SIBILANTS — SIGN

is perhaps preferable, since timidity and timid are used sometimes for fear.


Sibilants: see Phonarvices.

Sibylline Books [Lat. sibyllae, pertaining to a sibyl]: Gen. die Sibyllischen Bücher; Fr. les livres sibyllins; Ital. i Libri Sibyllini.

The books of prophecy which the Sibyls of ancient mythology, are said to have written. The Sibylline books were lost in the destruction of the temple of Jupiter by fire in 83 B.C. A new collection was made, which has also been lost. The exact twelve books of Sibylline prophecies are of later and mostly apocryphal origin.

(A.T.O.)

Siège Window Experiment: Ger. outline Fensterversuch; Fr. (not in usage).

Ital. esperimento della finestra laterale. An experiment in binocular contrast: standing asymmetrically with respect to a window, observe double images of a white surface on a dark ground; the single image appears faintly blue (blue-green) on the window side, and faintly red (orange) on the other side.


Slewidge, Henry, (1768-1800.) Born in Yorkshire, England, educated at Rugby School and Trinity College, Cambridge, he became a fellow and bursar at Trinity College in 1809, reader in moral science in 1815, professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge University, 1816. He was identified with the movement in England for the higher education of women, and especially with the interests of Newnham College for women, at Cambridge. His principal works are in Ethics (6 v.) and politics, his position in ethics being that of a "modified" utilitarian.

S. Türkener. He was one of the "Consulting Editors" of this dictionary. See an "anti-historicist" note in his Ethical Philosophy (p. 691) and L. Stephen, in Dept. of Nat., Sup. III, sub verb.

Sign [Lat. signum, a mark, a token]: Ger. Stich, Fr. signe; Ital. segno. (1) Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which it itself refers (its object): in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum.

No doubt, intelligent consciousness must enter into the series. If the series of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at least. If an interpretant idea having been determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other significant effect of the sign, it become absolutely irrecoverable that there was ever such an idea in that consciousness; and in that case it is difficult to see how it could have any meaning to say that consciousness ever had that idea, since the saying so would be an interpretant of that idea.

A sign is either an act, an idea, or a symbol. An act is a sign which is a character which renders it significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a legible mark or representing a geometrical line. An idea is a sign which is a symbol which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of wood with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that significance.

(2) Used for COEFFICIENT (p. 9) or MARK
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results may be obtained by applying other objects—the things signified. It is also called (McCosh) the symbolic function.

The possibility of this procedure depends upon the existence of an appropriate connection between the signs and what they signify. But the nature of the connection may vary so as to constitute different kinds of signs. We may distinguish (1) the demonstrative sign, (2) the discriminative sign, (3) the mnemonic sign, (4) the expressive sign, (5) the substitute or symbol sign. Cf. Stout. (1) The demonstrative sign is the simplest and most primitive. It is used by animals as well as by men. It consists in some act by which one individual, who is interested in some object present to the senses, draws the attention of another individual to that object. The second individual attends primarily to the object signified and is, therefore, led to attach some value to it. Thus

(2) The discriminative sign consists in some modification of an object or addition to it, made with the view of enabling us to identify and distinguish it from the rest. Thus the robin who makes a call to the other robin's door used a discriminative sign. The house he desired to identify in the future was so like others in the neighbourhood that it seemed it would be indistinguishable. But the robin could always distinguish a door with a black mark on it from a door with no black mark. He accordingly marked his nest door on All Baba's door. Morgiana destroyed its discriminative value by painting similar marks on the neighbouring doors.

(3) The mnemonic sign is simply an aid to memory. A is connected with B so that when we think of A we shall probably or certainly think of B. If we ask, what is it which we are in danger of forgetting, and if we attempt to obviate this risk by arranging so that the sign of A shall be practically conjoined at the proper moment, and thus call up the idea of B, we are using A as a mnemonic sign. Some people, for instance, tie a string round one of the fingers to prevent their forgetting something which they have to do. The assumption is that they will be able to picture the string round the finger, and thereby have in mind the business which they wish to remember. The device may fail, either because they are oblivious of the string, and at the critical time, or because, when they do notice it, it fails to yield the required reminder or

(4) The expressive sign is not merely, like the mnemonic, a means of calling up the idea of an object. It is a means of speaking to the object while it is present to consciousness. The mnemonic sign has reminded us of that which it signifies, it has no longer any function to discharge, and may be dismissed. But words and the gestures conveying the language of natural signs are constituting factors of the very act of thinking of the objects which they signify. They are means of thinking of the object, as the handle of a box is a means of lifting it, and just as some things cannot be lifted without a handle, so some objects—concepts—cannot be thought of without words, or other expressive signs. See Language, Function, and of Speech.

