

results may be obtained applying to other objects—the things signified. It is also called (McCosh) the symbolic function.

The possibility of this procedure depends upon the existence of an appropriate connection between the signs and what they signify. But the nature of the connection may vary so as to constitute different kinds of signs. We may distinguish (1) the demonstrative sign, (2) the discriminative sign, (3) the mnemonic sign, (4) the expressive sign, (5) the substitute or symbolic sign. Cf. SIGN.

(1) The demonstrative sign is the simplest and most primitive. It is used by animals as well as by men. It consists in some act by which one individual, who is interested in an object present to the senses, draws the attention of another individual to that object. The second individual attends primarily to the action of the first, and is thus indirectly led to attend to something else. Pointing with the finger is a typical illustration.

(2) The discriminative sign consists in some modification of an object or addition to it, made with the view of enabling us to identify and distinguish it in the future. Thus the robber who made a chalk-mark on Ali Baba's door used a discriminative sign. The house he desired to identify in the future was so like others in the neighbourhood that he feared it would be indistinguishable. But he was convinced that he could always distinguish a door with a chalk-mark on it from a door with no chalk-mark. He accordingly made a chalk-mark on Ali Baba's door. Morgiana destroyed its discriminative value by making similar marks on the neighbouring doors.

(3) The mnemonic sign is simply an aid to memory. *A* is so connected with *B* that when we think of *A* we shall probably or certainly think of *B*. Now, if *B* is something which we are in danger of forgetting, and if we attempt to obviate this risk by arranging so that the recall of *A* shall be practically certain at the proper moment, and thus call up the idea of *B* when we want it, we are using *A* as a mnemonic sign. Some people, for instance, tie a string round one of the fingers to prevent their forgetting something which they have to do. The assumption is that they will frequently notice the string round the finger, and be thereby reminded of the business which they wish to remember. The device may fail, either because they are oblivious of the string at the critical time, or because, when they do notice it, it fails to yield the required reminder

(4) The expressive sign is not merely, like the mnemonic, a means of calling up the idea of an object. It is a means of attending to the object while it is present to consciousness. When the mnemonic sign has reminded us of that which it signifies, it has no longer any function to discharge, and may be dismissed. But words and the gestures composing the language of natural signs are constituent factors of the very act of thinking of the objects which they signify. They are means of thinking of the object, as the handle of a box is a means of lifting it; and just as some things cannot be lifted without a handle, so some objects—concepts—cannot be thought of without words, or other expressive signs. See LANGUAGE FUNCTION, and cf. SPEECH.

(5) The substitute or symbolic sign is antithetically opposed in its nature to the expressive sign. The expressive sign is a means of attending to the object signified; the substitute sign is a means of dispensing with attention to the object signified. Thus in cribbage the relative position of the pegs in the cribbage board is substituted for the relative number of points won by the players. In solving a problem by algebraical methods, when we have once assigned suitable symbols to the several quantities, we need not in the actual process think of anything but these symbols, and the rules of operation applying to them. The equation might be solved by some one who did not know what problem it represented. It is only when the solution of the equation is obtained that the need arises to retranslate our symbols in terms of that which they signify. Working with logarithms is another example. (G.F.S.)

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**Similar** (with **Similarity, Similitude**) [Lat. *similis*, like]: Ger. *ähnlich, gleichartig*; Fr. *semblable*; Ital. *similare*. See RESEMBLANCE.

**Similar** (in exact logic): having a common predicate of some considerable logical depth.

**Similar whole**: a whole of similar parts.

**Term of similitude**: a general name. (C.S.P.)

**Similarity** (consciousness of, law of): see LIKENESS (consciousness of, and law of), and RESEMBLANCE.

**Similia similibus percipiuntur** [Lat.]: see PERCEPTION, ad fin.

**Simple** [Lat. *simplex*, from *sim*, same, one, + *plicare*, to fold]: Ger. *einfach*; Fr. *simple*; Ital. *semplice*. Original or first in its nature; elementary; without parts or complication: opposed to COMPLEX (q. v.), COMPOUND (q. v.), and derived. (C.S.P.—J.M.B.)

