PERTINENT — PETITIO PRINCIPII

Terms cited below: Fr. perspicuité; Ital. perspicuità. Perspicuity is said to be an adjunct of truth variously defined. A perspicuous concept is defined by Burghardtius as one which represents its objects clearly, distinctly, and fully (Inst. of Met., i, xix. 2). Kant, in the Logik by Jüngschle (Introd., viii), after remarking that aesthetic distinctness (Deutlichkeit) often causes objective, or logical, obscurity, and vice versa (as if he had been reading Mill's Logic or Liberty), defines perspicuity (Helligkeit) as the union of objective and subjective distinctness. Hamilton (Lects. on Logico, xxiv) defines a perspicuous definition as one 'coached in terms intelligible, and not figurative, but proper and compendious' (c.s.P.).

**Pertinent** [Lat. pertinenté, to reach to, pertain, be pertinent]: Ger. zur Sache gehörig; Fr. pertinent; Ital. convenevole. In the doctrine of obligations, in logic, pertinent is applied to a proposition whose truth or falsity would necessarily follow from the truth of the proposition to which it was said to be pertinent, and also of a term either necessarily true or necessarily false of another term to which it was said to be pertinent (cf. the Cent. Dict.).

**Perturbation** [Lat. perturbation, confusion]: Ger. Verwirrtheit; Fr. perturbation, trouble; Ital. perturbazioni. Mental perturbation is a condition of disquiet or hesitancy; a restlessness or absence of mental tranquillity. As such it is a normal mental experience, but in extreme degrees, or when protracted duration, it is characteristic of abnormal conditions.

**Perversion** [Lat. perversione, a turning about]: Ger. Verwirrung; Fr. perverision; Ital. perversione, perversione (ethical). A degeneration or morbid alteration of the instincts, feelings, habits, or modes of thought.

These occur in many forms of insanity and in individuals of morbid, neurotic heredity. Perversions of taste, perversions of the sense of pain, a perverted moral sense have been noted in hysteria, in mania, in idiocy, &c. (Cf. these terms, and also especially Moral Insanity, and Degeneration.) Sexual perversions have been extensively studied, and are in most cases regarded as symptomatic of nervous or mental disorder; a special case is inversion or homosexuality—sexual instinct directed towards persons of the same sex.

**Literature:** HAVELOCK ELLIS, Studies in the Psychol. of Sex, i; Sexual Inversion (1897); KRAFFT-EISING, Psychopathia Sexualis; MOLL, Conträre Sexualempfindung (1891). (S.J.)

**Fessimism:** see Optimism and Fessimism, and cf. MELIORISM.

**Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich.** (1746–1827.) Educated in theology and law, his health failed and he devoted himself for some time to farming. Established a school for poor peasant children (1775); failed (1789). Devoted himself to literature for eighteen years. Took charge of an orphan asylum in Stanz (1798–99). Assisted in opening a school in Burgdorf Castle (1799). Elected member of a society by the Swiss to Paris (1802). In 1804 he removed his school to Münchenbuchsee. He removed to the Yverdun Institute the same year. Retired to Neuhof, his earlier farm (1825). He is called the founder of modern pedagogy.

**Petitio Principii** [Lat. This is a not very good translation of Aristotle’s phrase τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ (or εν ἀρχῇ) αἱρεῖται, to beg what was proposed in the beginning]. It is a FALLACY (q.v.) of a relatively high order, inasmuch as it cannot exist unless the conclusion truly follows from the premises. To accuse a man of begging the question is in reality a plea which virtually admits that his reasoning is good. Its only fault is that it assumes as a premise what no intelligent man who doubted the conclusion could know to be true.

A very necessary, though not always sufficient, precaution against this fallacy is to ask oneself whether the reasoning rests upon any observations, or inductions from observations, or even trustworthy hypothetic inferences from observations, which really involve the conclusion, relating to those matters of experience in reference to which the conclusion is important; and if relating to those things, whether in such a way and so closely that that conclusion really can have been implicitly asserted in those premises. For example, to take an illustration partly fanciful, a man proposes to prove the reality or possibility of clairvoyance to me by proving to me that the sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles. If, he says, you can sit in your study and know that this is true in the most distant parts of the universe, why may not an exceptionally gifted person know many facts about what happens only a hundred miles away? Upon that, I ask myself whether geometry rests upon any observations concerning clairvoyance or anything like clairvoyance. Nay, the consequence which my arguer has pointed out seems so cogent, and