result may be obtained by applying other objects—the things signified. It is also called (McCosh) the symbolic function.

The possibility of this procedure depends upon the existence of an appropriate con- 

nexion between the signs and what they signify. But the nature of the connexion may vary so as to constitute different kinds of signs. We may distinguish (1) the demonstrative sign, (2) the discriminative sign, (3) the mnemonic sign, (4) the expressive sign, (5) the substitute or symbolic sign. Cf. SIUS.

(1) The discriminative sign: the sign is the simplest and most primitive. It is used by animals as well as by men. It consists in some act by which one individual, who is interested in no object present to the senses, draws the attention of another individual to that object. The second individual attends primarily to the door of the first, and is thus indirectly led to attend to something else. Pointing with the finger is a typical illustration.

(2) The demonstrative sign: consists in some modification of an object or addition to it, made with the view of enabling us to identify and distinguish it in the future. Thus the robin who made a chalk on All Baba’s door used a discriminative sign. The house he desired to identify in the future was so like others in the neighbourhood that he feared it would be indistinguishable. But he was right; for he could always distinguish a door with a chalk-mark on it from a door with no chalk-mark. He accordingly marked the entrance to All Baba’s door: All Baba’s clever Morgania destroyed its discriminative value by leaving similar marks on the neighbouring doors.

(3) The mnemonic sign is simply an aid to memory. It is connected with the idea that when we think of A we shall probably or certainly think of B. For example, if I were to think of my hat, it is probable that I should visualize it. If I see a hat, I am using a hat as a mnemonic sign. Some people, for instance, tie a string round one of the fingers to prevent their forgetting something which they have to do. The assumption is that they will subconsciously notice the string round the finger, and so be reminded of the business which they wish to remember. The device may fail, either because they are oblivious of the string, and at the critical time, or because, when they do notice it, it fails to yield the required reminder or

(4) The expressive sign is not merely, like the mnemonic, a means of calling up the idea of an object. It is a means of pointing to the object while it is present to consciousness. The mnemonic sign has remained of that which signifies, it has no longer any function to discharge, and may be dismissed. But words and the gestures accompanying the language of natural signs are constituent factors of the very set of thinking of the objects which they signify. They are means of thinking of the object, as the handle of a box is a means of lifting it, and just as some things cannot be lifted without a handle, so some objects—concepts—cannot be thought of without words, or other expressive signs. See LANGUAGE, POSITION, and SIGN.

(5) The substitute or symbolic sign is the form in which a person is affectedly opposed in its nature to the thing signified. The expressive sign is a means of attending to the object signified; the substitute sign is a means of dispensing with attention to the object signified. Thus in cricket the relative position of the peg in the cricket-bag is substituted for the relative number of points won by the players. In solving a problem by algebraic methods, when we have once assigned suitable symbols to the several quantities, we need not in the actual process think of anything but these symbols. The operation is performed upon them. The equation might be solved by some one who did not know that it was represented. It is only when the solution of the equation is obtained that the need arises of translating the results back into the symbols.

The symbolic sign is the simplest form of this. It consists simply in establishing a connexion between a symbol and the thing signified. The connexion consists in the symbol being taken to represent the thing signified. The connexion may be actual, as in the case of a cross which is taken to represent the Crucifixion. It may be arbitrary, as in the case of the + sign which is taken to represent addition. The cross is a symbol in the former sense. The + sign is a symbol in the latter sense.

SIGWARTH, Heinrich Christoph Wil- 

helm (1789-1844). Born and brought up at Barmen, he was called Privatdocent in philosophy at Tübingen in 1813. In 1816 he became professor extraordinary, and in 1818 professor extraordinary. In 1823 he became Professor extraordinary, and in 1818 he died at Stuttgart.

SIMILE (with Similarity, Similitude) [Lat. similis, similitudine, similar; fr. similis; hol. similaar; see Resemblance].

SIMILAR (in exact logic): having a common predicate of some considerable logical depth.

SIMILARITY (in exact logic): having a common predicate of some considerable logical depth.

Simile enumeration: a term of Frings, by which he means mentioning a number of instances of an A which are B, and then concluding that every single is B, which he well says: Inductio quae procedit per enumerationem similitudinum, respondata significa per ipsum termi- num; cum dicatur, hominibus decidere; et dicatur, quae quidem sint singulae concursa dicta, et pleonae seu superflua punctus quidem esse, non minus actu possit esse praecedito, praecedito, praeconic. It is not in truth induction, but a singularly futile sort of presumption.

SIMPLE.

Simple examination: a proposition which is not reducible into copulative or disjunctive parts. Thus, All men are rational animals is reducible to ‘Every man is a rational animal’ and every rational animal is a man.’ So ‘Every man is a rational animal’ is reducible into ‘Every man is rational, and every man is an animal.’ But though perhaps every proposition of the form ‘Every s is P’ is composite, yet the form itself may be regarded as simple.

Simple interpretation. In this phrase, interpretation means the subject of Aristotle’s Pert hermeneutica, that is to say, a SYMBOL (q.v.). A simple interpretation is one which does not have (either expressed in the circumstances) one part to show what it denotes and another to show what that is to say, it is a term or phrase (FABIC. q.v., 3).

Simple Mode (q.v., ed. fin.): a term of Locke’s (Essay, II. xlii. 5); a variation of one simple idea.

Simple necessity: the necessity of that whose contradictory involves contradiction (Scottus, Opus Omn., IV. xii. 7).

Simple part: a part which has no parts in the sense in which it is in itself a part.

