REPRESENTATION — REPRODUCTIVE SELECTION

In a certain sense it must be admitted even by presentationists, that percepts only perform the function of conveying knowledge of objects, but that each is both combined and generalized to become more knowledge, so that they may be said to represent their own generalizations. In this, representationists and presentationists may agree. Be it disputed between them consists in this, that the representationists regard the percept in the light of testimony or a picture, which from by inference, or a mental act analogous to inference, the hidden cause of the percept may become known; while the presentationist holds that perception is a two-sided consciousness in which the percept appears as forcibly acting upon us, so that to perceive the consciousness of an object is to act on us as an indivisible as, in making a muscular effort, the sense of exertion is one with and inseparable from the sense of resistance. The representationist would not allow that there is any bilateral consciousness even in the latter sense, regarding the bilateralism as a quasi-inference, or product of the mind's action, while the presentationist insists that there is nothing intellectual or intelligible in this sense, so that is, a hard fact experienced, but never understood. A representationist will maintain the theory that everything in the outward world is atoms, their masses, motions, and energy, as a statement of the visual images. Spencers' presentationist, on the other hand, will more naturally take this as a self-evident thing which is fitted to sum up and reconcile the percepts as the only ultimate facts. There are, however, many different points of view in the perception, and neither should be found anything absolutely contrary to any doctrine of the other. Therefore, a government of the State.

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Represantation [from Verbs; see Poetics]: Gen. Reproduction; Fr. reproduction; Ital. reproduction. The recurrence of a content of consciousness considered as dependent on its previous occurrence. Cf. Memory, Evocation, Reproduction, and Revival.

Reproduction must be distinguished from repeated production. If I look at a tree, then look away, and then look at it again, the recurrence of the visual experience is not a reproduction; it is due to a repetition of the stimulus, and is to that extent independent of my having seen the tree before. But if after I have gone out of sight of the tree a mental image of it arises before consciousness, this is a reproduction; for the mental image owes its existence to the previous existence of the percept. It is obvious that the possibility of a mental image presupposes a percept, and after-effect left by the original experience; such an after-effect is a trace or impression.

Reproduction may be either free or determined by association (q.v.). So far as it is free, it seems to be mainly determined by dispositional interest (see under Interest). The thoughts of the lover tend to fix on his mistress whenever he is not otherwise preoccupied. No somnolent consciousness necessarily set them in this direction. The waking mind has good of other absorbing interests. Any modified positive disposition tends to make all the conscious surface of the mind agitatedly undecided, and the greater the intensity and complexity the stronger is the observer's ideation. Hence, a reproduction of the verbal speech of a person who is not in a position to speak, is not a reproduction of the voice, but only of the meaning.

Reproduction [in biology]: see ASOs, Genes, Fertilization, Fertility, and Sexuality; and of heredity. Physiological Selection, Reproductive Selection, and Sexuality.

Reproductive (or Genetic) Selection: Gen. Genetic Selection; Fr. sélection génétique; Ital. selezione genetica. The theory according to which the most fit individuals of one generation produce the offspring of the next, and by the inheritance of fertility, also of subsequent generations, and so establish in the succeeding race those characters which may be correlated with their relatively great fertility.

The theory was propounded and worked out by K. Pearson, and demonstrated for certain statistical data. Its importance as an aid to the theory of selection in the theory of descent would seem to depend on the presence and variety of characters which are in uniform correlation with, or in some degree vary with, variations