logical and social psychology, Marselli, Venturi, and others have come forward, who think genius is a progressive or evolutionary variation of the human (and every other living) type, either general or partial. Marselli thinks genius constant with some degeneration, since a profitable variation of intellect, sentiment, or will is capable of developing together with some degenerative characters. The Lombardian view of the epilepsy of the genius is vigorously opposed as a useless appendage to what is otherwise a definite clinical conception.

A much discussed question is the relation of the great man—the genius, especially the greatest man—to the general course of history and to social evolution. On one hand, the 'great-man theory' of history holds that the genius is himself not a product of the social movement, but a phenomenon—a variation or other positively new influence—which sets the direction of the historical and social movement subsequent to him. On this view history is a series of smaller movements, each carrying out the impulse given by some great character. Opposed to this is the view that the great man is himself an index of the social movement anterior to him—he is a result of the deeper moving forces from which history issues. He is, therefore, only relatively, not absolutely, the centre of new influences: the indication rather than the initiator of social change. Besides these opposed views, each extreme, more moderate opinion recognizes the importance of the genius, but does not make him an unaccountable godling. It attempts to teach a philosophy of the social movement as a whole, which, while recognizing the implicit forces which produce the genius, still allows place for great variations and their influence, not admitting either that the environment is altogether the cause of Cleopatra, or that the course of the world's political history would have been different—quite Pascal's famous saying: if Cleopatra's love had been shorter! Cf. Comte, Cours dePhil. positive, ed. Lefrère (3rd ed., 1869), iv and for a judicious discussion of this question, with citations of literature, see Barth, Philosophie d. Geist. des Sociétés, i. 201 f. Statistical inquiries into the inheritance of unusual talents have been made by Galton (Natural Inheritance, 1889), and into the nature and distribution of man of genius by Q. O. U. (Genus des grandes hommes, 1856).

Literature: Galton, Hereditary Genius, and English Men of Science (1874); Joly, Psychol. des grandes hommes (1845); Winne, Allg. Theorie des Genies; Barthelemy, Genie u. Wahrheit (1869); Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, i. Bc. III (1856), and i. chap. XXIV; Hesse, Genius and Degeneration (1897) (contains full literary references); Moreau (de Tours), La Psychologie moderne dans les Rapports avec l'Histoire, (1861); Spence, Study of Genius; James, The Will to Believe, 216 ff.; Longfellow, L'Uomo di Genio (6th ed.), Genio e Folle, and The Men of Genius (1864); Benvenuto, Psychological genius; Mazzucato, Aristocracy and Progress; Nordei, Degeneration; Alexis and Pouque, Ambition, Mo., 141, 152, and 312; Baldwin, Social and Eth. Interest; Memmius, Genio e Nervo (1914); and Ricci, Il Genio, 2nd ed., 1883.

Genus [Lat. genus, kind]: Gen.; Fr. genre; It. genere. See Geeni (genealogy).

Genus (in biology): see Classification (in biology).

Genus (in logic) [Lat. genus, kind]: Gen.; Fr. genre; It. genere. A class which contains within its extension, or is divisible into, smaller classes, called relatively species.

The significance of the term has always shared the ambiguity which is discernible in classification. Genera have been distinguished partly by causes of the obvious differences in the larger types of natural forms partly by reference to the relatively arbitrary process of arranging in accordance with selected marks. The first or empirical factor is pre-dominant in the popular sense of the term, and in much of the Aristotelian and Scholastic logic; the second has been insisted on in the more strictly formal logic. The divergence of the two views makes itself manifest at the limits of classification, at the conception of a maximum genus and as infraspecies, which tend on the one view to be regarded as having a place in every nature, while on the other they are but ideal boundaries to an arbitrary process.

One of the Aristotelian rules of Dynamics (q. v.) in logic is that the differences of different genera are different, that is to say, order-divisions are not to be made. This rule is strictly observed in the modern classifications of chemistry, mathematics, and logic itself; but in biology, owing to the common origin of species, the classification is hierarchical, as Aristotle required. Cf. Forster (1881).