RECALL — RECAPITULATION

The third elementary way of reasoning in deduction, of which the warrant is that the facts presented in the premises could not under any imaginable circumstances be true without involving the truth of the conclusion, which is therefore accepted with necessary modality. But though it be necessary in its modality, it does not by any means follow that the conclusion is certainly true. When we are reasoning about purely hypothetical states of things, as in mathematics, and can make it one of our hypotheses that what is true shall depend only on a certain kind of condition—that, for example, what is true of propositions written in black ink would certainly be equally true if they were written in red—we can be certain of our conclusions, provided no conditions have been omitted. This is 'demonstrative reasoning.' Failures in pure mathematics have gone undetected for many centuries. It is to real states of things alone—or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality—that deduction applies. The process is as follows, at least in many cases:

We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and sensual; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination. Visual, it will either be geometrical, that is, such that familiar spatial relations stand for the relations asserted in the premises, or it will be algebraical, where the relations are expressed by objects which are imagined to be subject to certain rules, whether conventional or experimental. This diagram, which has been constructed to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same relations which are abstractly expressed in the premises, is then observed, and a hypothesis suggests itself that there is a certain relation between some of its parts—or perhaps this hypothesis had already been suggested. In order to test this, various experiments are made upon the diagram, which is changed in various ways. This is a proceeding extremely similar to induction, from which, however, it differs widely, in that it does not deal with a course of experience, but with whether or not a certain state of things can be imagined. Now, since it is a part of the hypothesis that only a very limited kind of condition can affect the result, the necessary experimentation can be very quickly completed; and it is seen that the conclusion is compelled to be true by the conditions of the construction of the diagram. This is called 'diagrammatic or schematic reasoning.'

Cf. Longworth: "A System of Logic (1854);" treatise on logic generally; many treatises on psychology, in loc.; Bibl. C. 2, 3, 4.

Recapitulation (law of) [Lat. récapitulat, récapitulier, récapitulare; Fr. récapitulation; Ital. recapitulazione: the theory according to which the individual in its ontogenetic development passes through a series of stages which represent successive forms in the descent of the species (phylum) to which it belongs; the theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Cope suggested the term "Biologia" for the science of the relation of the two genetic series of forms. Cf. Ontogeny.

The facts were recognized—so far as the parallelism is concerned—by Agassiz, and formulated, for the development of the embryo, by Haeckel interpreted the principle as a law of evolution. It is now very generally recognized as, in principle, true, although liable to much variation due to other forces and conditions. Modifications of it have been formulated in the "law of acceleration" (q.v.) and the theory of abbreviation, with that of Short Cut (q.v.)."
REDUCTION - REDUCTION

for a short time at resting-light (method of Brücke, 1858), or that of flashin' a point while a light is thrown through the field of view (method of Pilkington), is employed. (G.L.P.

REDUCTION DIVISION - REFLECTION

When Hamilton says that the whole is only incidentally reproduced because the parts are immediately reproduced, he seems to deprive the term reintegration of all distinctive meaning. It is not easy to point out with any confidence whether there is any advantage in substituting it for the more familiar "autonamation by contiguity." On the other hand, there is a clear gain if the term be taken to denote the tendency of the part to reproduce the whole as such, including not merely the other part.

The term reintegration is used by Shepard and Hodge for associative reproduction in general. It does not, like Hamilton, recognize a distinct law of reflection. See also Stelmach, Coherence in Exper. Psychol. exp. 160; Charpentier, Compte Rendu (1890), xxiv. 245; and Arch. de Physiol. (1891), 547.

Reedemer (Lat. redemner, to redeem): Gen. Redemtor; Fr. Redempteur; Ital. Redentore. The term applied to Jesus Christ as the rescuer and savior of men from sin and its effects. Applied in a secondary sense to religious prophets in general. (A.T.O.

Redemption (Lat. redemption, from rede-, to redeem): Gen. Redemtor; Fr. Redempteur; Ital. Redentore. The term applied to Jesus Christ as the rescuer and savior of men from sin and its effects through the atoning work of Jesus Christ.

Reduplication (Lat. re-frequentia, from rede-, to repeat) is a name for the scheme of Christian salvation as a whole, and is a term that is used in the following sense: 'Atonement, and Contention. (A.T.O.

Redintegration (Lat. re-integra, from rede-, to receive) is the reinstatement of a part of the whole by a partial constituent of it. Hamilton first introduced this term. He recognizes two fundamental laws of reproduction. The first is that of repetition, which he states as follows: "Thoughts co-extensive with the same object in the same place are identical."

The second is that of reintegration: "Thoughts co-extensive with the same place at different times are, however different in mental modes, again supposed to be identical, and that in the most identical way possible."

The process of bringing an object into the given form into some standard form or state, and that in the most identical way possible. (A.T.O.

Reflection (Lat. reflexio, from refl. to reflect) is the term of thought following a first impulse to believe or act, and revising, modifying, or confirming it. (A.T.O.

Reflection, in its psychological use, has an narrower application than "introspection," and a wider than "introspection." All awareness of the self with the awarenesses, e.g., under secular-consciousness (p.v). But such awareness is not reflexion, unless interest and attentiveness is directed toward the self and its state. When I fail to hit a mark with a missile, I become aware of the miss, but do not project the在我 conscious State. I may not say to think about my subjective state. On the contrary,