PERSONIFICATION — PERSPICUITY

factory; but they furnish a suggestive basis of explanation, and one which embraces in an orderly scheme various forms of alterations of personality.

Under all theories the connection of changes of personality with organic disturbances, particularly in the field of anaesthesias and parasthesias, is of fundamental importance. In some cases such connection is clear, an anaesthesia appearing in one state and disappearing in another; in other cases it can only be indefinitely inferred. Its influence in alienation of personality has already been noted. But such parasthesias frequently affect the dominant emotional tone or temperament, and this, whether gay or sad, contemplative and brooding or suspicious, or curious and vivacious and interested, influences the quality and character of the personality. Finally, the influence of distinct hallucinations and the fluctuations and vagaries of a disordered intelligence may develop changes or alienations which are at the mercy of individual fancy, and cannot be expected to conform to the results of logical analysis. The changes of personality incident to spontaneous trance and to the induced trance-states of spiritualistic and other mediums should be cited in this connection, but cannot as yet be described under the light of explanatory principles.

Literature: Ribot, Diseases of Personality (1885; Eng. trans., 1891); Binet, Alterations of Personality (1891; Eng. trans., 1896); Azam, Hypnot., double conscience et alterations de la personnalité (1887); Bouret and Burot, Variations de la personnalité (1888); P. Janet, Automatisme psychol. (1889); James, Princ. of Psychol., i. 383; Myers, Proc. Soc. Psych. Res. (1890), 233; Hericourt, Activité inconsciente de l'esprit, Rev. Scient., Aug. 31, 1889; La personnalité et l'écriture, Rev. Philos., April, 1886; Morbelli, Semej. malat. ment.; Dessor, Das Doppel-Ich (1890), Psychol. Rev., 1; Forbes Winslow, Obscure Diseases of Brain and Mind, chaps. xii–xxvii; Royce, Anomalies of Self-consciousness, in Stud. in Good and Evil; Dugas, Un cas de dépersonnalisation, Rev. Philos., 45; Dépersonnalisation et fausse mémoire, Rev. Philos., 46; B. Leroy, Sur l'illusion dite dépersonnalisation, Rev. Philos., 46. See also references under Automatic Writing. (j.j.)

Personification: Ger. Personifikation; Fr. personification; Ital. personificazione. A general term for the attribution to natural objects of some or all of the characteristics of personality.

The notion of personification is mainly current in mythology and comparative religion and philology. It is more exactly rendered by the narrower conceptions of Animism (q.v.) in its various forms in philosophy, and Ejection (q.v.) in psychology. It is distinct from Anthropomorphism (q.v.), since it is a further step from personification to identify the personified forces and objects of nature with the anthropomorphized gods. The questions formerly ‘treated’ under the term personification may now be distinguished somewhat as follows: (1) Does primitive man first of all and naturally look upon nature as in any sense personal, i.e. like himself? (2) If so, in what sense—physical, forceful, social, mental—as merely moving, as opposing, as arranging, as planning? These two questions relate to an ultimate personifying category. (3) How does he think of himself, and how does he come by this thought?—is it a reflex of his experience of nature—the question of introduction (q.v.)—or does he reach both self and the ‘spirits’ of nature by special experiences, e.g. from dreams? Cf. Dream (anthropological). (4) Granted a start in the personifying direction, either natural or acquired, what is the process by which it becomes fuller, takes on its various stages, and finally disappears altogether?

The exact answers to these inquiries will be slow in coming; meanwhile the interpretation of Animism, Totemism, and Feticism (see these terms) awaits such answers. The rise of grammatical gender is another cognate and unconsidered question; for gender is in some form a quasi-personal distinction.

The tendency is to accept some sort of a psychological process by which thoughts of self and nature arise in the human mind together, and exist in close correlation. The violent divorce between them is a matter of high development, and the depersonification of nature, in the categories of mechanical science, becomes the real problem, rather than the personification of nature.

Literature: see the citations under the topics referred to, especially under Introduction, and Ejection. A brief psychological note may be found in Höffding, Outlines of Psychol., 2 ff.; consult also the literature of Race Psychology, and most of the general works given under Anthropology. (j.m.d.)

Personification (in aesthetics): see Symbol.