Simple power: the same as pure power, or that passive power which belongs to first MATER (q.v. Aristotle’s use).

Simple proposition: a proof consisting of a single syllogism.

Simple propositions: simple examination (q.v., above). For instance, Hume says: ‘Acciden- 
tual propositions, &c. are simple propositions: simple acceptance (q.v., above) is that which is distinguished from a complex proposition which contains a term whether whether or why it has a certain character.

Simulacrum: Dual acceptance (q.v., above). For instance, Hume says: ‘Acciden- 
tual propositions, &c. are simple propositions: simple acceptance (q.v., above) is that which is distinguished from a complex proposition which contains a term whether whether or why it has a certain character.

Simposia: simple acceptance (q.v., above). For instance, Hume says: ‘Acciden- 
tual propositions, &c. are simple propositions: simple acceptance (q.v., above) is that which is distinguished from a complex proposition which contains a term whether whether or why it has a certain character.
SIMPLICITY — SINCERITY

et tamp 2 proue le quond a illi terminis home non nupta sollicitus eiusmod intentiones; et illis voce de illi intentio amnis et tantum calculi ordinans in significando.

Simple quaetias: a SIMPLUS (q.v.) to which cannot be resolved into several allusion, nor contains any composite propositions.

Simple truth: that truth which permits to the thing itself, otherwise called "transcendent accedent.

SIMPLICITY [in aesthetic] (Lat. simplex, from sine a, plo, without fail): Gen. Simplicifes; Fr. simplicite; It. semplicita. A straightforwardness, the revelation of the utmost and variety of parts in an aesthetic whole, in the interest of unity and ease of comprehension.

It excludes not only what is superfluous or exaggerated but even elements that might have value by adding to the richness of the unity. It represents one pole (becoming in extreme form bareness or monogeny) of aesthetic planning form, as variety represents the other.

Literature: KÖTTLER, Aesthethik, 84 ff.; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA.[R.E.T.]

Simplicity. Lived in the first half of the 6th century B.C. Taught by Alexander the Great. He himself taught at Athens, and in 350 B.C., following the death of Alexander, the schools of philosophy at Athens, especially in Peripatetic, but they were then, in 350 B.C., the Neo-Platonic thinker, and continued in the works of Aristotle.

SIMULATION [Lat. simulare, a feigning] (Gen. simulatus, Fr. simulation; Ital. simulazione). (1) Make-believe. (2) See also SUBSTANCE.

(3) Conscious perception, including EXTRAVOCATION (q.v.) and LEER (q.v).

In medicine: the judging or counterfeiting of a disease, or that which is called malingering, as well as such sensory defects as colour-blindness and deafness, seen or heard in a disease, are called malingering, and are often counterfeited with the object of escape from military duty, or the consequences of a crime, again for no very obvious reasons (see below).

SIMULATION is generally detected by the feeling of the symptoms, the absence of slight indication of the disease, and the results of special tests. Of the various instances, malingering, amnesia, and insincerity (parasomnia) are perhaps the most susceptible to simulation, but the number of cases of successful simulation is probably extremely small. It should be noted, however, that in some cases of simulated disease, which is present (of which, indeed, simplicity exhibits no evidence), the symptoms may be an expression of mental disease which is simulated.

SINCERITY [Lat. sincerus, from sine, without, with-against]: Fr. sincérité; It. sincerità. Insincerity not only misleads others either positively or negatively, but is in itself itself, and the sincerity man aims to be truly understood, whether he has positive representations of or negative intentions, his is often used for sincerity in this sense. Cf. VERACITY, and LIE. [R.E.T.]

SINE QUA NON — SLEEP

The depth of sleep was measured by Kollard (Kollard, 1876), who found that it increased the tendency to the first hour, then became rapidly lighter, and continued to the sixth hour, without waking. The depth of sleep (see PRINCE, 1883, 1884) is found in a similar curve, with indication of a much shallower-deepening of sleep between the fifth and sixth hours. See also HOWELL, Physiology of Sleep, J. of Exper. Med., II, 352.

The chief cause of sleep is probably the process of the highly organized processes in the cells of the brain; during sleep this loss is made good. A secondary cause is a generally started to a condition of waste matter (fatigue products) in the blood. Monoacids cause accumulation of fatigue in a rested dog by transferring the blood of a rested dog into its veins, but he fails to tell us whether this sleep was required for recovery. Yet fatigue of the central nervous system is certainly a predisposing condition. But wakefulness sometimes persists even in conditions of extreme exhaustion, and on the other hand the more sleepiness of mental activity is often sufficient to induce sleep without prior fatigue. Animals almost invariably go to sleep when accustomed to rest and inactive stimuli are withdrawn. There seems to be no doubt that if the brain is essentially connected with alterations in the conditions of the blood supply of the brain and the Cerebral Cortex.

Abnormalities of sleep may be due to deficiency in amount or nature of sleep (see LITERATURE), or as excessive tension (see LITERATURE), known as sleep disease or narcolepsy; or as special conditions, such as sleepwalking (suggested), and deep sleep (suggested). A term used (of Kölpe, Intrad. to Phyllis) (q.v.) to characterize psychiatric schools "explaining or deducing all the phenomena of the universe from one principle" (assumed to be the cause of sleep, see Moroni). [A.D.R.]

Sincerity. Cf. NECRITY [Lat. sincerus, from sine, against]: Fr. sincérité; It. sincerità. Insincerity not only misleads others either positively or negatively, but is in itself itself, and the sincerity man aims to be truly understood.