whose known character seems to be entirely of universal type. In the biological sciences the problem as to the living individual introduces entirely different questions and interests; and the problems of ethical individuality belong to still another realm of a decidedly special character. Finally, the problem of the ultimate place of the category of individuality in the world at large remains as an issue for general metaphysics. It is, nevertheless, a fair question for philosophical inquiry whether all these so various problems are not really much more closely connected than they seem, and whether a final definition which will hold for all forms of individuality may not yet be discovered. Cf. Identity (individual).

Literature: the classic scholastic view of the problem is to be found in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II, 1, questions 47, 53, and 54; Q. 47, art. 3, Q. 48, art. 4, Q. 49, art. 4, and Q. 50, art. 4. See also the famous treatises on this subject by John Duns Scotus, in his commentary upon the Sentences, in the first half of the sixth volume of his collected works (Londinii ed., of 1599), discusses the problem of individuality in connection with his Angelology. See, in particular, 374 ff., 403 ff., 407 ff., 409 ff. Bruno, in his Rerum universalium institutionem, sums up the scholastic opinions on the whole range of the problem in Disq. V: De substantiis individualibus. See also Bishop Newton, in his Metaphysics of the School, 1, 293-99, reviews the same issues at length. See also the youthful dissertation of Leibniz, De principio individuationis, and his later discussions of the problem, in particular in the Nouv. Rev., Lib. II, chap. xxvii. Heuzey treats our problem, in connection with the theory of miracles, at the outset of the third part of his Logique Schopenhauer's frequent reference to this problem is found in his Logik, III, 125. According to recent discussions of this subject by E. H. Köppen, in Untersuchungen über die Schopenhauer'sche Logik, III, 125, and 126, the problem of the individuality of concepts in Schopenhauer's sense is of fundamental importance for the understanding of Schopenhauer's philosophy. See also the work of J. A. Schopenhauer, in his Logik, III, 125, and 126.

Individual (in biology): a single organism.

Individual (in logic) [as a technical term of logic, individual] first appears in Boethius in a translation of Boethius from the Latin, 1231, a word used by Plato (Sophistes, 259D) for an individual species, and by Aristotle, often in the sense, but occasionally for an individual. Of course the physical and mathematical senses of the word were earlier. Aristotle's usual term for individual is indiudicium, Lat. singularia, Eng. singularia. Used in logic in two closely connected senses. (1) According to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term) not only actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each such character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by its mode of being to be so determinate. See PARTICULAR (in logic).

This definition does not prevent two distinct individuals from being precisely similar, since they may be distinguished by their relation to other objects or their determinations not of a generalizable nature; so that the principle of individuality is not involved in this definition. Although the principles of contrariety and excluded middle may be regarded as together constituting the definition of the relation expressed by "not," yet they also imply that whatever exists consists of individuals. This, however, does not seem to be an identical proposition or necessity of thought; for Kant's Law of Specification (Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 1st ed., 160; 2nd ed., 644; but it is requisite to read the whole section to understand his meaning), which has been widely accepted, is a strong logical principle. Quantity as a continuum in Kant's sense, i.e., that every part of which is composed of parts, though it is only regulative, is not supposed to be demanded by reason, and its wide acceptance is as much a subject of argument in favor of the constructibility of a world without individuals in the sense of the definition now considered. Besides, since it is not in the nature of concepts adequately to define individuals, it would seem that a world from which they were eliminated would only be the more intelligible. A new discussion of the matter, on a level with modern mathematical thought and with exact logic, is in his dissertation, A denotatorum. A highly important contribution is contained in Schröder's Logik, III, 125, 126, a work in which what is special is not a natural one that it might be, or have been, against my will.

