PRESSURE SENSATION — PRESUMPTION

Histories of Philosophy by UEBERWEG-HEINZE, WINDELBAND, ERMANN (the former give bibliographies). For recent literature see the ‘Berichte’ in the Arch. f. syst. Philosophie.

Pressure Sensation [Lat. pressura, a burden]: Ger. Druckempfindung; Fr. sensation de pression; Ital. sensazioni di pressione (or barica). A sensation obtainable (1) from the ‘pressure spots’ of skin and mucous membrane, (2) from striped muscle, and possibly (3) from joints. Cf. Articular Sensation.

Pressure and pain are perhaps the oldest sense-processes in kind. On its intensive side, cutaneous pressure follows Weber’s law. Both the cutaneous pressure and the articular sensation are endowed with the attribute of extent, and possess local signature.

The following points may be noticed:—(1) Pressure stimuli give rise, under favourable conditions, to two sensations, the primary and the secondary pressure. The explanation has been sought in a double conduction by the spinal cord, and in the existence of centrifugal fibres of the sensory nerves. (2) There is a close interrelation of the senses of pressure and temperature: cold and hot bodies are heavier than bodies of equal weight at a neutral temperature. (3) Under certain conditions—constancy of articular and inconstancy of cutaneous stimulation—there is an outward reference of sensation, e.g. to the tip of the stick held in the hand. Cf. Haptics.

Literature: FUNKE, in Hermann’s Handb. d. Psychol., Ill. 316; WEBER, Tastsinn u. Gemeingefühl (1834); SANFORD, Course in Exp. Psychol., expi. 11-12, 21-30; HENRI, Raumwahrnehmung d. Tastsinnes (1898); v. FRAEN, Untersuchungen ü. d. Sinnesfunktion d. menschlichen Haut, and in Ber. d. k. sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss., xxxii. 3 (1896); DESSOIR, Du Bois-Raymond’s Arch. (1892). (E.B.T.)

Pressure Spot: Ger. Druckpunkt; Fr. point de pression; Ital. punto di pressione (punto barico). A spot of the skin evincing peculiar sensitiveness to stimulations of passively supported weight. See Pressure Sensation, and Weight Sensation. Cf. the remarks made under Temperature Spot on the use of the word ‘spot’ (in preference to ‘point’).

Literature: M. BLIX, Zeitsch. f. Biol., xx (1884); A. GOLDSCHREIBER, Du Bois-Raymond’s Arch. (1885), 340; v. FRAEN, as cited under Pressure Sensation (q.v.). (E.B.T.)

Presumption [Lat. prae-sumptio, used by Quin utilian to translate Gr. προδοσία, anticipation, from πρᾶ + σύν, to take]; Ger. Vermuthung, präsumieren (vb.), Voraussetzung (in logic); Fr. présomption; Ital. presunzione. (1) In logic: a more or less reasonable hypothesis, supported, it may be, by circumstances amounting all but to proof, or, it may be, all but baseless.

Logical or philosophical presumption is non-deductive probable inference which involves a hypothesis. It might very advantageously replace hypothesis in the sense of something supposed to be true because of certain facts which it would account for. See Probable Inference (3). (C.S.P.)

(2) In psychology: the disposition towards acceptance or Belief (q.v.), which anticipates the complete resolution of doubt.

Theories of belief have not taken sufficient account of the transition states of mind between belief and disbelieve, or between belief and Reality Feeling (q.v.). The psychology of more or less doubt is reflected in the logical discussions of presumption and hypothesis.

Presumptions are either of law or of fact. A presumption of fact is an inference drawn by a trier of a question of fact of the existence of one fact from the existence of others, and may be overthrown by proof to the contrary. A presumption of law is one which the law draws as the result of human reason and experience. It is a rebuttable presumption when it can be overthrown by evidence to the contrary, a conclusive presumption (prae sumptio juris et de tute) when it cannot be. ‘In its origin, every presumption is one of fact and not of law. It may, in course of time, become a presumption of law, and even an indisputable one. Its truth may be so universally accepted as to elevate it to the position of a maxim of jurisprudence. Its convenience, as a rule of decision, may be so generally recognized as to place it in the rank of legal fictions. But so long as it retains its original character as a presumption of fact, it has simply the force of an argument’ (Ward v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 66 Conn. Law Reports, 227; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 44; Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 246). A legal presumption is not strictly evidence (Lisbon v. Lyman, 49