MISDEMEANOUR — MNEMONIC VERSES AND WORDS

seen fragmentarily in the reverse, and even
the up-or-down-turning, of single letters,
figures, etc., and in the writing with the left
hand of many adults who write normally with
the right hand. A simple test is: starting
with both hands together before the body,
trace one's autograph naturally with each
index-finger in mid-air. In many cases of
right-handed persons the left hand then in-
scribes mirror writing more naturally than
correct writing, performing movements sym-
metrical with those of the right hand, rather
than analogous to them; that is, moving away
from the right hand rather than following it.
Mirror writing furnishes an important
problem to the writer on HANDWRITING (q.v.).
It is probably due in children to the incom-
plete association of the series of hand-move-
ment sensations with the control series of
visual sensations. In some the hand un-
acquainted to writing reproduces the muscular
sensations to which the other hand is acclimated
(symmetrical accompanying movements); this
is in persons who think of writing mainly in
terms of the muscular sensations alone. Others,
who do not produce mirror writing, think on
the contrary of the visual form of the words,
and so reproduce that, giving a correct imita-
tion of the other hand (analogous accompanying
movements).

Literature: see HANDWRITING, GRAPHOL-
ogy, and Agraphia under Speech and its
Defects. (G.R.R.)

MISDEMEANOUR (in law) [OE. mœdæmænur].
Ger. Vergehen, Unbehagen; Fr. déplaisir; and
for petty offences contravention (Code Penal,
1); Ital. contravvenimento. A crime less than
a felony; a minor offence. In common usage
the word "crime" is made to denote such
offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious
dye; while smaller faults and omissions of
less consequence are comprised under the
gentler name of "misdemeanors" only
(Blackstone's Commentaries, iv. 4). (G.R.R.)

MINIOLOGY (Gr. mεινιο, to hate, + μοιας,
resemblance). = Ger. Minologie; Fr. minologie; Ital.
minologie. Hatred and despair of reason.
Sometimes applied to intellectual Paranoia
(q.v.). (G.R.R.)

MISSING LINK: the immediate ancestor of man.
See ANTHROPOID, ad fin.

MITOICE (Gr. μιτος, a thread). = Ger. Mitose;
Fr. mitose; Ital. mitosi. The indirect mode
of nuclear division, to which the term karyo-
kinesis is also applied.

The chromatin of the nucleus forms a thread,
which breaks up into a number of separate
CHROMONEMAS (q.v.); there are hence split
such into two halves, which travel to the
opposite poles of the achromatic spindle
(anaphase), where they become reconstituted
into the daughter nuclei. Mitosis is the
ordinary mode of nuclear division, and is
found, with but little variation, in the cell
division of the Protocista and Metazoa, and of
plants also. Cf. CELL THEOREY (also for litera-
ture), ANIMALS, and NUCLEI. (G.R.R.)

MIXED [Lat. mixtus, from mixti, to
mix]: Ger. gemischt; Fr. composé; Ital.
misto. (1) Mixed proof: a proof which is
partly analytic, partly synthetic.

(1) Mixed modes: a mode comprised of
simple ideas of several kinds, put together to
make one complex one (Locke, Essay con-
cerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, chap,
xii. § 3). See MORE.

(2) Mixed power: a power of once active
and passive, because the principle of change is
in itself. (C.R.P.)

MIXTURE (linguistic): = Ger. Mischung; Fr.
mélange; Ital. miscelana, mescla. Applied
to the results of the borrowing from one
language to another of words or other speech-
elements.

Languages influence each other through
different speaking two or more languages.
Words of one language are lifted into the
intoned framework of another. An in-
feetional or formative element cannot be
"borrowed." It becomes a loan-argument, unless
enough words containing it are borrowed to
fix each element as an independent existence
in the consciousness of the speech-community.
In bilingual communities it is noticed that
the tendency is for a single sentence to cause
to suffice for two languages. This tendency to
use a single model of syntax with various
vocabularies has brought about the "moderna-
ing" of the syntax of all European lan-
guages. (G.R.R.)

Mnemonic Verses and Words (in logic).
Aids to memory in logic, of the sort described
under MEMORY (q.v.). (G.R.R.)

1. Instruments novum curial, gutiar, lingus, palatum
Quæsitor et dea dea, et duo alia simul.

The following mnemonic verses are con-
tained in the De memorialis locupletissimis
Petrus Hispanus, but were older, perhaps Very much
older.

