Inceptive — Implicit

Imperceptible

Inceptive to actions which it is the purpose and policy of the individual to inhibit. Examples of inceptive ideas which affect both thought and action are: agoraphobia, the nervous dread of open places; claustrophobia, the dread of closed places; acrophobia, the impulse to count all sorts of objects and speculate unceasingly and endlessly on numerical relations. Such tendencies as coprophagia, the impulse to use pharyngeous or obscene expressions; and such habits of thought as constant speculation about intellectual trifles, fear of contamination in the slightest and most exaggerated form, may come to dominate as much of the intellectual processes as to approximate to a condition of inanity. If this is to be noted that these uncouth but incident tendencies (well characterized by the German Zwangsvorstellung) are the more intense that the patient from his early experience at certain impulses, and maintains a struggle against this habit which he recognizes to be absurd. Rather few of the inceptive ideas are purely intellectual, most of them being related to morbid motor impulses. Those that are armature may be regarded as similar to Zwangsvorstellungen or Zwangsimpulsi-stungen, or the inevitable association of one sensation with another; while those which are entirely motor become nothing more than stereotyped habits; e.g. the habit of feeling some obligation to touch with the nose every post or tree, or some particular object on an accursed walk. What is common to all cases is a bondage or impulse which the victim feels to pursue a certain trivial or disagreeable line of thought, often associated with vocal elaboration, or motor acts (and with emotional disturbances, such as fear, anxiety), along with impotency in other respects (Tuke).


Also see works of Markham, Kopen, Lebransky-Baclot, and Morelli, as cited under Destructive Mana, and Degeneration. (J.A.)

Imperceptible

[Lat. in + percipere, to perceive; Gr. unmercathe; Fr. imperceptible; Ital. impercettibile. Applied to stimulations or differences of stimulation which are too weak to be distinguished by consciousness. Such stimulations are said to be below the conscious threshold (q.v.), as those which are faint or just noticeable are just above it. The discussion as to whether there are sensations which are imperceptible is not raised here. Cf. unconscious. (J.A., J.P.D.)

Empirical Judgment: see Deception.

Implicate and Implication: see Inceptive and Explicit.

Implicit and Explicit: Ger. unmerkbar, implizirt (implication) and ausdrücklich, explizirt; Fr. implicite (implication); means also contradiction—etrée—and explicite; Ital. impliqa e esplicito. That which is entirely, definitely, or extremely included in any whole is explicit to the whole; that which belongs to a whole but is not explicit is implicit to it.

Inferable, mean or implicit, immune all present shades of meaning expressed in various contexts by implicit. That which is, especially logically, implicit is called an implicite or an implication. Both implicit and explicit are applicable in particular to wholes of meaning or intent. Cf. the next topic. (J.M.B.)

Implicity (in logic). Said of an essential character or a representation, whether verbal or mental, which is not contained in the representation itself, but which appears in the strictly logical (not merely in the psychological) analysis of that representation.

Thus, when we ordinarily think of something, say the Antartic continent, as real, we do not step to reflect that every intelligible question about it admits of a true answer; but when we logically analyze the meaning of reality, this result appears in the analysis. Consequently, only concepts, not perceptions, can contain any implicit elements, since they alone are capable of logical analysis. An implicit contradiction, or contradiction in terms, is one which appears as soon as the terms are defined, irrespective of the properties of their objects. Thus there is, strictly speaking, no implicit contradiction in the notion of a quadrilateral triangle, although it is impossible. But, owing to exaggeration, this would currently be said to involve not merely an implicit, but an explicit contradiction, or contradiction in terms.