Perspicuity (Lat. perspicus, clear, from per + spicere, to look): Ger. Perspicuität,
Pertinent — Petition Principii

Terms cited below: Fr. perspicuité; Ital. perspicuità. Perspicuity is said to be an adjunct of truth variously defined. A perspicuous concept is defined by Burgersdicus as one which represents its objects clearly, distinctly, and fully (Inst. of Met., I. xix. 2). Kant, in the Logic by Jäsehe (Introd., viii), after remarking that aesthetic distinctness (Deutlichkeit) often causes objective, or logical, obscurity, and vice versa (as if he had been reading Mill's Logic or Liberty!), defines perspicuity (Helligkeit) as the union of objective and subjective distinctness. Hamilton (Lects. on Logic, xxiv) defines a perspicuous definition as one 'couched in terms intelligible, and not figurative, but proper and compendious.' (C.S.P.)

Pertinent [Lat. pertinere, to reach to, pertain, be pertinent]: Ger. zur Sache gehörig; Fr. pertinent; Ital. convenevole. In the doctrine of obligationes, in logic, pertinent is applied to a proposition whose truth or falsity would necessarily follow from the truth of the proposition to which it was said to be pertinent, and also of a term either necessarily true or necessarily false of another term to which it was said to be pertinent (cf. the Cent. Dict.). (C.S.P.)

Perturbation [Lat. perturbation, confusion]: Ger. Verwirrtheit; Fr. perturbation, trouble; Ital. perturbatione. Mental perturbation is a condition of disquiet or hesitancy; a restlessness or absence of mental tranquillity. As such it is a normal mental experience, but in extreme degrees, or when protracted duration, it is characteristic of abnormal conditions. (J.J.)

Perversion [Lat. perversio, a turning about]: Ger. Perversion; Fr. perversion; Ital. pervertimento, percezione (ethical). A degeneration or morbid alteration of the instincts, feelings, habits, or modes of thought. These occur in many forms of insanity and in individuals of morbid, neurotic heredity. Perversions of taste, perversions of the sense of pain, a perverted moral sense have been noted in hysteria, in mania, in idiocy, &c. (Cf. these terms, and also especially Moral Insanity, and Degeneration.) Sexual perverisons have been extensively studied, and are in most cases regarded as symptomatic of nervous or mental disorder; a special case is inversion or homosexuality—sexual instinct directed towards persons of the same sex.

Literature: Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychol. of Sex, i; Sexual Inversion (1897); Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis; Moll, Konräre Sexuallempfindung (1892). (J.J.)

Pessimism: see Optimism and Pessimism, and cf. Meliorism.

Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich. (1746–1827.) Educated in theology and law, his health failed and he devoted himself for some time to farming. Established a school for poor peasant children (1775); failed (1780). Devoted himself to literature for eighteen years. Took charge of an orphan asylum in Stanz (1798–99). Assisted in opening a school in Burgdorf Castle (1799). Elected member of deputation sent by the Swiss to Paris (1802). In 1804 he removed his school to Münchenbuchsee. He removed to the Yverdun Institute the same year. Retired to Neuhof, his earlier farm (1825). He is called the founder of modern pedagogy.

Petitio Principii [Lat. This is a not very good translation of Aristotle's phrase τὸ ἐκ αὐτοῦ (or ἐκ αὑτοῦ) αἰτιῶσα, to beg what was proposed in the beginning]. It is a Fallacy (q.v.) of a relatively high order, inasmuch as it cannot exist unless the conclusion truly follows from the premises. To accuse a man of begging the question is in reality a plea which virtually admits that his reasoning is good. Its only fault is that it assumes as a premise what no intelligent man who doubted the conclusion could know to be true.

A very necessary, though not always sufficient, precaution against this fallacy is to ask oneself whether the reasoning rests upon any observations, or inductions from observations, or even trustworthy hypothetic inferences from observations, which really involve the conclusion, relating to those matters of experience in reference to which the conclusion is important; and if relating to those things, whether in such a way and so closely that that conclusion really can have been implicitly asserted in those premises. For example, to take an illustration partly fanciful, a man proposes to prove the reality or possibility of clairvoyance to me by proving to me that the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles. If, he says, you can sit in your study and know that this is true in the most distant parts of the universe, why may not an exceptionally gifted person know many facts about what happens only a hundred miles away? Upon that, I ask myself whether geometry rests upon any observations concerning clairvoyance or anything like clairvoyance. Nay, the consequence which my arguer has pointed out seems so cogent, and