1. 'Qua' 1 ca. vel hyp., 'Quæla' 1 no. vel
aff. u. 'Quætis' univ. par in. vel. sing. (What
is the substance of a proposition?)
ocategorical or hypothetica. What is its quality negative

87
or affirmative. What is its quantity? Universal, partial, indefinite, or singular? Simpliciter, Fuit, converserit et vice versa, atque in contrariis. Aequum: negat 0, sed universaliter ambas; Asservit, negat 6, et particulariter ambas. [E and / e/ is converted simply; E and 4, / e/ converted; A and 6, / e/ converted; A and 0, per concretionem.] Prae, contrae; post, contene; pro postuere, subscripte. Non omnem, quisdam non; omnis non, quasi nullus; Nulla, quisdam; sed nullius non, nullis non, nullam non. Nullum, nullius; non quisdam non, quasi nullas. Non aut, neceter; non neceter non, praestat: 'interuenae.' Venis placet domini ornulla gives the contradictory proposition; placed after the contrary, both before and after, the subalternate. Primus, Anonymus; Eodemque, quod, sequit. Tertius, Illisim; Dicuntur, alii, alii. Distruxit ad totum, et ad continuates utrant. Diet in dietum, dedit in dietum. Omne est prior; impossibile, quasi nullus; Possibile, quisdam; quisdam non, possibile. E dietum negat, iuque modum, nihil aut. The first syllable of each of the four voices Anagogus, Edentale, Iterum, Perpetuum, is for the positive, second for the contrary; the third for the impossible; the fourth for the necessary. The vowels are signified by both mood and 'dictum' are to be taken assertorically; v, that the dictum is to be denied; u, that the mode is to be denied; a, that both mode and dictum are to be denied. Each word refers to a line or order of equi-proportion. Tertius est quarto semper contrarius ordine. Sit ibi linea autobiurabri prima secundae. Tertium est prima contraria secundae. Pagnut quam consequiiniscit secundae, Prima subsecunda quaeris particularis habeat et, Hanc habet et omnem se legas secundae sequentes.

The relation of 'Soritum impossibile est, curandi' and 'Soritum necessum est, curandi' is that of contraries; they cannot be true at once. The relation 'Soritum possibile est, curandi' and 'Soritum necessum est, curandi' is that of subcontraries; they cannot be false at once. The relation of 'Soritum possibile est, curandi' and 'Soritum impossibile est, curandi' is that of contradictories. The relation of 'Soritum possibile est, non curandi' and 'Soritum necessum est, curandi' is that of subcontraries; they cannot be false at once. The relation of 'Soritum possibile est, non curandi' and 'Soritum impossibile est, curandi' is that of contradictories. The relation of 'Soritum possibile est, non curandi' and 'Soritum necessum est, curandi' is that of contradictories; it is converted simply; p, that it is to be converted per accedentem; q, that the premises are to be transposed; r, that the preferred reduction is by reduction of the contradictory of the conclusion to an absurdity, this contradictory of the conclusion being, in the second figure, put in place of the minor premise (the major being retained), and in the third figure in the place of the major (the minor being retained). A great number of other memorial words and verses have been proposed by logicians. (c.s.s.)

Mnemonic [Gr. µνημονεῖς, pertaining to memory], Memoria, Memon, Memonidaposeresis, Fr. mémor; Ital. memoria, memoria direttiva. Mnemonics or memory technics is the art of memory, a code of rules for remembering. The method consists usually in a framework learned mechanically, of which the end is to be retained in permanent and secure possession. Then, whatever is to be remembered is deliberately associated by means of a logical or psychological with some particular part of this framework, and this connection then marks its retrieval (James, Princip. of Pedagog., 448).

Mob [abb. of Lat. modulatio, modality]: Gen. Mobi, Fr. modul, modulations, Fr. modulations; Ital. modulazione. A 'riddle,' the most disputable sort of mob, is designated in Gen. by Modulatio, in Fr. by modulations, and in Ital. by modulazione. A writer who introduces an r, m into the name of a mood containing an r or m only after its third vowel, or who omits it from the name of a mood having r or m as before the first and second vowels, uses the fourth figure.

Modality [Lat. modulatio, modulations; Fr. modulations; It. modulazione]. There is no agreement among logicians as to what modality consists in; but it is the logical qualification of a mood, or of its copula, or the corresponding qualification of a fact or its form, in the ways expressed by the modals. The noun modality is also used of the modal forms, impossible, contingent, necessary, necessary.

