regards the existence of a material world was reached by Arthur Collin (Clavis Universitatis), but, like Berkeley, he did not question the independent existence of God and other spirits.

Leibniz, Locke, and Berkeley all assumed the self to be an independent substance, or self-existing entity, and held up the principles of causality and determinism as the basis of the existence of God as a distinct entity. Hume assailed both these positions. He ac-

cepted Leibniz's doctrine that all the contents of experience must be some aspect or mode of 'consciousness.' One world in the 'world of the imagination,' and we can never transcend this. 'But the concept of cause cannot be relied upon to carry us beyond our own perceptions. The existence of any exter-

al cause for our impressions is a matter concerning which we can make absolutely no affirmations. The impressions may be pro-
duced by God, by external objects, or by the

mind. Belief in the existence of an external world is due to a propensity to feign a separate and continued existence for our perceptions. While, therefore, Hume did not
dogmatize in the soul existence of the self, he had reached the position which Kant characterized as a 'scholastic' to philosophical and to a 'natural' in general; that we should have to accept the existence of things without us (from what world on our own cannot of faith only, unable to meet with any satis-

factory proof of anything he is pleased to doubt it).

Kant sought to meet this position of scholastic. In his analysis of the meaning of all-con-

sciousness. He maintains that while all objects of knowledge are necessarily objects of consciousness, and that the distinction between sub-
ject and object, or between the empirical self and the external world, is a matter of consciousness and something outside of con-
sciousness and something outside of con-

sciousness, in fact, the external world is logically prior to the internal, since it is only as contrasted with the external that the internal self, as existing in time, is definitively conscious of itself as such. Kant, however, was not entirely consistent in his expressions upon this point, and as certain of his later decla-

ments show, he corrected the proof for the

proof of the existence of things by them-
selves, since an appearance without something that appears would be a logical absurdity.

Fichte, though making the 'I' the central principle of his system, was not a 'solip-

isit' for the 'I' of his science of knowledge was not a solipsism, but rather the analysis of the general conditions of consciousness. Mill, in his definition of the external world as permanent possibilities of sensation, repeated the Berkeleyan analysis. Recent dis-

cussions between Neo-Kantians and Realists (see REALISM) have turned very largely upon ambiguities above referred to.

Literature: KULPE, INTROD. TO PHIL., 1897; BRADLEY, Appearance and Reality, chap. iv; LADE, Philos. of Knowledge, chap. vii; EMMERDE, Metaphysik, chap. IV; SCHMIDT, Grundlegungen der Erkenntnistheorie, chap. III, ENSLING, Betr. e. monistischen Erkenntnistheorie, 1813 ff.; HAMILTON, Notes B and C in ed. of Reid; MILH, ENS. OF HAMILTON, chaps. x f.; VON HARTMANN, Neukantianism u. Schopenhauersismus, Vol.

I, 1858; ERBEN, Ueber Drenken; BERGMANN, in Zeit., 6, Philosophy, ex. 1; KONIG AND HARTMANN, bid., 1909, vii, iv; G. W. SETH, DESC. Biog., in Philos. Rev., 1895; ZELLE, Forts. u. Abhandl., iii, 224 ff.; SOLON, (circa 685-680 B.C.): A native of Aegina, and a merchant by education and profession, he travelled much in Greece, Egypt, Asia, and Africa, acquiring the know-

ledge which made him the most learned and

greatest in the six centuries of his

life.

THERE was one of the greatest "law-givers" and was one of the six wise

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THERE was one of the greatest "law-givers" and was one of the six wise

of ancient Greece. See CNE (in law).

Solution [Lat., solutionem, to melt] (Gen. Lumin. Fr. solution. Ital. soluzione). (1) The solution of a geometrical problem consists in: (a) forming a geometrical structure; (b) proving that this structure would satisfy the requirements of the problem; (c) proving that the construction is possible when the problem has no solution.

(2) The solution of an equation of the system of equations is sometimes in the form of an equation in which the unknown numbers are expressed in terms of other numbers.