This is the sternal definition of a reality; but since the States were individualistic
Individualism

Nominalism, this rather favours the satis-
factoriness of the definition than otherwise.
It may be objected that it is unintelligible;
but in the sense in which this is true, it is
merely a case of an individual in unintelligible
in that sense. It is in fact true that the
moon does, and all explanations support the
existence of that name matter. That ex-
istence is unintelligible in the sense in
which the definition is so. That is to say,
a reaction may be experienced, but it cannot
be conceived in its character of a reaction;
for that element evaporates from every gener-
ous idea. According to this definition, that
which
cannot immediately present itself as an in-
dividual is a reaction against the will. But
everything whose identity consists in a con-
tinuity of reactions will be a single logical
individual. Thus any portion of space, so
far as it can be regarded as reacting, is for
logic a single individual; its spatial exten-
sion is no objection. With this definition
there is no difficulty about the truth that
whatever exists is individual, since existence
(not reality) and individuality are intrin-
sically the same thing: and whatever falsifies
the present definition equally falsifies the
former definition by virtue of the principles
of contradiction and excluded middle, re-
garded as mere definitions of the relations
expressed by 'not'. For the principle of
indiscernibility, if two individual things are
exactly alike in all other respects, they must,
according to this definition, differ in their
spatial relations, since space is nothing but
the intuitional presentation of the conditions
of reaction, or of some of them. But there
will be no logical hindrance to two things
being exactly alike in all other respects; and
if they are never so, that is a physical law, not
a necessity of logic. This second defini-
tion, therefore, seems to be the preferable
one. Cf. PARTICULAR (in logic).

Individual (social) (1) A single human
being. (2) Hence, by development of the ideas
of separateness and complements, a human
being in a marked degree differentiated
from others; a centre of social influences.

The history of the concept individual is
important both in psychology and in sociology.
The individual has been conceived as indepen-
dent of and antecedent to society. As correlative
with society, and as dependent on and created
by society. All of these conceptions are pre-
cluded in Aristotle's Politics, where the dis-
tinctions are made that in genera individual
and society are inseparable, that in will and
conduct the individual is independent or free,
while in moral perfection he is created by the
state. The political philosophy of Hobbes
in his 'Leviathan' takes the antecedent com-
pleteness and sufficiency of the individual.
Modern psychology and sociology demonstrate
the interdependence of individual and society
(cf. Baldwin, Social and Eth. Interprets.)

Individual: G. Individuum, psychology; Fr.
'individual'; Ital. 'individualità.' The term
'state of individuality.' That department of
psychology which investigates the psy-
chological individual considered as different
from others, i.e. having for its subject matter
psychological variations among individuals.

Particular questions on which work has
been done are: (1) the psychology of Temper-
ament (q.v.); (2) of Mental Type (q.v.); (3)
of mental differences of the sexes (Sexual
Character); (4) of Genius (q.v.); (5) of
mental defect (q.v., also special types of
defect); (6) of the Criminal (q.v., also
criminality); (7) of genius, problem, etc.,
considered as based on individual differ-
ences. Cf. VARIATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Individual Selection: G. Personalko-
aktion (Weimann); Fr. 'élection entre
individus' (q.v.); selection individuelle (better
than 'personelle'-J. A. Thompson); Ital. 'sele-
czione individuale.' The survival of the indi-
vidual organism or animal under the opera-
tion of NATURAL SELECTION (p. v.), as
distinguished from the survival of parts, cells,
membrane elements, etc., (cf. Inheritance),
which are supposed to be selected by an ana-
logous method.

This rendering of Weimann's Personal-
selection for the original German view of
the survival of the individual-for which,
however, it was earlier used-is better than
the literal translation 'personal selection.'
'Personal selection' suggests a 'consideration
selezione' by a person, and it is better to re-
serve it for that. See SELECTION.

Individualism: G. 'Individualismus';
Fr. 'individuisme'; Ital. 'individualismo.' (1)

Excessive or exclusive regard for self-
interest. (2) The doctrine that the pursuit of self-
interest and the exercise of individual in-
terests should be little or not at all restrained

538

P 0772