Any qualification of a predication is a mood; and Hamilton says (Lecte on Logic, xiv) that 'all logicians' call any proposition affected by a mode a modal proposition. This, however, is going much too far; for not only has the term usually been restricted in practice, from the age of Alcmeon, when it first appeared, until now, to propositions qualified by the four modes 'possible,' 'impossible,' 'necessary,' and 'contingent,' with only occasional extension to any others, but positive testimonies to that effect might be cited in abundance. The simplest account of modality is the scholastic, according to which the necessary (or impossible) proposition is a sort of universal proposition; the possible (or contingent, in the sense of not necessary) proposition, a sort of particular proposition. That is, to assert 'A must be true' is to assert not only that it is true, but that all propositions analogous to A are true, and to assert 'A may be true' is to assert only that some proposition analogous to A is true, and to ask what is here meant by analogous propositions, the answer is—all those of a certain class which the convenience of the case may establish. Or we may say the propositions analogous to A are all those propositions which in some conceivable state are to be found indistinguishable from A. Error is the third mood; that is, the class of propositions which are such that in some conceivable state it is to be supposed, that they are to be found indistinguishable from A. This ignorance consists in its subject being unable to reject certain propositions, and its object to name each of its members determinably in every respect, but all of which are, in fact, false. The aggregate of all such propositions constitutes the 'range of possibility;' or, better, 'of ignorance.' Were there no ignorance, this aggregate would be reduced to zero. The state of knowledge supposed is in the necessary, the proposition always true; the contingent, all possible, the impossible propositions more often the actual state of the speaker. The necessary proposition asserts that, in the assumed state of the case, there is no case in the whole range of ignorance in which the proposition is false. In this sense it may be said that an impossibility underlying
every necessity. The possible proposition asserts that there is a one in which it is true.

Various satisfactions are encountered in the work of modality. In the exercise of our own state of knowledge is the one whose range of agreements is given in question, the judgement 'a is true' and 'a must be true' are not logically equivalent, the latter asserting a fact which the former does not assert, although the fact of its assertion affords direct and conclusive evidence of its truth. The two are analogous to 'a is true' and 'a is true, and I say so', which are readily shown not to be logically equivalent by denying each, when we get 'a is false' and 'If a is true, I do not say so.'

In the necessary particular proposition and the possible universal proposition there is sometimes a distinction between the 'compositional' and 'divided' sense. Some 's' must be 'p'. Often in the compositional sense, means that there is no case, in the whole range of ignorance, where some 's' or other is not 'p', but taken in the divided sense, it means that there is some 's' which some 's' remains 'p' throughout the whole range of ignorance. So whatever 's' there may be, 'p' is taken in the compositional sense, means that there is in, in the range of ignorance, some hypothetic state of things that may be known, without any knowledge whatever of the universe of discourse, but only with a perfectly distinct understanding of the meanings of words; geometrically necessary and possible propositions, to what a knowledge of the properties of space does or does not exclude; physical necessity, to what a knowledge of certain principles of physics does or does not exclude, &c. But when we say that the two collections one can be correspondently greater than the other, each cannot be correspondently greater than the other, and that the necessary proposition is represented as determinate by law, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time (bath, foot, etc.; Jaffe's Logic, etc., etc.) that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time.

Kant holds that all the general metaphysical concepts applicable to experience are capable of being represented as in a diagram, by means of the line of time. Such diagrams he calls 'schemata.' The schema of the possible he enunciates to be the figure of anything at any instant. The schema of necessity is the figure of anything lasting through all time (bath, foot, etc.; Jaffe's Logic, etc., etc.) and elsewhere) that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, the figure of anything lasting through all time, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time, the figure of anything lasting through all time, the figure of anything lasting through all time, and that the possible proposition is merely conceived but not judged, and is in that sense, the figure of anything lasting through all time.

The first distinction between logical and real possibility and necessity, applied two new pairs of terms: 'real' and 'possessive'; 'supervene' and 'underlie.' These definitions (what Hegel has called 'substan- tive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality.

1. What is the formal condition of the judgment of the subject? Is it not a function and 
   objective? The following definitions of the judgment and its movements (what Hegel has 
   called 'substantive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality.

1. The first condition of the subject is singular, its predicates are the reflexion of 
   the particular object upon the universal. That is, all or that object found upon us by 
   experience is judged to conform to something in the realm of ideas. But when this 
   is doubted, since the subject does not exist, in itself, involve any such reference to the 
   ideal world, we have the 'possible' judgment, or judgment of doubt. But when the subject is 
   referred to its genus, we get the apophatic judgment. But Hegel had already developed the ideas of 
   possibility and necessity in the objective logic as categories of the world. In the 
   Encyclopaedia the development is somewhat as follows: Wirklichkeit is that whose 
   modus of being consists in itself; possibility is that which exists in the generative 
   (the identity of Being and Existence) and that which exists in the generative (the identity of Being and Existence) 
   the possibility is that which exists in the generative (the identity of Being and Existence). 

