terms cited below; Fr. perspicuité; Ital. perspicuità. Perspicuity is said to be an
adjunct of truth variously defined. A perspicuous concept is defined by Bur-
gersdicius as one which represents its objects clearly, distinctly, and fully (Inst. of
Met., I. xix. 2). Kant, in the Logik by Jässche (Introdt., viii), after remarking that
aesthetic distinctness (Deutlichkeit) often causes objective, or logical, obscurity, and
vice versa (as if he had been reading Mill's Logic or Liberty!), defines perspicuity (Hell-
ligkeit) as the union of objective and subjective distinctness. Hamilton (Lects. on Logico,
xxiv) defines a perspicuous definition as one
‘couched in terms intelligible, and not figurative,
but proper and compendious.’ (C.S.R.)

**Pertinent** [Lat. pertinent, to reach to, pertain, be pertinent]: Ger. zur Sache gehörig;
Fr. pertinent; Ital. convenevole. In the
discipline of obligations, in logic, pertinent
is applied to a proposition whose truth or
falshood would necessarily follow from the
truth of the proposition to which it was said
to be pertinent, and also of a term either
necessarily true or necessarily false of another
term to which it was said to be pertinent
(c.f. the Cent. Dict.). (C.S.P.)

**Perturbation** [Lat. perturbatio, confusion]:
Ger. Verwirrtheit; Fr. perturbation, trouble;
Ital. perturbazioni. Mental perturbation is a
condition of disquiet or hastiness; a restles-
sness or absence of mental tranquillity. As
such it is a normal mental experience, but
in extreme degrees, or when protracted
duration, it is characteristic of abnormal
conditions. (J.J.)

**Perversion** [Lat. perversio, a turningabout]:
Ger. Perversion; Fr. perversion; Ital. perver-
timento, perversione (ethical). A degeneration
or morbid alteration of the instincts, feelings,
habits, or modes of thought.
These occur in many forms of insanity and
in individuals of morbid, neurotic heredity.
Perversions of taste, perversions of the sense
of pain, a perverted moral sense have been
noted in hysteria, in mania, in idiocy, &c.
(Cf. these terms, and also especially Moral
Insanity, and Degeneration.) Sexual per-
versions have been extensively studied, and
are in most cases regarded as symptomatic
of nervous or mental disorder; a special
case is inversion or homosexuality—sexual
instinct directed towards persons of the same
sex.

**Literature**: Havelock Ellis, Studies in
the Psychol. of Sex, i; Sexual Inversion (1897);
Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis; Moli,
Conträre Sexuallempfindung (1891). (J.J.)

**Pesssimism**: see Optimism and Pess-
simism, and cf. Meliorism.

**Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich.** (1746-
1827.) Educated in theology and law, his
health failed and he devoted himself for some
time to farming. Established a school for poor
peasant children (1775); failed (1780). De-
voted himself to literature for eighteen years.
Took charge of an orphan asylum in Stanz
(1798–99). Assisted in opening a school in
Burgdorf Castle (1799). Elected member of
deputation sent by the Swiss to Paris (1802).
In 1804 he removed his school to Münchenu-
buchsee. He removed to the Yverdon Institu-
tute the same year. Retired to Neuhof,
his earlier farm (1825). He is called the
founder of modern pedagogy.

**Petitio Principii** [Lat. This is a not
t very good translation of Aristotle's phrase
τὰ ἀγαθά (or ἀριστά) αἰτεῖσθαι, to beg what
was proposed in the beginning]. It is a Fall-
acy (q.v.) of a relatively high order, inasmuch
as it cannot exist unless the conclusion
truly follows from the premises. To accuse
a man of begging the question is in reality
a plea which virtually admits that his reasoning
is good. Its only fault is that it assumes as a
premise what no intelligent man who doubted
the conclusion could know to be true.
A very necessary, though not always suffi-
cient, precaution against this fallacy is to ask
oneself whether the reasoning rests upon
any observations, or inductions from observa-
tions, or even trustworthy hypothetic inferences
from observations, which really
involve the conclusion, relating to those
matters of experience in reference to which
the conclusion is important; and if relating
to those things, whether in such a way and so
closely that that conclusion really can have
been implicitly asserted in those premises.
For example, to take an illustration partly
cumulative, a man proposes to prove the reality
or possibility of clairvoyance to me by proving
to me that the sum of the angles of a triangle
is two right angles. If, he says, you can sit
in your study and know that this is true in
the most distant parts of the universe, why may
not an exceptionally gifted person know many
facts about what happens only a hundred miles
away? Upon that, I ask myself whether
geometry rests upon any observations con-
cerning clairvoyance or anything like clair-
voyance. Nay, the consequence which my
arguer has pointed out seems so cogent, and
yet the line of reasoning so inadmissible, that I go up to the garret to exhume my old Euclid or Legendre, to see how it is proved that sitting in my study I can know what the angles of the triangle whose vertices are at Sirius, Arcturus, and Fomalhaut, may sum up to. I find it is done by assuming that certain propositions about space are self-evident. Now, this may be safe enough so far as that sort of reasoning has been millions of times verified. But nothing of the sort has been, or can be, verified exactly; and for such monstrous triangles a divergence from exactitude in the formula may be large, although for terrestrial triangles it is too minute for detection. In short, I am led to see that there must be a petito principi in any argument which, resting merely on common sense, concludes the exact truth of any matter of fact. 