Any proposition which neither requires the exclusion from nor the inclusion in the universe of any state of facts or kind of object
IMPORT — IMPRESSIONISM

except such as a given second proposition so excludes or requires to be included, it is implied in that second proposition in the logical sense of implications; no matter how different it may be in its point of view, or otherwise. It is a part of the meaning of the copula 'is' employed in logical forms of proposition, that it expresses a transitive relation, so that whatever inference from the proposition would be justified by the dictum de omni is implied in the meaning of the proposition. Nor could any rule be admitted as universally valid in formal logic, unless it were a part of the definition of one of the symbols used in formal logic. Accordingly, whatever can be logically deduced from any proposition is implied in it; and conversely. Whether what is implied will, or will not, be suggested by the contemplation of the proposition is a question of psychology. All that concerns logic is, whether all the facts excluded and required by the one proposition are among those so excluded or required by the other. (C.R.A.)

Import [Lat. in-per-turare, to carry]; Ger. Einfuhrung; Fr. portée, enlèvement; Ital. importanza, significato. Import is almost synonymous with signification or meaning. It is therefore used in logic as equivalent to Corre-xpression (q.v.), e.g. in the case of notions. In reference to judgment, import must be taken to mean the whole thought-relation which is asserted, positively or negatively, in the judgment. Cf. JUDGMENT.

Impression [Lat. impressus]; Ger. Nr. druckt; Fr. impression; Ital. impressione.

(1) Used by Hume to designate experiences of the perceptual order as contrasted with "ideas" (habit-revived impressions).

(2) The physiological process of stimulation apart from the corresponding sensation which it produces.

(3) In sociology: sometimes used for CON-SCIENT (q.v.).

Impression (esthetic). The effect produced by the intrinsic qualities of an aesthetic object, as distinguished from its expression or suggestion of a meaning pointing beyond itself. For example, the impression of a straight line as compared with that of a curve, and the impression of either of these as compared with the expression of a face, whose features chance to contain both (cf. Sasteyryan, The Sense of Beauty, 1864). See IN-SCIENT.

Impressionism [Lat. impressio, from in + pressus, to press in or upon]; Ger. Impressionismus. See IMPRESSIONIST.

Impressionist [Lat. impressionis, from impressionis, to impress in or upon]; Fr. impressioniste; Ital. impressionista. A school or tendency of art, in which the aim is to record or render the immediate and personal impressions received or felt by the artist. The impression may be derived from an outer scene, or from inner experience. The artists concerned are chiefly those of painting, music, and literature. In painting, the term has meant more definitely the effort to portray the momentary effect caused by some aspect of nature, seen at once and as a whole, without details, but with no alteration of proportion. An especially prominent phase of impressionist painting has been the rendering of the effects of light, notably of sunlight or clear air. In contrast, with REALISM (q.v.) in art, which emphasizes meaning or EXPRESSION (q.v.), impressionism requires that the artist should abstract himself from 'meaning', seeing only that which he looks upon, and that as for the first time. It is distinguished from certain other phases of REALISM (q.v.), and NATURALISM (q.v.) in art, in that its aim is to present not a literal transcript of nature, but the impression or emotion which nature gives to the artist. It is opposed also to formalism (see FORM, in aesthetic). This shows itself in painting and drawing by emphasizing 'values', i.e. light and shade effects in mass, rather than accurate delineation, and in music by the presentation of a series of tone-colour effects instead of the development of a theme. In literature, impressionism aims to tell its story by a series of vivid pictures, and in criticism to record the critic's impression as immediately felt, with no attempt at analysis or objective evaluation. The term came into use in connection with the paintings of E. Manet and others, which were exhibited in Paris in the seventies. Although denounced by the school itself, which preferred to be known as that of the 'Indépendants', it has passed into general use and has been extended to other arts. It is useful to indicate an aspect of the work of many artists who are not impressionists in a narrow sense. Such, among painters, were Courbet and Millet; among writers, Stendhal and Huysmans; among musicians, Wagner and Grieg.

Literature: Mursell, Hist. of Mod. Painting, ii, chap. xxxvi; Liebich, L'Art Impressioniste (1874); Durante, La nouvelle peinture (1876); Duret, Les peintres impressionistes (1879); Huysmans, L'Art moderne (1879); Wedmore, in Forte's Rev., Jan., 1883;