PROTOTYPE — PROXIMATE

Literature: E. B. Wilson, The Cell (2nd ed.); O. Hertwig, Die Zelle; Hennert, La Cellule; Delage, L’Hérédité. See also L. E. Matzke.

Prototype: see TYPE AND TYPOLOGY (in religious philosophy).

Prototype: see animal; Protocorpus, esculentus Tiers; Fr. proto-corpus, Iat. proto-corpus. An animal constituted by a single cell, or a group of similar cells. The cells may be multinucleated, and the body of the cell may be very considerably differentiated. Cf. Amoeba, Acrozoa, and Cytokinesis.


PROUDHON, Pierre Joseph. (1809–65) 

Political writer and sociologist. Born and partly educated in a village near Besançon, he was forced, by lack of means, to become a type-setter. In 1837 he was admitted to the Paris Academy, and the Academy of Besançon awarded him a three-year stipend of 1,500 francs annually. In 1849 he was committed to three years’ imprisonment for attacking the president of the Republic. His literary activity continued unabated, and in 1858 he was again committed for three years. He escaped to Brussels, returning to Paris in 1860, after the general amnesty, where he died.

Prove: see PROOF.

Providence [Lat. providentia, from provido, to foresee]: Ger. Voraussicht; Fr. providentie; Ital. provvidenza. The foreseeing and regulating agency of God in the world as distinguished from his creative and sustaining activities.

Providence is an essential feature of the notion of the divine government, and implies not only power, but conscious care and solicitude. It presupposes a divine plan and provision, and involves personal attributes in the deity. In Christian belief a distinction is recognized between God’s general providence and the special providences which have regard to the “full of a sparrow.” The Stoics recognized providence in a general sense, but denied special providences, which seemed to them to conflict with universal causation.

Provisional [Lat. praé + videre, to see]: Ger. vorläufig; Fr. provisoire; Ital. provvisiò. Temporarily adopted; applied most appropriately to any ratio resulting from inducive inquiry; for the value obtained will presumably be increased or diminished on further investigation.

Proximate [Lat. post participle of proxi- moro, to approach, but it is used to translate proximus, next. The word occurs in Olaus's Family of Dogmaticism, but in no English treatises on logic before Wadde]. In philosophy, synonymous with IMMEDIATE (q.v., also for foreign equivalents), though not so strong.

Proximate cause and effect: an obscure term, like most of the terms of Aristotelian logic, which acquired some practical importance owing to the courts holding that a man was responsible for the proximate effects of his actions, not for their remote effects. This sought to determine what should be meant by proximate cause and effect; namely, that which a man ought to have foreseen might result from his action is its proximate effect. The idea of making the payment of considerable damages dependent upon a term of Aristotelian logic or metaphysics is most shocking to any student of such subjects, and well illustrates the value of PLATONISM (q.v.). Burgersludic (who is one of the closest of the Aristotelians, says: 'Proximate cause is taken in two senses, to wit, in a general sense and absolutely. An absolutely proximate cause is one which constitutes its effect, not merely immediately, but by its mere existence; so that, if it exists, its effect (occlusion, for Burgersludic is not limiting his remarks to efficient causes) necessarily exists. The proximate cause in our genus is that which immediately constitutes its effect, that is to say, without the intervention of anything else of the same order concurring to produce the effect.' Interpreting this in the light of proximation, the man should be held responsible for what might naturally be expected, or feared, as the result of his action; but not for effects depending upon subsequent occurrences which he could not anticipate. Burgersludic continues: 'One thing may have many causes, proximate in one genus, but only one absolutely proximate. . . . So the proximate material cause of man is his body; the efficient, his father; the formal, his rational soul; the final, bene esse. Proximate knowledge is direct knowledge of a thing, not knowledge through something else. Better called direct knowledge. Proximate matter is in a state in which it is prepared for the reception of a
from. The proximate matter of a syllogism consists in its propositions, as distinct from the remote matter, which consists in the terms.