**Petrus Hispanus** (Peter of Spain). (1226–77.) A scholastic logician who became Pope John XXI.

**Phacoscope**: see **Laboratory and Apparatus**, III, B, (1).

**Phantasm** [Gr. φάντασμα, an appearance]: Ger. Phantasma; Fr. (2) fantôme; Ital. (2) fantasma. (1) Used formerly (as equivalent to the Greek φάντασμα) to mean mental pictures or revived images of all sorts. (J.M.B.)

(2) Applied to hallucinations of forms or spectres, whether occurring under normal or quasi-abnormal conditions; apparitions.

The appearances provoked by a dose of opium or hashish, the phenomena of dream-life, the forms conjured up by the excited imagination of religious devotees, the spasmodic or habitual externalizations of the visualizing faculty, may all be spoken of as phantasmata. In the literature of the Society for Psychological Research (q.v.) the term has received a more specialized meaning, and 'phantasmata of the living' is applied to the apparition to a friend or relative of persons still living but approaching death, and as if premonitory of such death. The term phantasmagoria was applied to the raising or recalling of the spirits of the dead, as formerly practised, or as initiated by natural agencies; or again to any series of illusory figures, as those occurring in dreams or hallucinations. (J.D.)

**Phariseism** [Gr. Ἰταλίκα, Parasi; Hebr. parush, separated]: Ger. Pharisäerismus; Fr. pharisaisme; Ital. fariissismo. Self-righteousness in religious profession combined with over-scrupulousness in the observance of forms. Historically, the principles of the Jewish sect of Pharisees, who in religion united orthodoxy with belief in the authority of oral traditions, and in politics were opposed to foreign dominance and ideas.

The Pharisees first appeared as a party of that name in the reign of John Hyrcanus, 135–105 B.C. From the beginning they represented national exclusiveness and opposition to foreign and especially Greek influences. They were orthodox believers, in opposition to the free-thinking Sadducees. They were the educated class and the intellectual and moral leaders of their time, and, in spite of their shortcomings, stood distinctively for the best elements in Judaism.

**Literature**: Wellhausen, Die Pharisaeer und d. Sadduceer (1874); Encyc. Brit., arts. Israel and Messiah. (A.T.o.)

**Phase** [Gr. φάσις, from φαίνειν, to make to appear, to make visible]: Ger. Phase; Fr. phase; Ital. fase. One of a series of definite forms, or modes of appearance, or specific characters which one and the same subject-matter presents either successively, or from different points of view.

It is often used as synonymous with aspect, but strictly speaking is differentiated by referring to successive, instead of simultaneous, modes of manifestation. It also involves a shade less reference to the subject or perciept, 'aspect' indicating a certain distinction introduced by the way the subject looks at the matter. (J.D.)

**Phenomenalism** [Gr. φανέρωθαι, to appear]: Ger. Phänomenalismus; Fr. phénoménisme; Ital. fenomenismo. (1) The theory that all knowledge is limited to phenomena (things and events in time and space), and that we cannot penetrate to reality in itself. Cf. **Phenomenon**, **Empiricism**, Agnosticism, and Positivism.

(2) The theory that all we know is a phenomenon, that is, reality present to consciousness, either directly or reflectively; and that phenomena are all that there are to know, there being no thing-in-itself or object out of relation to consciousness.

This latter is the philosophy held by Shadworth. Cf. also **Immanence Philosophy** (q.v.). It is obvious that the two senses differ radically from each other, the first having its point in the assertion of a real but unknown thing-in-itself; the latter in its denial. (J.D.)

**Phenomenology** [Gr. φανέρωθαι, that which appears, ἀλήθος, doctrine, theory]: Ger. Phänomenologie; Fr. phénoménologie; Ital.