

of real estate. (2) That part of the return on real estate which is due to the value of the land as distinct from the improvements. (3) Any excess of price over cost; particularly when such excess is due to the possession of a differential advantage. Cf. MONOPOLY.

Adam Smith used the word nearly in its first, or commercial, sense. Ricardo separated the return to capital from the return to land, and developed the second sense of the term (see DIMINISHING RETURN), which is known as economic or Ricardian rent. Mangoldt, Walker, Marshall, and others have shown that many other agents of production are remunerated under laws similar to those which Ricardo developed with regard to land. These returns are sometimes called *quasi-rents*; sometimes the term rent is so extended as to cover all these gains, as in definition (3). Even the differential advantages of consumers, so far as they are subject to similar laws, are brought under the name CONSUMER'S RENT (q. v.).

Repentance (in theology) [Lat. *repenitentia*, through Fr.]: Ger. *Reue*; Fr. *repentance*; Ital. *pentimento*. That change of mind in which a sinner, realizing the true nature of his sin, seeks divine forgiveness and purposes to live a new life.

Repentance is more than sorrow for sin or a sense of its guilt; it includes an active seeking for divine forgiveness, and a purpose to sin no more. According to the Roman Catholic doctrine, repentance must be accompanied by penance, inasmuch as the temporal effects of sin remain after its mortal guilt has been removed. Protestants repudiate this distinction, and hold that the divine grace freely remits all the effects of sin, both eternal and temporal, so far as these lie in the province of grace and not of nature.

Literature: see PENANCE.

Repose [Lat. *reponere*, to lay or place back]: Ger. *Ruhe*; Fr. *repos*; Ital. *riposo*. (1) Quiet, rest, calm; especially such composure of soul as excludes all agitation by passion or desire, and is suggestive of order, moderation, and often of dignity or latent power. (2) Art: such disposition of masses or pose of figure in stable equilibrium (in architecture or sculpture), or such shaping of features, or general simplicity, moderation, and harmony (in sculpture or painting) as to favour or express composure.

Repose was brought forward as an aesthetic category by Winckelmann (1765), who made it the distinctive characteristic of Greek art,

as the most important mark of 'beauty' as contrasted with 'expression.'

Literature: WINCKELMANN, *The Hist. of Ancient Art*; BROWN, *The Fine Arts*, 273. (J.H.T.)

Represent [Lat. *re + praesentare*, to present]: Ger. *repräsentieren*; Fr. *représenter*; Ital. *rappresentare*. To stand for, that is, to be in such a relation to another that for certain purposes it is treated by some mind as if it were that other.

Thus a spokesman, deputy, attorney, agent, vicar, diagram, symptom, counter, description, concept, premise, testimony, all represent something else, in their several ways, to minds who consider them in that way. See SIGN. When it is desired to distinguish between that which represents and the act or relation of representing, the former may be termed the 'representamen,' the latter the 'representation.'

Representamen: see REPRESENT.

Representation: Ger. (1) *Vorstellung, Idee*, (2) *Repräsentation, (reproduzierte) Vorstellung*; Fr. *représentation*; Ital. *rappresentazione*. (1) A cognitive state considered as copying or in some sense representing its object.

(2) Recurrence of presentation.

(3) See REPRESENT; see also SIGN (in logic), and INDEX (in logic).

The first is the old usage. Hamilton (*Lects. on Met.*) classifies theories of knowledge as immediate and representative. The theory goes back to the Greek doctrine of *εἰδωλα* or images. Spencer (*Princ. of Psychol.*), who adopts this usage, uses re-representative for states which represent a representation—stand for something which stands for the object.

The second usage contrasts representation with presentation; an idea is contrasted with impression in the terminology of Hume (cf. Baldwin, *Elements of Psychol.*, 'Glossary'). This usage is current in the French (e.g. Rabier, *Leçons de Psychol.*). The contrast with presentation is difficult in view of the use of presentation as translation of the German *Vorstellung* (see PRESENTATION); and since we have the word idea in about the same sense, representation is not likely to be much used in the second sense. On the German use of *Repräsentation* see Erdmann, *Arch. f. syst. Philos.*, vii. (1891) 446. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Representationism: Ger. *Repräsentationismus*; Fr. *représentationisme*; Ital. *rappresentazionismo*. The doctrine that percepts stand for something behind them. See COSMOTHETIC IDEALISM, and IDEALISM.