(3) The answer to a general schematic problem of pure descriptive logic is the general form of relationship held good. (c.f.p.

SOMA (Gr. soma, body): name in other

languages. The mortal portion of the body in opposition to the material elements, which con-

stitute the body as a whole in the next generation. (c.f.p.

Germ.-Eng.)

SOMA: The term has been used only since the publication of Weismann's theories (see WEISENMANN). Following Weismann, somas are used for the substance and size of the body con-

sidering the soma in contrast with the germ-

cells of the germ-cells. Only the latter, on

Weismann's view, are the bearers of heredity, modifications of the somas having no effec-
tion on the next generation. (c.f.p. WEIS-

MANN. (c.f.p.)

SOMASOMAS [Gr. soma, body, + soma, discourse]: Gen. SOMATOPTOLOGY: Fr. somatopa-

tologie: Ita. somatologia. (1) A synonym for physical anthropology, or the study of the physical part of man. The use of this term would avoid the con-

fusion between the several meanings attached to somatology, as well as the need for descriptive objectives in connection with it.

SOMATOLOGY is a division of anthropology which includes an account of the structure of the human body, the skeleton, and internal organs; the proportions of the body (ANTHROPOMETRY, q.v.); and the special study of the brain: the developmental and com-

parative study of the body and its growth; and throughout, the utilization of all these facts for the differentiation of man from the most primitive animal kin, as well as the differen-
tiation of human races, tribes, peoples, nations, or special classes of man (criminals, crimina-

tes). It would thus constitute, in the most comprehensive sense, the description and systematic arrangement of our entire knowledge regarding the body, with special reference to the application of such knowledge to the problems of anthropology. See for further de-

tails and for literature ANTHROPOLOGY, and ANTHROPOMETRY.

(2) In theology, see PSYCHOLOGY (empirical and rational).

SONIA (in embryology) [Gr. soma, body, + soma, wall]: Gen. SOMATOPHYSIS; Fr. somatophrise; Ita. somatofisi. The primi-
tive wall of the body formed by the union of the ectoderm and outer or somatic leaf of the mesoderm.

The term was introduced by Michael Foster in 1879. It is often used incor-

rectly in Germany to designate the somatic

mesoderm.


SOMA [in logic]: Gen. som, Fr. de, subjunctive; Ital. soluto, subjunctive. (1) The work of a particular proposition, i.e., of that modification of the subject of a proposition which limits the predication to an indefinite subject of the clause. See PRECEP-

tion, IV.

It is thus equivalent to 'at least some' and does not assert or deny anything concerning all; i.e., it is not equivalent to 'only some' (see definition 2).

(2) A multicast which has a proposition to be the precise denial of a universal proposition. See ALEX (1).

The latter definition is held by those who hold that the particular asserts the existence of the subject while the universal does not. This, however, a matter for difference of opinion. Definition (1) in the commonly accepted one.

No practical difficulty need arise from this difference of opinion: it is only necessary to add statements of such existences as the parties to the discussion believe to be involved.

SOMA [Lat. somna, sleep, somnolence, wake]: Gen. SLEEP, SLEEPING, SLEEPWELL: Fr. somme; Ita. somnem; Jap. somme; Sp. somnio.

SOMAPLASM — SOMNAMBULISM

TALKING, SINGING, WRITING, ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN SLEEP AND WAKING, MAY USUALLY BE PROPERLY BE REGARDED AS INSTANCES OF SOMNAMBULISM. THE OCCURRENCE OF SLEEP IS SHOWN BY THE LIMITATION OF SENSIBILITY, FREQUEN-

TLY THE ABSENCE OF THE SENSES, WITH THE INDIFFERENCE TO ORDINARY STIMULI, AND THE COMPLETE FORGOTTENNESS OF WHAT WAS DONE DURING THE SLEEPING STATE, THE TASK OF THIS INSTINCT IS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SLEEP AND WAKING, IN WHICH PURPOSES ARE PERFORMED.