In the first instance, the subject is singular, and its predicates are the reflexion of 
the particular object upon the universal. That is, all or that object found upon us by 
experience is judged to conform to something in the realm of ideas. But when this 
is doubted, since the subject does not exist, in itself, involve any such reference to the 
ideal world, we have the 'possible' judgment, or judgment of doubt. But when the subject is 
referred to its genus, we get the apophatic judgment. But Hegel had already developed the ideas of 
possibility and necessity in the objective logic as categories of the world. In the 
Encyclopaedia the development is somewhat as follows: Wirklichkeit is that whose 
modus of being consists in itself; possibility is that which exists in the generative 
(see encyclopaedia, Hegel, and subject of modality). In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel mentions the necessity 
and objective. The following definitions (what Hegel has called 'substantive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality:

1. Has the formal condition of the judgment of the subject? Is it not a function and 
   objective? The following definitions of the judgment and its movements (what Hegel has 
   called 'substantive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality.

2. The second condition of the subject is singular, its predicates are the reflexion of 
   the particular object upon the universal. That is, all or that object found upon us by 
   experience is judged to conform to something in the realm of ideas. But when this 
   is doubted, since the subject does not exist, in itself, involve any such reference to the 
   ideal world, we have the 'possible' judgment, or judgment of doubt. But when the subject is 
   referred to its genus, we get the apophatic judgment. But Hegel had already developed the ideas of 
   possibility and necessity in the objective logic as categories of the world. In the 
   Encyclopaedia the development is somewhat as follows: Wirklichkeit is that whose 
   modus of being consists in itself; possibility is that which exists in the generative 
(see encyclopaedia, Hegel, and subject of modality). In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel mentions the necessity 
and objective. The following definitions (what Hegel has called 'substantive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality.

3. Does the subject of the judgment have the formal condition of the judgment of the subject? Is it not a function and 
   objective? The following definitions of the judgment and its movements (what Hegel has 
   called 'substantive' or 'correlative' or 'absolute') are advanced to the subject of modality.
MODE — MODESTY

usually attributed to Eulo, but really going back to Vives. 'We, therefore, here again see how the relation of discourse, just as in geometry, verifies (beguclid) a priority and necessity.' (C.R.P. 17. Mdm., manner) Gen. Modus, Fr. mode, Ital. modo. In general, the manner of the existence of a thing is equivalent in the generic sense to the terms attribute, quality, state, all of which have substance as their correlate. But the terms mode especially emphasize the aspect of modality or variability in things, that is, the change from one state to another. Although a substance, therefore, must exist in some mode, any individual mode is regarded as accidental. In consequence of this emphasis upon the aspect of variability, a differentiation arises between the two terms to signify the permanent and essential qualities of a substance, and mode, as signifying its more variable qualities or the varying forms in which the fundamental attributes express themselves.

This is the sense of the term mode in the Cartesian system, where it first acquires philosophical prominence. 'We have understood by modes the Descartes (Principia Philosophia, proposition 58), the same as what we elsewhere designate attributes or qualities. But, when we consider substance as affected or varied by them, we use the term modes.' "Modus," to the term substance, in the sense of self-subsistence, is in a sense strictly accidental, and may or may not be coextensive with it; it is true, in accordance with usages of speech, to say "A is B" even in what the old scholastics called the sensa unam, that is, for the copulative proposition "A is B" true, and the further A may or may not be true. But this does not make it assert esse, more, than the technical form. In regard to the necessary propositions, "If it is true, following his guide, the usage of speech, finds that 'A must be true' of all the other things, and as in anything else due to reflect the same actual state of things, and the former is a whole range of other possibilities. However, let us not last the propositional form S, in P, or P as S, properly. This is not a disjunctive proposition, but is a propositional disjunctive predicate. Let us consider it a peculiar form, because it cannot be represented by an S, or S, and the like, but is simply a conjunction. The necessity to which it gives rise must, therefore, either be the same with the condition it is different from it merely by greater simplicity. For

other such obvious objections to Locke's theory see Lange, Logische Studien, 2.

Tenebrery, (c. xil.) maintains that possibility and necessity may only be resolved in terms of the ontological judgment, the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' he means the meaning of a proposition. Locke finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illegal, since it identifies contrary. However, the meaning of this judgment is justified by the not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by these terms are identical.

The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically useful in a particular proposition, that is, in which the predicate is not a term of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that not mean it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected.

