was seen that certain experiences appeared to have permanent and general validity, while others had to do with the particular and changing. The tendency was to assume a superior form of knowing—reason—and an inferior—one—and to divide the objective spheres accordingly. Heracleitus and Parmenides contributed to the distinction, but we owe its sharp formulation to Plato. With reference to his theory of ideas, he marks off sharply the incorporeal world, Ideas, from the world of perceptions, from the world which is seen, mere reflections, the world of propositions. The first is the ultimate reality of which the second is but an image.

Aristotle, following Plato, used the term to express the essence of real beings taken in their intelligible aspect, their capacity of being rationally apprehended. As the Neo-Platonists made much of the doctrine of Nous (νοῦς), the subjective notion played a large part in their system. The Neoplatonist Porphyry (c. 233 CE) expressed the fact that the Nous includes within itself a complete system of forms and forces as its own dispositions. Ossian revived the term with practically the Aristotelian meaning. Sir William Hamilton used it to designate knowledge originating within the mind.

**Literature:** Plato, Rep., vi. 507 E; Phaedrus, 245 E; Phaedo, 112 D; Thol. Deo. De Anim., III. iv. 12; Plotinus, Enn., vi. 22; Condren, Eternal and Immutable Morality, Brit. ii. 1. 6. 2; Hamilton, Lects., etc., Nat., xxxviii. See also Martinez, Types of Biblical Theory, 443 ff.

**Notes:**

1. Nouns (OF. and ME. noun and nois): Ger. Gernsicht; Fr. bruit; Ital. rumore. A sensation of hearing distinct from the sensation of tone, usually given as mixed noise and tone, characterized by intensity, duration, and pitch.

2. It is stimulated by six vibrations of mixed or rapidly changing rates. It was formerly referred to the vestibule, but is now generally held to have its seat in the cochlea of the ear. Cf. Auditory Sensation under Bracing.

**Literature:** Helmholtz, Sensations of Tone, 7; 8; Ebbinghaus, Psychol., 283, 484.

**Notition** (Lat. notitia, to be unwilling): Ger. Wider-Widerbrühlung (see below); Fr. notitiance; Ital. notiziano (not in use). Negative Notition (νοῦς) or the will not to do.

A term not in general use, but convenient. An act of notition is CONTRA-VOLUNTARY (νοῦς), and a decision of notition is a Veto (see Flag). "Nobilis et aversus sensu non sint actiones privativas [involuntariae] sed autonomas (contra-volitionis)" (Ch. Wolff, Phil., Prunt., 1, 1, 48, quoted by Euler).

The German equivalent is suggested. Notition in a form of Strenthen (condition) and also of Widerristen (negative condition) but is confined to Widersprechend (voluntary action) as narrower than Widerspruch (voluntary action).

**Nominal (Lat. nominale, pertaining to a name): Ger. nominal; Ital. nominale.** Referring to a logical term, whether expressed in language or merely a concept of the mind, and not to anything real. Cf. Nominalism, and Realism.

**Nominal definition (definitio nominalis):** the declaration of the essence of a word or expression, that is, the necessary and sufficient conditions of its applicability, or the enumeration of marks which suffice, but do not more than suffice, to give the meaning of the term, understanding by the 'meaning', not the whole idea it may convey, but so much as it would require to be intended to convey in order to be a suitable word. Latinsa says, "Illud genere distinctum inter definitiones nominativas, quae notae tantum rei ab aliqua disjuncta, contineant, et rei, ex quibus constat rem esse possibilem, et habi ratione saepe habita, quotiesque vox voce sustinetur, nullam rationem arboris, quae definitionibus nominatiborum precedent, non considerans realitatem definitionis in se habita non esse, nec quasdam notiones inter se semel conditur. Nec definitiones nominatiborn sufficient ad perfectam resistentem, nisi quando aliius constat rem esse possibilem." This mode of making the distinction has been approved by many nominalists, as J. S. Mill. It cannot satisfy the realists, who demand of the real definition that it should express the real generating nature of the real species which it defines. As for the possibility of the thing, if by that in meant logical possibility, the nominal definition suffices. If more than that is meant, it is out of the province of definition to prove or declare a thing to be possible. A 'postulate' defines what is supposed to be possible; a 'problem' proves such possibility.

**Nominal mode, in the doctrine of modal: a mode of a proposition expressed by an adjective, as 'sortem currens est contingens' (C.B.).**