In sign language, the substitutive or symbol sign is antagonistically opposed in its nature to the sign or expressive sign. The expressive sign is a means of attending to the object signified; the substitutive sign is a means of dispelling with attention to the object signified. Thus in crude languages the relative position of the peg in the cribbage board is substituted for the relative number of points won by the players: in solving a problem by algebraic methods, when we have once assigned suitable symbols to the several quantities, we need not in the actual process think of anything but these symbols, and the solution of the problem is represented. It is only when the solution of the equation is obtained that the need arises, if there be any, to refer back to the symbols which they signify. Working with logarithms we have

Siegwart, Heinrich Christoph Wilhelm. (1785-1844). Born and brought up at Rummels in Wurttemberg, he became Privatdozent in philosophy at Tubingen in 1813, professor extraordinary in 1817, and ordinary in 1818. He died at Stuttgart.

Similar (with Similarity, Similitude) [Lat. similitudo; Fr. ressemblance; It. somiglianza. See Resemblance]

similar (in exact logic): having a common predicate of some considerable logical depth. Similar (in term logic): having the same formative concepts. Term of similitude: a general name. (C.S.P.)

Similar (in cosmology): the appearance of something counterfeit to the original. See Resemblance.

simultaneous percipitur [Lat.]; see Perception, ed. fin.

Simple

Simple examination: a proposition which is not reducible into copulative or disjunctive parts. Thus, 'All men' is a proposition which is reducible into 'Every man is a rational animal, and every rational animal is a man.' So 'Every man is a rational animal,' reducible into 'Every man is rational, and every man is animal.' But though perhaps every proposition of the form 'Every S is F' is compound, yet the form itself may be regarded as simple.

Simple interpretation. In this phase, interpretation means the subject of Aristotle's Peri hermenias, that is, to say, a Symbol (q.v.). A simple interpretation is one which does not have (either expressed in the circumstances) one part to show what it denotes and another to show what it signifies. Thus, that is to say, it is a term or rhea ( Dekke- ges, q.v., p. 2).

Simple Mere (q.v., ed. fin.): a term of Lecky's (Essay, II. xii. 5); a variation of a single idea.

Simple necessity: the necessity that which is not reducible into contrariety. (Scottus, Opus Ores., IV. n. 7.)

Simple part: a part which has no parts in the sense in which it is itself a part.

Simple power: the same as pure power, or that passive power which belongs to free will (Maxvtes q.v., Aristotle's use).

Simple production: a proof consisting of a single syllogism.

Simple proposition: simple examination (q.v., above).

Simple substitution: a proposition which is reduced into a single proposition.

Simple terminus: a term which is distinguished from a complex question which seeks the nature be the question, whether or why it has a certain character.

Simple supposition: simple acceptance (q.v., above).

Simple term: a term which is not reducible into copulative or disjunctive parts. Thus, 'All men' is a proposition which is reducible into 'Every man is a rational animal, and every rational animal is a man.' So 'Every man is a rational animal,' reducible into 'Every man is rational, and every man is animal.' But though perhaps every proposition of the form 'Every S is F' is compound, yet the form itself may be regarded as simple.

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SIMPLICITY — SINCERITY

whether he make positive representations or none, but is often used for sincerity in this sense. Cf. VERACITY, and LIE. (J.M.R.)

SINE QUA NON [L.]. Abbreviation of condition sine qua non: necessary condition. (J.M.R.)

**SINGULAR** [L. etym., separate; translates Gr. and Lat. ]: Fr. (1) sotage; (2) sotet; (3) individuel; Fr. (1) individu; (2) individu; (3) individu. (1) Applicable, as a sign, to a single individual.

Sine qua non: A significant phrase upon a continent is a place whose properties differ from those of all other places in the vicinity, and whose constituents in one respect constitute a discrete and coherent whole. (J.C.R.)

Sine qua non (log.): A term which, during a given discussion, is not to be treated as the separate part of a singular or individual term. Like many expressions in logic, the significance is not absolute, but relative to the discussion in hand. Thus "my palette" may be, upon one occasion, an indivisible object, and upon another it may be thought of as the field for many different colours. The technical definition in this: a singular or individual if for every term whatever, either no $X$ or else $X$ is non-$X$; in other words, there is nothing that is other than that, can be par truth and partly non-$X$. A proposition containing a singular term is called a "singular proposition." (J.C.R.)

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