (2 vols., 1845); and in the life of Adam Smith. It is the beginning of a complete and very good essay in his Introduction to the Study of Political Economy (trans. by Dyop; London, 1852).

Economy (as aesthetic).—Ger. Ökonomie-principle; Fr. principe d'économie; Ital. principio dell'economia. The principle or law which asserts that the aesthetic value of any object, as a statue, or set of dancing, depends upon the absence of all superficial features or elements, and upon the presence of the essentials only.

The brothers Weiher (Mechanik d. mensch. Gehrwerkz., in Pogg. Ann., 1837) appear to have been the first to maintain, on the basis of experimental observations, that the physically correct, that which involves no wasted energy, is synonymous with the aesthetically beautiful. Spencer (Economy, 3rd ed., 1852) has developed the principle of economy in a somewhat similar manner as applied to literary style and to physical law. Avenarius, under the title Principes des gréantes in Kraft- musen (Philos. als Wissen d. Welt, 1873), employs essentially the same conception as a basis in his philosophy. Fehlauer also regards the principle of economy as the one against which the whole of the aesthetic state is directed. In a somewhat similar manner, the economy of the physical considerations see Hartung.

The principle of economy to painting and sculpture, see Blackwell, Principles of Art (1893). See also Ruskin, "The Lamp of Bartholomew," in Seven Lamps of Architecture. (Cf. A. R.)

Economy (as logical principle).—A principle introduced by E. Mach that general concepts are merely an application for the solution of a mental process. That they have that effect was noticed by Leche.

Economy (as condition).—Ger. Ökonomie; Fr. statisme; Ital. statismo. A condition of the nervous system and mind characterized by immobility, suspension of normal sensory and motor functions, and rapid concentration upon a limited group of ideas. It is particularly characteristic of various forms of religious absorption. The symptoms are very much alike in all cases: after sustained concentration of the attention upon the desire to attain an intimate communion with heavenly things, the self-absorption being to a certain extent through the gaze intensely upon some holy figure or upon the aspirant's own novel, the soul is supposed to be detached from the objects of earth, and to enter into direct converse with heaven; the limbs are then motionless, fixed, or rigid in the maintenance of some attitude which has been assumed; general sensibility is blunted or extinguished, the special senses are insusceptible to the impressions which usually affect them; the breathing is slow and feeble; the pulse is scarcely perceptible; the eyes are perhaps bright and animated, and the countenance may wear such a look of rapture, the motions of the body being destroyed, that it seems to be transfigured and to shine with a celestial luster. (Maudsley.) Sensibility to external impressions is not always completely destroyed, but there seems an inability to break through the trance and respond to such impressions. At times there is a complete forgetfulness of what has occurred during the ecstatic state, but usually the ecstatic can give some account of his vision and experiences; such reports have been of a typical form of religious doctrine among primitive men and in historical religions.

The condition is closely related to Hypnosis (q. v.) and to Catatonia (q. v.), and as a rule occurs not so frequently from causes except by the presence of a religious or supernatural absorption not found in the trance. It is usually self-sustained, and seems subject to contagion and the dominance of psychological motives. Ribot regards it as a typical form of extinction of the will. The impossibility to pain may be so diminished that severe torture remains inefficacious; only by the most extreme measures is the individual by the insensibility produced by religious ecstasy. Conditions of violence or of automatic movements connected with religious excitement are also described as cases of ecstasy, e.g. the "jumpers," "shakers," "exorbitants," &c. Of Convulsion (mental), and also Hysteria, Extasy, Stupor, Stupor.