**Simple acceptation**: the acceptation of a term to signify a nature abstracted from existence, as 'animal is the genus of man' (*Century Dict.*). (C.S.P.)

**Simple agreement**: the agreement of one thing with another; opposed to analogy or the agreement of many things with many. **Simple agreement** is either *essential* (which is identity in the sense of unity of essence) or *accidental*. Accidental simple agreement is either internal or external; the former being either equality or likeness, the latter co-relationship to thirds which agree.

**Simple apprehension**: (1) the faculty or act of apprehending without forming judgments. See APPREHENSION (2). (2) INTUITION (q. v., in philosophy).

**Simple COMPARISON** (q. v.): the faculty or act by which the subject and predicate of a judgment are compared (cf. *Century Dict.*). (C.S.P.—J.M.B.)

**Simple concept**: a concept of which no other definite concept (at any rate, no first-intentional concept) can be predicated.

**Simple consequence**: (1) an inference drawn from a single premise. This was the standard form of setting forth arguments in the scholastic writings of the middle ages. The suppressed major premise was called the *consequentia*. (2) An inference drawn from a single premise, from which the conclusion follows by virtue of the meaning of the middle term.

**Simple CONVERSION** (q. v.): the immediate inference from a proposition to another proposition differing from the former only by the interchange of subject-term and predicate-term.

**Simple enumeration**: a term of Francis Bacon's, by which he means mentioning a number of instances of *a*'s which are *b*'s, and thence concluding that every single *a* is a *b*, of which he well says: 'Inductio quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt, pronunciat.' It is not in truth induction, but a singularly futile sort of presumption.

**Simple enunciation**: a proposition which is not resolvable into copulative or disjunctive parts. Thus, 'All men are all rational animals' is resolvable into 'Every man is a rational animal, and every rational animal is a man.' So 'Every man is a rational animal' is resolvable into 'Every man is rational, and every man is an animal.' But though perhaps every proposition of the form 'Every *S* is *P*' is composite, yet the form itself may be regarded as simple.

**Simple interpretation**. In this phrase, interpretation means the subject of Aristotle's *Peri hermeneias*, that is to say, a SYMBOL (q. v.). A simple interpretation is one which does not have (either expressed in words or in circumstances) one part to show what it denotes and another to show what it signifies; that is to say, it is a term or *rhema* (PREDICATE, q. v., 2).

**Simple MODE** (q. v., ad fin.): a term of Locke's (*Essay*, II. xii. 5); a variation of one simple idea.

**Simple necessity**: the necessity of that whose contradictory involves contradiction (Scotus, *Opus Oxon.*, IV. xii. 7).

**Simple part**: a part which has no parts in the sense in which it is itself a part.

**Simple power**: the same as pure power, or that passive power which belongs to 'first' MATTER (q. v., Aristotle's use).

**Simple probation**: a proof consisting of a single syllogism.

**Simple proposition**: *simple enunciation* (q. v. above). Yet all categorical propositions are sometimes so called.

**Simple question**: a question which asks either *whether* or *what* anything is, as contradistinguished from a complex question which asks of a thing whether or why it has a certain character.

**Simple supposition**: *simple acceptation* (q. v. above). Petrus Hispanus says: 'Accidentalium suppositionum alia simplex; alia personalis. Suppositio accidentalis simplex est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum terminum: ut cum dicitur, homo est species, animal est genus.' Ockham (*Logica*, I. lxiv) says: 'Est autem primo sciendum quod suppositio primo dividitur in suppositionem simplicem, personalem, et materialem. . . . Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animæ sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia, dicendo sic, homo est species, ille terminus homo supponit pro intentione animæ, quia illa intentio est species,