NECESSITY

only the principle of causation and effect, and which imparts universality to the universe. Technically, various forms of it have been recognized. (1) Logical (or metaphysical) necessity: the fact that certain truths, whether mental or physical, must be conceived in such a manner that even from itself it follows that a logical necessity if it follows, in accordance with the principles of identity and non-contradiction, from perceived premises. (2) Mathematical necessity: the similar logical relationship of parts of a demonstration or construction in mathematical reasoning. (3) Physical (or natural) necessity: that which is caused by laws of nature or which arises in the course of nature from the principle of causation: mechanism, the "reign of law"; invariable sequence, according to modern writers, e.g., J. S. Mill. (4) Moral necessity: that required by moral law, by the moral order of the universe: that which follows from the nature of the good as a moral principle; also used in a narrower sense, equivalent to 'practical' necessity, which is neither logical nor physical, but the result of a certain need or demand regarded as of fundamental importance (see Postulate).

These distinctions are overdrawn to Leibniz, and they are most fully developed in hisMonadology. According to him there are three main types: (1) Empirically natural; (2) geometric; (3) that which is not or cannot be otherwise; absolute necessity: that of the order of nature, which might conceivably be otherwise, but which follows from the logic of the will of God, who has chosen the best world; and, hence, logical necessity: (c) Moral necessity: that which is a moral being, even God in itself, in the choice of good. Since morally being would have a perfectly adequate conception of the good, it would by itself be good, and hence, necessity choose it. In this sense, physical necessity would imply moral necessity. This term is also used in a strictly logical sense, equivalent to Aristotle (q.v.), and also to designate the character of those truths which are not free will (incomprehensible: see Determinism, and Will). While the Pre-Socratics, necessity was a quasi-metaphysical expression for the law of order of the course, as in the teaching of Parmenides that the centrality of the universe is necessity, or (apparently) Pythagorean concept of the principle of necessity or the myth of Eros (Patio, Rep. Bk. X), where the entire universe is made to revolve upon an axis of necessity. Heraclitus used the idea (of the principle of destiny) to account for the fact that a certain balance and system is observed in all change. With the Atomists (Leucippus), it becomes a definite philosophical concept: the atoms, distorting about at random, impinge on each other, and hence, the apparent order that appears formed, there is of necessity, a whirligig motion set up. With Plato (aside from incidental and non-technical use of it as equivalent to the force of proof and demonstration) necessity is the co-author, with of the sensible world, as it thought, it is blind, indifferent to good, since none alone is the principle of good, or of the way, and hence that which keeps the world in a state of partial non-being and which prevents its surviving at completion (Phenomena, 48, 56, 68). Aristotle repeats the same idea (De An. part., IV, 11, 557). Matter resists form, and thus hinders Nature (q.v.) from arriving at its actualization. (The idea seems to be that in part matter lends itself to the realization of purposes, but in part has an impetus of its own which is quite indifferent and endless. In this indeterminate matter is thus contained, it may or may not present certain traits. As such it can be chance; so that necessity in the physical sense, and chance in the logical sense, are practically one and the same thing. The various logical necessities have quite another meaning. The States that are the various forms of necessity—that of the source of physical world-order, (b) the universal necessity of the Atomists, (c) the law of uniformity and law of nature, (d) the universal natural law of the Sun systems, and (c) the natural (or temporal) causation of the two preceding (Sather, States, Epicureans, and So-Lo, 170-8, and 181). Since the Atomists did not work out their own system systematically, and even presupposed a more or less random impingement upon which necessity supervened, we may assume, as we have done, that the system of the conviction that everywhere, is controlled by necessity admitting of no exceptions—in other words, of the idea of the universality of natural causation, which is fatal. This conception is common to what is called moral necessity, thought, that to the hypothesis of a fixed and immovable world. Spinoza carries the fusion further by expressly identifying the infinite nature relationship with the logical or mathematical: the world follows from the nature of the world by the same necessity that various truths follow from a geometrical definition. (It will be, in the context from Spinoza that Leibnitz made the distinction referred to above.) It was characteristic of the whole rationalistic school (see Rationalism) to identify reality with the requirement of logical necessity, as manifested in the principles of identity and non-contradiction; and, if, like Leibnitz, they made a distinction between truths of reason and truths of matter (which are empirical, and thus avoided the Spinozistic identification of logical relationship with natural reason), it was a concession to common sense rather than a philosophic implication of their system. Kant introduced a new motive. On the one hand, growing natural sciences had given to the conception of necessity (causal relationship) in nature a solidity and concreteness which it could not have earlier writers; on the other hand, he, of course, denied the dependence of the absolute necessity (involving the necessity of the things of reason) in the understanding of the thing in itself, from an experiential subject. The source of necessity was, in the understanding as applied to sense; so that the any may be said that Kant restored the critical and constructive way in which it had been held in a dogmatic and formal way, namely, the origin of necessity in reason. At least, this path was followed by his disciple, Schelling, and of whose theories which are ascribed the idea that reason is the truth of necessity, that is to say, the self-determination of one phase of the object of the world is another at bottom the self-determination of conscious mind, so that the necessary object, when experienced, appears as a co-operating factor in the development of the external life. (Ed. St. P., X. 20.)  

The following distinctions are usual.

NECESSITY

Internal necessity springs from the nature of the subject of the phenomenon: it comes from the inside. External necessity is either absolute or conditioned. Absolute necessity belongs to the contingencies that whose being otherwise would involve the necessity: it is that which depends upon some matter of fact. Thus the Aristotelians held that a body falls to the ground by a necessity of its own nature, without external force or agency: yet, it is easily prevented from falling. External necessity, also called necessity ex hypothese, becomes dependent upon an external condition, is distinguished in whatever way the necessity is distinguished in the doctrine of the Monads (q.v.), and, in particular, reference to the sense consciousness and sense experience. In addition, external necessity is divided according to the realization of the condition or the necessity of the condition in either due to the existence of a force or the knowledge of it or it is casual. Casual necessity (used also in modern logic) in either necessity of composition or necessity of determination. Necessity determined by a consequent condition in either ex hypothese, in sense determination (actus quantum non actu), and in existential consequence (actus as actu). Necessity ex determinatio is either or both of these.

Another common distinction is between necessity and possibility, in sense, and in sense. Possible things, phrases which explain themselves.

Still another throwback distinction, due to Aristotle (A. Anc. post), is between necessity of some (in mores), per se (in se), and universality presence (in se). The last of these, however, is unattainable, and it may be that in its meaning that the exaggerated application of the phrase would give us a phrase we hear daily in the streets, præsens de praesenti or sensum esse de praesenti. The name of a predicate which belongs to the immediate subject at all times. Necessity per se is one being to the essence of the species, and is subdivided according to the presence of per se, especially it is the first and second modes of per se. Among modern distinctions we may mention that of Beaux Edmonds between predicative and descriptive necessity. The former

Literature: Works on metaphysics, in general: G. Tarras, La doctrine de la nécessité (q.v., etc.). The following distinctions are usual.

Epistemological necessity is determined by the laws
Corresponding to every such predicate there is a more general one, that all the blanks in the two are to be filled with the same set of proper names (of individuals known to exist), one of the two being of such propositions would be true, while the other is false; as, for instance, a syllogism:

1. Every man is mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.

1. Socrates is mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.

The first of these is true; the second is false.

But there are many cases which are not so simple; in which the difference between the two is more complex.

Negation.

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