In this way Locke vindicates the necessity of the analytic categorical proposition. Coming next to conditions, by the same order, he finds that, assuming that the universe of real, intelligible objects is 'coherent,' we may be justified in asserting that the introduction of a condition X into a subject S gives rise to a predicate P as an 'analytical' necessity, not only by the universal analytic judgment, or the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' he means the meaning of a proposition. Locke finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illegal, since it identifies contrary. However, the meaning of this judgment is justified by the not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by these terms are identical.

The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically useful in a particular proposition, that is, in which the predicate is not a term of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that not mean it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected.

In this way Locke vindicates the necessity of the analytic categorical proposition. Coming next to conditions, by the same order, he finds that, assuming that the universe of real, intelligible objects is 'coherent,' we may be justified in asserting that the introduction of a condition X into a subject S gives rise to a predicate P as an 'analytical' necessity, not only by the universal analytic judgment, or the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' he means the meaning of a proposition. Locke finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illegal, since it identifies contrary. However, the meaning of this judgment is justified by the not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by these terms are identical.

The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically useful in a particular proposition, that is, in which the predicate is not a term of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that not mean it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected.

In this way Locke vindicates the necessity of the analytic categorical proposition. Coming next to conditions, by the same order, he finds that, assuming that the universe of real, intelligible objects is 'coherent,' we may be justified in asserting that the introduction of a condition X into a subject S gives rise to a predicate P as an 'analytical' necessity, not only by the universal analytic judgment, or the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' he means the meaning of a proposition. Locke finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illegal, since it identifies contrary. However, the meaning of this judgment is justified by the not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by these terms are identical.

The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically useful in a particular proposition, that is, in which the predicate is not a term of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that not mean it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected.

In this way Locke vindicates the necessity of the analytic categorical proposition. Coming next to conditions, by the same order, he finds that, assuming that the universe of real, intelligible objects is 'coherent,' we may be justified in asserting that the introduction of a condition X into a subject S gives rise to a predicate P as an 'analytical' necessity, not only by the universal analytic judgment, or the conditional judgment, or the disjunctive judgment. By the 'judgment' he means the meaning of a proposition. Locke finds that the meaning of the analytical judgment is illegal, since it identifies contrary. However, the meaning of this judgment is justified by the not meaning to mean that the terms are identical, but only that the objects denoted by these terms are identical.

The analytic proposition is, therefore, admissible, because it is practically useful in a particular proposition, that is, in which the predicate is not a term of all the particulars. And the justification of the proposition, whose use was to be to connect elements of terms, is that not mean it is meant, but as it is meant to be meant, these elements are identical and do not need to be connected.
he now thinks it might be well to term these the four 'cardinals,' or four cardinal dual relations.


(1) Cook, \textit{Errors of Observation} (c. a.d.).

\textit{Modus tollens} and \textit{Modus ponens} (Lat.)

Two ways of reasoning from a conditional proposition or consequence. The \textit{modus ponens} from the consequence and the antecedent infers the consequent; the \textit{modus tollens} from the consequence and the falsity of the consequent infers the falsity of the antecedent, thus:

\textit{Modus Ponens.}
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{If } A \text{ is true, then } B \text{ is true.} \\
\text{Then if } B \text{ is true, } A \text{ is true.}
\end{array}
\]

\textit{Modus Tollens.}
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{If } A \text{ is true, then } B \text{ is true.} \\
\text{Then if } B \text{ is false, } A \text{ is false.}
\end{array}
\]

A third way of reasoning, namely, from the truth of the antecedent and falsity of the consequent, is generally overlooked. See Hypothetical (Syllogism) (c. a.d.).

\textit{Mohammed,} or \textit{Mahomet}, or \textit{Mahomed} (c. 570-632 a.d.) An Arabian prophet, born at Mecca. His father died about the time of Mohammed's birth, and his mother in his sixth year. He was raised by a grandfather and an uncle. The latter, Abu Talib, was his faithful friend and protector all through life. Accounts of Mohammed's youth are legendary: he probably tended flocks until his twentieth year, when he entered the service of a rich widow named Chadhija, whom he married. In his fortieth year Mohammed saw his first vision and received his 'message.' In four years he made forty proclamies, and it was revealed to him that he must preach openly. As his followers increased in numbers, he was forced to the most careful watchfulness to save his life. About 622 he moved to the friendly city of Medina, and the Mohammedan era dates from the first month of the following Arabian year. Mohammed now became the law-giver, judge, and ruler of Medina and of two powerful Arabian tribes. In the first year of the new era, he assumed hostilities against his enemies. War followed, and in the sixth year of the new era the first pilgrimage to Mecca was announced, but not carried out until the following year. The Meccans concluded peace with him, however, and he had become an equal power. His missionaries passed throughout Arabia, and even beyond its borders. Mohammed's forces being de-