PURE EXPERIENCE — PURGATORY

It cannot be understood at all without reading Kant very attentively.

Pure concept: in Kant's doctrine, a concept, imposed upon experience by the mind, not derived from it (Krit. d. reinen Vernunft, 1. Auf., 220).

Pure concepts, in logic, are an unusual equivalent of SIMPLE CONCEPTS (q.v.).

Pure intuition: in Kant's doctrine, the pure form of phenomena, or the a priori, before all actual perception. It is impossible to suppose that Kant meant here a succession of sensations, feelings, or images. This is never experienced in ordinary life. Words, for example, call it 'a conceptual fiction'.

Pure judgment: see Pure proposition, below.

Pure knowledge: knowledge of which sensation is not an element.

Pure logic: a phrase often used, but to which no distinct conception can be attached. The following explanation by Hamilton ( Lect. on Logic, App. I) is as good an explanation as can be given: 'The doctrine of logic, which contains the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, is to be understood in the form of thought, in the conditions of the mind itself, which is the subject in which knowledge in the necessary—this science may be called formal, or subject, or abstract, or pure logic. Science, again, which contains the laws by which our scientific procedure should be governed, is to be understood in the form of thought, in the conditions of the mind itself, which is the subject in which knowledge in the necessary—this science may be called material, or objective, or concrete, or applied logic.' Perhaps we may say that pure logic is a logic deduced from hypotheses (which none will look upon as axioms) without any inquiry into the observational warrant for those hypotheses. Pure power, potential pure, in matter with a form, power, without energy or act.

Purgatory: see Purgatory, a place of cleansing from purgation to election—Ger. Elysium; Fr. purgatoire; It. purgatorio. A process of purification by suffering in an intermediate state after death, by means of which the deceased soul is fitted for a higher state of existence. Specifically, the state in which, according to Roman Catholic theology, the soul of the penitent who has died in the faith is purified by suffering from venial sins and from the temporal effects of mortal sins already forgiven.

Purgatory, in its general sense, is a feature of the doctrine of transmigration in Eastern and Western thought. As held specifically by the Roman Catholic Church, it is not in any sense an extension of probation, but is purely explanatory in its character. Only penitents are admitted into purgatory. The Roman Catholic Church teaches that the sacrament of penance...
QUALITY

the four "concepts of the understanding" from which Kant derives his four classes of categories, is equivalent to intensive quality, "quality" standing for extensive; a vague thing which is in the same category as a distinct and simple predicate; but it has not established that confusion between quantity and quality which it implies. From Hegel proceeds a modern tendency to hold that the categories of quality, quantity, and relation are self-contradictory, and to obscure the distinctions between them; but at the same time, consistently or inconsistently, a pre-eminence is assigned to quality, since some philosophers aver the view that relations are to be interpreted as qualities of the things related, and most imply that the most ultimate form in which all truths can be expressed is as predicates of several subjects, or, by preference, of one— mistakes which are clearly due to the neglect of a thorough inquiry into the nature of predication and the consequent failure to perceive that even predicates are only related to their subjects, and that in several different ways. Cf. the following topics, and see LAVIN and SCALIGER in the Glossary.

QUALITY (in grammar and logic). (1) Take a sentence in which a common noun or adjective is predicated of a proper noun, and imagine that the subject does not refer to anything which corresponds to the form of the proposition. Then imagine that this form of fact could be interrupted in a relation of the objective subject, or substance, to one being, the same correlate for all cases where the same noun or adjective is predicated in the same sense, and that imaginary being, whether looked upon as real or not, is a quality. Thus, if anything is beautiful, white, incomprehensible, this consists in its possessing the quality of beauty, or in its incomprehensibility. (2) But in a more proper sense the term quality will not be applied when the adjective, like incomprehensible, is conceived as signifying a relation. Thus, whiteness will be, in this narrow sense, a quality only so long as objects are thought of as white independently of anything else; but when this is conceived as a relation to the eye, "whiteness" is only a quality in a loose sense. Locke defines quality as what is in the predicate or category which agrees with the above explanation tolerably.

Qualitas, having inevitably reached an exclusive region in the Bemas schools, was taken to designate almost any character or characters for which no other name was at hand. Thus arose a variety of special names. Thus in grammar the difference between nouns which had a plural and those which had not was called a difference of quality; as was the difference between the personal pronouns and part of speech.

(3) In logic: the distinction between the affirmative and the negative personation (v.t.) has been called the distinction of quality in propositions by all logicians, without interruption, from Apuleius, in the 2nd century of our era, to our own contemporaries.

Kant, in order to round out a triad, added a third quality, called Quantitative (q.v.), that of "sortes ea non homin "—with a distinction from "sortes ea non homin": this will not bear criticism; but Kant's authority and the force of tradition have caused it to survive. As long as the universe of characters is unlimited, it is obvious that any collection of objects has some predicate common and peculiar to them. This being the case, an ordinary syllogism naturally and easily follows. (c.a.p.)

Quality and Quantity. (aesthetic). Aesthetic value may be considered under two aspects, quantity and quality, according to as it is referred to the magnitude and numerical relations of the object, or its elements, applying the reality of the subject. But what, then, does "some patriotic does not die " mean? Besides, all admit that propositions per se prima mae do not imply the existence of the subject, although they are affirmative. At any rate, the resulting syllogism, if consistent, is very objectionable. If, however, the unification of thought is not one of the terms at issue, or the terms are mixing.

The logical terms quantity and quality were applied to the aesthetic judgment, nothing in common, then the system of formal logic required will be a simple case of the logic of quantities (q.v.); but the distinction of affirmative and negative propositions will become material or absolute, the forms of simple categorical propositions then being:

Any A possesses every characteristic of the group B.
Any A possesses some characteristic of the group B.

Any A has some characteristic of the group B.

1. The experience and attribute of more or less (L.C.M.)
2. Notions: the science of the existence of parts within a whole considered in abstraction from the special nature of the parts or qualities. (q.v.)

The fundamental conception of quantity is expressed in the so-called axiom, "the whole is greater than the part;" in reality, this is a definition; for the whole is a whole just because it is greater than the part, or, in other words, includes the part. It is true, of course, that one whole may be greater than another. But this means the first may be conceived as included within the second; it means that the first might be conceivably substituted for a part of the second. Here it is necessary that the special nature of the whole or its parts should be more or less completely abstracted from. Let one whole be a group of sheep and the other a group of five. It is obvious that this particular collection of three sheep cannot be contained in that particular collection of five. But if we abstract from the individual identity of the particular sheep, and consider them only in their general character as belonging to the class sheep, the abstraction becomes possible. The group of three is smaller than that of five because it could be substituted for a part of the group of five, without making any difference to it, considered abstractly, as a collection of just three sheep, but of any sheep whatever. The same holds good for a group of three sheep and a group of five sheep considered from individual identity, but also from the specific nature of sheep and cows, and cattle, and the specific things, e.g., skin, hair, symmetry, proportion, size, and under quality, the characteristic, significant, charming, unity of kind, contrast, succession of thought in succession of thought, order, and cosmos.

The same analysis applies to principle of continuous quantity. A continuous quantity of beauty, whiteness, incomprehensibility, etc., not be expressed by a number. But this makes no difference to the general concept of quantity. One line is space is greater than another, which are distinct, from difference in position, etc., we see that the second could be substituted for a part of the first without making any reference to it. The greatest difficulty arises in the case of