In a certain sense it must be admitted, even by presentationists, that percepts only perform the function of conveying knowledge of something else. That is to say, they have to be combined and generalized to become useful knowledge; so that they may be said to represent their own generalizations. In this, representationists and presentationists may agree. But the dispute between them consists in this, that the representationist regards the percept in the light of testimony or a picture, from which by inference, or a mental act analogous to inference, the hidden cause of the percept may become known; while the presentationist holds that perception is a two-sided consciousness in which the percept appears as forcibly acting upon us, so that in perception the consciousness of an active object and of a subject acted on are as indivisible as, in making a muscular effort, the sense of exertion is one with and inseparable from the sense of resistance. The representationist would not allow that there is any bilateral consciousness even in the latter sense, regarding the bilaterality as a quasi-inference, or product of the mind's action; while the presentationist insists that there is nothing intellectual or intelligible in this duality. It is, he says, a hard fact experienced but never understood. A representationist will naturally regard the theory that everything in the outward world is atoms, their masses, motions, and energy, as a statement of the real fact which percepts represent. The presentationist, on the other hand, will more naturally regard it as a formula which is fitted to sum up and reconcile the percepts as the only ultimate facts. These are, however, merely different points of view in which neither ought to find anything absolutely contrary to his own doctrine. (C.S.P.)

Representative Government: see GOVERNMENT, and STATE.

Reprobation (in theology) [Lat. *reprobare*, to disapprove, condemn]: Ger. *Verdammung, Verwerfung*; Fr. *réprobation*; Ital. *riprovazione*. The passing over, in the divine decree of election, of a portion of the human race, so that they are left to perish in their sins.

In Roman Catholic theology the term is also applied to the eternal condemnation of the sinner who dies impenitent as distinguished from the condemnation of the penitent sinner to purgatorial fire.

Literature: see DECREES, PREDESTINATION, and PURGATORY. (A.T.O.)

Reproduction [for deriv. see PRODUCTION]: Ger. *Reproduktion*; Fr. *reproduction*; Ital. *riproduzione*. The recurrence of a content of consciousness considered as dependent on its previous occurrence. Cf. MEMORY, EVOCATION, RECOLLECTION, and REVIVAL.

Reproduction must be distinguished from repeated production. If I look at a tree, then look away, and then look at it again, the recurrence of the visual experience is not a reproduction; it is due to a repetition of the stimulus, and is to that extent independent of my having seen the tree before. But if after I have gone out of sight of the tree a mental image of it rises before consciousness, this is a reproduction; for the mental image owes its existence to the previous existence of the percept. It is obvious that the possibility of reproduction presupposes a persistent after-effect left by the original experience; such an after-effect is a trace or disposition.

Reproduction may be either free or determined by ASSOCIATION (q. v.). So far as it is free, it seems to be mainly determined by dispositional interest (see under INTEREST). The thoughts of the lover tend to fix on his mistress whenever he is not otherwise preoccupied. No associational cue seems necessary to set them in this direction. The same holds good of other absorbing interests. Any unsatisfied conative disposition tends to become conscious spontaneously, and the greater its intensity and complexity the stronger is the tendency. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)

Reproduction (experiments on, and method of): see MEMORY (experiments on).

Reproduction (in biology): see AGAMOGENESIS, FERTILIZATION, FERTILITY, and SEXUAL REPRODUCTION; and cf. HEREDITY, PHYSIOLOGICAL SELECTION, REPRODUCTIVE SELECTION, and STERILITY.

Reproductive (or Genetic) Selection: Ger. *genetische Selektion*; Fr. *sélection génétique*; Ital. *selezione genetica*. The theory according to which the most fertile individuals of one generation produce a large proportion of the next and, by the inheritance of fertility, also of subsequent generations, and so establish any characters which may be correlated with their relatively great fertility.

The theory was propounded and worked out by K. Pearson, and demonstrated for certain statistical data. Its importance as a factor in the theory of descent would seem to depend on the presence and variety of characters which are in uniform correlation with, or in some degree vary with, variations