NECROMANCY — NEGATION

of the understanding, according to Kant (Crit. d. reini Formenl. 1, A. 75). Metaphysical necessity is that of God's existence.

Necromancy is absolute necessity. See above.

The objects by which different kinds of necessity are usually distinguished include absolute, accidental, causal, constant, compound, consequent, deductive, disjunctive, disjunctive external, formal, hypothetical, immediate, internal, logical, material, mediate, metaphysical, moral, physical, practical, preduplicative, prime, simple, teleological, unconditioned.

(Necromancy — see Magic.)

Negation [Lat. negatio, which translates Gr. ἀπόκρύπτον] [Ger. Negation] [Ital. negazione]. Negation is used (1) logically, (2) metaphorically. In the logical sense, it may be used (a) relatively, and (b) absolutely. In the absolute sense, when applied to a proposition, it may be understood (a) as denying the proposition, (b) as denying the predicate,

(1). In its logical sense, negation is opposed to affirmation, although, when it is used relatively, it is not in absolute sense, but in a certain customary term; in its metaphysical sense, negative is opposed to positive (fact, etc.).

The concept of negation, objectively considered, is one of the most important of logical relations; but subjectively considered, it is not a term at all, but is prelogical. That is to say, it is one of those in which the mind must have been fully developed and mastered before the idea of investigating the continuity of reasoning could have been carried to any extent.

The treatment of the doctrine of negation should not be a good illustration of the effects of applying the principle of Exaamento (s.v.) in logic. The problem is in view a definite purpose in investigating logical questions. He wishes to ascertain the general condition of the truth. New, without ordering an undertaking to present here the whole development of the subject, let it be said that it is found that the first step must be to define how propositions can be so related that under all circumstances whatsoever, the truth of the one entails the truth of the other. The falsity of the one entails the falsity of the other.

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This must be the first part of logic. It is deductive logic, or (more correctly) its principal result) syllogistic. At all times this part of logic has been recognized as a necessary preliminary to further investigation. Deductive and inductive, or methodological, logic have always been distinguished; and the former has generally been called by that name.

In order to trace these relations between propositions, it is necessary to dissect the propositions to a certain extent. There are different ways in which propositions can be dissected. Some of these conduces no measure to the conclusion of the present problem; and will be called by the pragmatist at this stage of the investigation. Such, for example, is the example that makes the copula a distinctive part of the proposition. It may be that there are different ways of useful dissection; but the common one, which alone has been sufficiently studied, may be described as follows:

Taking a proposition whatever, as

Every prior man marries some woman

we notice the parts of a machine may be struck out so as to leave a blank form, in which, if the blanks are filled by proper names (of individuals known to exist), there will be a complete proposition (however silly and false).

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It is obvious that there is some language in which the blanks in such forms cannot be filled with proper names do us to make perfect sentences. Hence the system may be different for sententious involving proper names.

But it does not matter what the rules of grammar may be.

The last of the above blank forms is disjunctive, and the first is conjunctive. The former states, that when such as some, any, or any expression equivalent to such a word. It may be called a Predicate (s. v., sense 2) or phasis.

Corresponding to every such predicate there is another sentence that all the blanks in the two will be filled with the same set of proper names (individuals known to exist), one of the truth of the proposition will be true while the other is false; as

Chrysostom marries Helen to Constantine.

Chrysostom non-marries Helen to Constantine.

It is true that the letter is not good grammar, but that is not of the smallest consequence. Two such propositions are said to be contradictory, and two such predicates to be negatives of one another; or each to result from the negation of the other. Two propositions involving selective expressions may be contradictory; but in order to be so, such selective has to be changed from indicating a suitable selection to indicating any selection that may be made, or vice versa.

Thus the two following propositions are contradictory:

Every priest marries some woman to some man.

Some priest non-marries every woman to some man.

It is very convenient to express the negative of a predicate by simply attaching a non to it. Thus, if we adopt that plan, non-negation must be considered as equivalent to negation. If we look at both in Latin and in modern language, there is probably a great difference in the metaphor of the language in which these very artificial rules prevail.

Of the contradictory propositions each is said to result from the negation of the other.

If the relation of negation may be regarded as defined by the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, See Laws or Laws. That is an admissible, but not a necessary, point of view. Out of the conventions of non-relative deductive logic, such as common existence or composition, aggregation, incompatibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material of these propositions. What are to be selected is a question that the doctrine of transcendents the function of this branch of logic; the indispensable merit of Mrs. Franklin's eight copulae, which are exhibited as co-ordinate formal rank. But, so regarded, they are not proper copulae or conjunction of the relation between the several individual subjects and the predicate, but mere signs of the logical relations between different components of the proposition. The logical doctrine connected with these signs is of considerable importance to the theory of negation.

For the negation of modal see Modal.

Concussion by negation see CONTRADICTION.

(37.) Neoplatonic or negative negation is the negation affected by attaching to the copula in the usual Latin idiom, 'scotan et non est stultus,' in contradistinction, which is effected by attaching the negative particle to the predicate, 'scotan est non stultus.'

Kant revived this distinction in order to get a triad to make out the symmetry of his table of categories; and it has ever since been one of the deepest and most studied studies of German logicians. No one has ever made a more essentially dualist, and distinctly not trinadic.

The word 'not' is a second thing to 'A,' language preserves many traces of this. Duhem is between two alternatives, yes and no.

(4) In the metaphysical sense, negation is in the absence of a character or relation that is regarded as positive. It is distinguished from privation in not implying anything further.

Spinoza's celebrated saying of which the fillings have made so much, 'omnis determinatio est negatio,' has another meaning, that determinatio to one alternative excludes us from another. The same great truth is impressed upon you in the sentence: 'You cannot eat your cake and have your too.'

Predicates are not denied to subjects at a hazard; it would be a great waste of time to set forth in language the fact that the vast majority of predicates are inapplicable to the vast majority of subjects. In ordinary negative statement may have any value, there must have been some reason to suppose that the affirmative statement of which it is the exact denial was true, either that it had been proposed for our acceptance by an interlocutor, or that it had been part of our stored-up knowledge of an inadvertent and mistaken knowledge, or that we had in mind what was suggested by the suggestion of the interlocutor.

Sign is, therefore, right in taining that the negative statement, in its affirmative form, is not of the same primordiality as the affirmative statement; 'a is not b' is not merely