

**Nominalism** [Lat. *nominalis*, from *nomen*, a name]: Ger. *Nominalismus*; Fr. *nominalisme*; Ital. *nominalismo*. The doctrine that universals have no objective existence or validity; in its extreme form, that they are only names (*nomina, flatus vocis*), that is, creations of language for purposes of convenient communication. See **REALISM** (1) for full account and history. (J.D.)

**Nomology** [Gr. *νόμος*, law, + *λόγος*, doctrine]: for equivalents see the next topic. The science which investigates laws, as general psychology and general physics; contradistinguished from classificatory and explanatory science. Hamilton says, 'We have a science which we may call the nomology of mind — nomological psychology' (*Lects. on Met.*, vii). (C.S.P.)

**Nomology** (in law): Ger. *Nomologie, Gesetzeslehre*; Fr. *nomologie*; Ital. *nomologia*. Jural science; the science of the conformity of human actions to rules of conduct prescribed by law. 'Ethic is the science mainly of duties, while nomology looks rather to the definition and preservation of rights' (Holland, *Jurisprudence*, chap. iii. 25). The rules of conduct, with which it is conversant, are both those prescribed by the current standard of morality, and those of legislation (*ibid.* 26; Smith's *Right and Law*, § 51). (S.E.B.)

**Non-A** (in logic): same in the other languages. An expression occurring in the usual forms of statement of the principles of contradiction and excluded middle. It is a term which denotes whatever is supposed not to be denoted by A, and denotes nothing more. (C.S.P.)

**Non-being**: Ger. *Nichtseiendes, Nichts* (*Nicht-sein*); Fr. *non-être (néant)*; Ital. *non-essere*. Literally, just the absence or negation of being; but in accordance with the Greek tendency to give (unconsciously) an objective meaning to all categories of thought, non-being (*μη ὄν, μη εἶναι*) was assumed as existent, until it became an object of dispute among philosophic schools as to whether non-being is or is not.

The Eleatics (Parmenides, 470 B.C.), who identified it with empty space, holding that everything must be full (or that all that is, is), denied its existence. The Atomists, however (Leucippus), needing a space for their discrete particles to move in, asserted that non-being (the VOID, q.v.) was as real as being (the atoms). Plato (denying empty space as a fact) assumed a relative world of non-being (the counterpart of ignorance) as the opposite

of his ideas, and, interpreting it also as space, regarded it as the matrix out of which the world was created. In not dissimilar fashion the theological doctrine of the creation of the world 'out of nothing' tended to give non-being a quasi-existence, as at least the background of the divine operation. Aristotle attempted to give the term a dynamic interpretation. As all nature moves between the potential and the completed, the potential at once is and is-not. On one side, it is the medium, the matter, through which the form realizes itself; and it is also the restraint which prevents the full exhibition of form, and which is responsible for failures and deviations from the main line of development. In the Neo-Platonists, non-being becomes a highly important category. As empty space and as privation it was the responsible factor in the development of the purely physical world and also the cause of evil. It is the absolute opposite of pure being, which yet, just because it is non-being, reduces the manifestations of being to lower levels. However naive the Greek formulation, it is obvious that through the use of this term there were gradually developed two of the most serious problems of philosophy: one on the side of cosmology, as to the existence of a vacuum, and the possibility of motion without a vacuum; the other the metaphysical and ethical problem of the significance of the negative factor in the universe, of hindrance and imperfection. It is a metaphysical problem, as well as an ethical one, because the value of the concept of growth and development (of change which is qualitative) seems to imply a passage from the potential to the actual, or from (relative) non-being to being. The problem in the former sense was revived by Descartes and in the latter by Hegel. With Hegel, becoming (Werden), process, activity are the ultimate and absolute, and thus a negative factor is as necessary as is a positive. In the famous doctrine of the identity of being and non-being is contained the assertion that the immediate or 'first' being of anything negates itself, and thus passes away, and that this passing away turns out to be not complete disappearance, but a development of itself, and so a reconstitution of being upon a higher, more mediate (or significant) plane (cf. the recent development of the doctrine by Ormond, as cited below). Scotus and other mediaeval philosophers had already taught that since God creates the world out of nothing, nothing belongs to the essence of God.

*Literat. qre.* PARMENIDES, v. 33, 35; ARISTOTLE, *De Gen. et Corr.*, i. 8 (for Leucippus's doctrine), and also PLUTARCH, *Adv. Coel.*, 4. 2; PLATO, *Rep.*, v. 476-9, vi. 511; TIMAEUS; ARISTOTLE, *Physics*, iv. 2 (cf. ZELLER, *Philos. d. Griechen*, iii. 603-23); MET., Bk. XII; PLOTINUS, *Enneads*, iii. 6, 18; ST. AUGUSTINE, *De Civ. Dei*, xii. 2; SCOTUS, *De div. Nat.*, iii. 19; HEGEL, *Logic* (lesser), §§ 87-8, and *Werke*, iii. 72-3 (larger logic); ORMOND, *Basal Concepts in Philos.* (1896). (J.D.)

