the number of units of territorial area (e.g. square miles), the quotient gives the density of population.

Increase of population was regarded as a public good by practically all writers down to the close of the last century. It was reserved for Malthus to show that under conditions of production which may often exist, increase of numbers might result in making the average standard of life lower, and thus be an evil instead of a good. Cf. MALTHUS’ LAW.

Some writers (e.g. Nitti) have attempted to show that prosperity tends to check the increase of population; but as all their observations can be equally well accounted for on the hypothesis that increase of population tends to check prosperity, their work can hardly be considered as vitiating the most important of Malthus’ generalisations. (A.T.H.)

_**Porphyry.** (233-cir. 303 A.D.) Educated under Origen at Caesarea, Longinus at Athens, and Plotinus at Rome, he became a passionate disciple of the latter. Traveled in Sicily and elsewhere, returning to Rome to live. He was a voluminous writer, but most of his writings are lost. See **ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL.**

_**Port Royal Logic.** The name usually given to a treatise entitled La logique, ou l’art de penser, published in 1662. It appeared anonymously, but was written by the Port Royalists Antoine Arnauld (called the great Arnauld) and Pierre Nicole.

The former, a man of considerable power, thought and sketched the book, which his collaborator worked up. Being the first Cartesian logic, a book marked, too, by good sense and literary charm, and not without some scientific merit (though it is weak on the inductive side), it became immensely popular, and did a great deal to spread the doctrine of Descartes. It is chiefly celebrated for the prominence it gives to the anti-Aristotelian theory of logical extension and comprehension; although this doctrine does not begin here to take the position it occupied in the Kantian treatises.

It has been translated several times into English, the best version being that of Thomas Spencer Baynes. (C.S.P.)

_**Port Royalists.** A body of ascetic scholars who settled in the deserted monastery of Port Royal and became leaders in the Jansenist movement. See **Jansenism,** and **Port Royal Logic.**

The Port Royalists numbered some of the most distinguished scholars of the time. In philosophy they were influenced by Descartes. They were the leaders in the Jansenite attack on the Jesuits.

_Literature:_ see references under **Jansenism.** (A.T.O.)

**Porter, Noah.** (1811-92.) Educated at Yale College. He was master of the Hopkins Grammar School, New Haven, 1831-3; tutor at Yale, 1833-5; studied theology also, 1833-5; pastor at New Milford, Conn., 1836; located at Springfield, Mass., 1843; Clark professor of metaphysics and moral philosophy at Yale College, 1846; studied German philosophy (chiefly) for one year in Europe, 1853-4; president of Yale College, 1871; resigned, 1885; remained Clark professor until his death.

**Posit** [Lat. ponere, to put, place, lay down]: Ger. setzen, gesetzt (posed), **Position** (a posing); Fr. poser, affirmer; Ital. porre, affirmare. To assert immediately, that is, not as a result of inference; to assert as given fact; to present as unquestioned existence, not depending on any prior process. Cf. **IMMEDIACY** (psychical, and logical).

The term had originally, in the main, a logical significance, meaning any premise so far as asserted without reference either to previous argument or to the concessions of a real or supposed opponent. In the post-Kantian movement, however, the term assumed a more metaphysical meaning, in harmony with the general tendency to give an objective rendering to the logical, or to hold that thought has a material and not merely a formal bearing. This tendency is most marked in Fichte. In following the effort, initiated by Descartes, to get something beyond all doubt, absolutely certain in itself, and hence a first principle in itself, he started from assertion as the principle of all judgment, and found as a condition of all judgment whatever, the ultimate and irreducible self-assertion of the Ego—its self-positing. ‘The Ego posits originally and simply its own being’ (Werke, i. 98; see Adamson, Fichte, 153-63; Everett, Fichte’s Science of Knowledge, 71). This act is at the same time a fact; the self-activity of the Ego is its existence. Further metaphysic consists in developing the system of posings implied in and derived from this original positing. Positing is, so to speak, the fundamental category—that in which the logical and ontological are one, in which thought (the activity of Ego) gets objective value.

Hegel, on the contrary, in accordance