Proximate object of a directive (as we now say, normative) science is a certain one of the objects of practice, as distinguished from the object of doctrine. In speculative sciences there is only one object, the object of doctrine.

In practical sciences there is besides an object of practice, which is that upon which it is designed to produce an effect. In a normative science, such as logic, there are two objects of practice—the proximate, which is the operation or action which is regulated, such as reasoning, and the remote, which is that in which that action takes place, such as a mind or a science conducted by many minds.

Proximate science, testimen. There is hardly any such thing in English law. It is the witness who testifies, not to his own experience, but to facts which are known by the immediate testimony of others. (C.A.P.)

Proximate (or Second) Cause: see Creation.

Punishment [Lat. præstum, Ger. Knupeheit; Fr. prudence; Ital. prudenza. Foresight or purpose of the consequences of our actions, and the guidance of conduct by such foresight.

This was regarded by Socrates as the indispensable condition and the absolute guarantee of virtue: "virtue is knowledge." It was also emphasized by certain members of the Cyrean school, and by the Epicurean. Butler tended to co-ordinate prudence with virtue, making the former the sphere of Stare-love (q.v.), the latter that of Conscience (q.v.). The earlier hedonists, like Plato and Bentham, affirmed the coincidence in the experience of the individual, either present or future, of prudence and virtue, of profits and altruism. The evolutionists hold that a tendency towards such a coincidence is to be recognized (cf. Spinoza, Ethics, chap. iv. v.); Leslie Stephen, however, regards this effort as the best hope of the attempt to square the circle or to discover perpetual motion (St. Eri, chap. x. § 35).

Sidgwick regards prudence as an equally intuitive principle with benevolence and justice: "I hold with Butler that "reasonable self-love and conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of men," each of which we are under a "manifest obligation" to obey (Med. of Eth., prof. to end ed., cf. Be. III. chap. xiii.). (J.B.)

Pseudo- or Pseudo- (in compound) [Gr. θεός, a lie]: Ger. pseudo, falsch; Fr. le pseudo; Ital. pseudo, spirito. False, spiritually, spurious.

Examples are: PERUSCARICTERIA (q.v.); pseudochromoscopy, the imaginary perception of colors in connexion with sounds (see SYNAXOTHELMIA); pseudomnesis, an illusion or mistake of memory in which a person seems to remember that which he never experienced; pseudopause, false vision, hallucination; instances under MIMERY (q.v., in biology).

Pseudoesthesia [Gr. θεός, fals, + λεύκος, sensation]: Ger. Pseudesthesia; Fr. pseudoat-thèse; Ital. pseudoestesia. Illusion of sensation.

Applied especially to the cases in which irritation of the nerve at the point of amputation of a limb (q.g. stump of the arm) produces the sensation normal to the end-organ of the limb which has been removed (e.g. felt as if in the hand).

Psyche [Gr. ψύχη, breath, life, soul, from ψύειν, to breathe]: Ger. Psyche; Fr. psyché; Ital. psicé. (1) The Greeks conceived man as having a "double," a second, shadowy counterpart or likeness of the bodily existence, the ψυχή. This was not contrasted with the body in the way in which the psyché is now contrasted with the corporeal. It was rather conceived as a "breath," a thinner more subtle body, which formed the animating principle in life, left the body at death through the mouth or through a wound, and after separation from the body had no existence too substantial to be called life.

Such was the Homeric conception. A more definite existence and influence were implied in the cult of the gods of the dead which was maintained by families; and the worship of the gods of the underworld, especially the cult of Demeter in the Eleusinian mysteries, directed men's attention towards the "other world."

(2) In the worship of Dionysus, which was introduced from Thrace and subsequently modified by contact with Apollo-worship, the "psyche" becomes the primary superior half of man's nature. Exiled from some previous dwelling-place into the body, its life in this bodily state is a penalty rather than a privilege. It escapes temporarily in ecstasy (tirances) or frenzy induced by the sacred music or by fasting, and at such times becomes united to the god and inspired (θυσία) by him. The true home of the psyche is not in the lower world, but beyond the stars.