MATTER AND FORM

For just as phenomena have no existence in themselves, but are merely relative to the mind, as having senses, so laws do not exist in themselves, but are merely relative to the mind in which the phenomena interfere with that mind exercising understanding (and which is the passage, ibid., § 46)

Form of form. Francis Bacon says 'the soul may be called the form of forms,' which would be more convenient, were it not plagiarized from the serious doctrine of Aristotle in his "Ethics," § 135 a, 6.

The terms matter and form are used in certain peculiar ways in logic. Speaking metaphorically, the matter of a proposition is said to be its subject and predicate, while the copula is its form. But speaking formally, the matter of a proposition is, as we familiarly say, the 'matter of fact' to which the proposition relates, or as defined by the scholastics, 'habitatio extentionis adaequationis.'

The second treatate of the Summulae of Petrus Hispanus begins with the words: 'Propositum triumplex est utens, scilicet, naturales, contingens, et remotas. Naturales est illa qui praedicitur essentia subjecti vel propositionis; ut, homin est animal; vel, homo est animal. Contingent est illa qui praedicitur posside adsit ad subiectos subjecti et subjecti corporum et subjecti correlationes; ut, homo est albus, homin est sacer. Remota est illa qui praedicitur non posside convenire con subiecto; ut, homo est anima.'

The above three propositions are the three propositions; the remote, the three terms. The form which ought to be the external form by which the copula is rendered is that in which the copula is rendered, and which, upon the definition of the thing, it may be assumed; and which, upon the definition of the matter, and the conclusion the form. (C.S.P.)

Maxim (in ethics) [Lax, maxima substantiae, omne substantia veritatem] [Verg.]: [Eur.]: [Maxim]: [Fr. maxime]; [It. maxime]. (1) Any important principle for the regulation of conduct. (2) A technical term in Kant's ethics; a practical principle regarded by the agent as valid in all circumstances. (3) In this latter sense, a maxim is distinguished from a practical law. The latter is regarded as a law, and is valid for the will of every rational being. Morality consists, according to Kant, in the objective law, becoming also the subjective maxim of the will; and his moral imperative is accordingly expressed in the terms, 'Act so as the maxim of thy will may always correspond to a universal law.'

Maxim (in logic). A widely received general assertion or rule.

The earliest writers, so far as has been shown, to use maxima as substantive were Albertus Magnus and Petrus Hispanus. The fornters (Post. Anal. Lib. I. cap. I) make maxima constitute the seventh of thirteen classes of propositions which may be accepted, though they are uncertain, so they differ widely from dictionaries, or lexicons. He says, Maxime propositions opinionar esse quasi non recipiuntur nisi in quantum sunt manifeste. Et peius vulgo comum esse simpliciter et non perit quod sit pres per se eI veritate communis communem cognoscere necessario; sic est utipius proposicio, maxime est urs, ut Hamilton quotes, but gives as unverifiable reference to, a sentence in which Albertus maxima another name for a dissertation. Petrus Hispanus (Summulae, v.) says, 'Maximis est propo sitio quae non est quae praetior neque nactus,' and he divides commonplaces into two kinds, called Maxim and Difficultia of Maxim. The science of this was generally followed that it is surprising that Kant's contribution of it to logic and metaphysics is that which simply copies the Summulae here, almost verbatim, should have found any acceptance. Dunsdie and other early all possible English take the word from the Summulae. It was also adopted into English law. The meaning now tends to that of the copula, rather than of a maxim. Albertus. Kant (Crit. d. reform. vers. Fr. ed. 686) defines a maxim of reason as a subjective principle derived not from the character of the effect, but from the interest of reason in the production of an effect which may be possible; and in the Critic of the Practical Reason he endeavours to make out no proposition analogous in that respect to the Copula. Logik by Fichte (Einzetzung II) he defines a maxim or a broad principle of choice between different ends. (C.R.P.)

Maxim (legal) [Ger. Rechtsvorschrift, Grundsatze; Fr. maxime de droit; Griechische griechische]. The sententious expression of an established rule of law in a short form, which has become a part of the law of the whole country and general approval; a legal axiom. Such a maxim has the force of law, e.g. 'Causes, proxima, non remotae, spectant.'

The use of maxima is common to all