remark that the intent is the consciousness of the general nature of the act (q. v.), of an intentional person before it is reached, and in mental progress toward an intent (q. v.), we have successive stages of 'intent.'

Intention [Lat. int. + tendere, to stretch].

A man acts at his peril. If loss to another naturally follows from his voluntary act, he is liable, although it is neither intended by him nor due to his negligence (Holmes, The Common Law, 82; Holland, Jurisprudence, chaps. viii. 93; Poullenc, Jurisprudence, chap. iv. 158). Gross rests on intention; but he who does a criminal act is held to have intended the actual and natural result, although in fact he may have intended only a much less grave offense. Contracts rest on agreement, presupposing an intent to assume an obligation, but the law often implies the intent. 'Such an intent may be implied, although it be certain that it never actually existed, but not unless the parties are in such relations that each ought to have had it' (Barn v. Boston and Albany Railroad Co., 67 Conn. Law Reports, 425). Cf. Restatement, Sec. 166

Literature: authorities cited above; see Restatement, Mor. and Prop., i., chaps. vii., viii., § 2.

Intention (in logic) [Lat. intendere, with the same meaning in Aquinas (Summa Theol., I., 9. 53, the principal passage); in classical writers an act of attention (and so Aquinas, ibid., I. 9. 38, art. 2. and elsewhere); from int. + tendere, to stretch. Aquinas sometimes uses the term for a mode of being (ibid., I. 9. 38, art. 2. and sometimes for a relation (ibid., I. 9. 38, art. 2. as a servant of the first, art. 4.). A concept, as the result of attention.

First intentions are those concepts which are derived by comparing concepts, such as ordinary concepts of classes, relations, etc. Second intentions are those which are formed by observing and comparing first intentions. Thus the concept "class" is formed by observing and comparing class-concepts and other objects. The special case-concept, or, or what is, in the sense of including figures as well as relations, can only have originated in that way. Of relative second intentions, four are prominent: identity, otherwise, co-existence, and incomposability. Aquinas defined logic as the science of second intentions applied to first.

Intention (in law). The purpose of an act; it is often imputed, without regard to its actual existence.

1. Intention (in law).