**Non compos mentis** [Lat.]: Ger. same, or *nicht dispositionsfähig*; Fr. *incapable, non compos sui*; Ital. same, or *non compos sui*. Incapable through mental impairment or disease of conducting one's affairs; usually employed in a technical or legal sense; cf. **COMPOS MENTIS**. (J.J.)

**Non-contradiction**. The 'law of non-contradiction' is another name for the principle of **CONTRADICTION** (q.v.). See also **LAW OF THOUGHT**. (C.S.P.)

**Non-ego**: Ger. *Nicht-ich*; Fr. *non-moi*; Ital. *non-io*. The opposite of the Ego; the not-me; the external object; the external world. Cf. **Ego**.

The term is of especial significance, as a technical term, in the philosophy of Fichte; it represents the second positing (the antipositing—*Entgegensetzen*; see **POSIT**) of the Ego as that which limits and thereby stimulates and defines the more specific activity of the Ego. See Fichte, *Werke*, i. 101-5, and Fischer, *Gesch. d. neueren Philos.*, v. 438. (J.D.)

**Nonsequitur** [Lat. for 'it does not follow']. A name which belongs to the slang of the universities for the fallacia *consequentis* (called by Aristotle *ὁ παρά τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος*, *De Sophist. Elen.*, 167 b 1), which is, strictly speaking, a fallacy which arises from a simple conversion of a universal affirmative, or transposing a protasis and apodosis, or condition and consequent.

Thus Aristotle tells us that the Eleatic Melissus argued that the universe is ungenerated, since nothing can be generated by what does not precede it. The universe, then, not being generated, has no beginning; and having no beginning, it is infinite. But, as Aristotle remarks, 'nothing does not follow' (*non sequitur, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν*) that everything that has a beginning is generated. A fever, for example, is not generated. Such fallacies are extremely common. De Morgan (*Formal Logic*, 268) gives this example:

'Knowledge gives power, power is desirable, therefore knowledge is desirable.' But though whatever is desirable has some desirable effect, it does not follow that whatever has any desirable effect is desirable. An attack of yellow fever has the desirable effect of rendering it unlikely the patient will for a long time have another; still, it is not itself desirable.

But the majority of logicians not only found this fallacy with the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, which Aristotle considers immediately after, but even define it as 'failure in the formal inadequacy of the reason' (Sidgwick, *Fallacies*, II. ii. 4), or as 'the introduction of new matter into the conclusion, which is not contained in the premises' (Hyslop, *Logic*, xviii. 2), or as 'the simple affirmation of a conclusion which does not follow from the premises' (De Morgan, *loc. cit.*), or as 'any argument which is of so loose and inconsequent a character that no one can discover any cogency in it' (Jevons, *Lessons in Logic*, xxi), or 'to assume without warrant that a certain conclusion follows from premises which have been stated' (Creighton, *Introductory Logic*, § 46). Very many logicians omit it altogether, which is better.

Aristotle, however, could not express himself more precisely: 'ὁ παρά τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οἰεσθαι ἀντιστρέφει τὴν ἀκολουθίαν. That is, 'from thinking that the *consequentia* can be converted.' That is to say, thinking that because 'If A, then C,' therefore 'If C, then A.' Owing to the neglect of fallacies by the more scientific logicians, it is not easy to cite many who define the fallacy correctly. The Comimbricenses (than whom no authority is higher) do so (*Commentarii in Univ. Dialecticam Arist. Stagir., In lib. Elench.*, q. i. art. 4); also Eustachius (*Summa Philos.*, Tom. I, pars. III, tract. iii, disput. iii. 9. 3); also Cope, an admirable student of Aristotle, in his note on the *Rhetorics*, B. cap. xxiv. See also the *Cent. Dict.*, under 'Fallacy.' (C.S.P.)

**Non-voluntary**: Ger. *nicht-strebend*; Fr. *non-volontaire*; Ital. (not in use). **ACONATIVE** (q.v.). See also **ACTION**.

**Noology** [Gr. *νοῦς*, reason, + *λόγος*, theory]: Ger. *Noologie*; Fr. *noologie*; Ital. *noologia* (the equivalents are suggested). That part of philosophy which deals with intuitive truths of reason; as distinct from **Dianoiology**, which deals with truths discursively or demonstratively established.

A term suggested by Sir William Hamilton, Reid's *Works*, note A, § v, but having no currency. Hamilton probably derived it from