STYLE — SUBCONSCIOUS

Used in various connections: (1) in gen-
eral as good or bad style; ideas or real-
istic style. (2) Historically, as classic,
Gothic, romantic, Doric style. (3) With
reference to the distinctive traits of the re-
spective arts, asitterscope, sculpture, ar-
musical, poetic style. (4) Of an individ-
al as 'in the style of Rembrandt.' (5) As an
attribute of value, as 'this artist (or work)
hangs.'

Literature: Völker, Ästhet. Zeitungen (1595),
chap. IV: Faeckesi, Verehret d. Ästhet. (1836),
chap. XXVI: Gadst. L'Art on point de vue sçologique (1839),
chap. X; Hagen, Das bildende Künstlerleben (1876),
chap. X; Spencer, The Philosophy of Style,
chap. II; are also the aesthetic publications
of Veyser, Konigsbr., Schmeltzer, Véron,
Richter, and Casanov.

SUBCONSCIOUS — SUBJECT

It is a least degree of consciousness, re-
quired by the law of continuity; (2) the con-
scious process given in attention, 'the
focus' of consciousness; (3) the conscious
state of the 'field' of consciousness; and
in the rest of the 'field' of consciousness;
(4) the subconscious process itself attract
attention, or be made the object of
voluntary attention, until it has attained
to stage (5), i.e., until it has escaped to
be subconscious.

The facts which have led to the hypoth-
esis of a subconscious are: (a) the existence
of blind instincts, organic tendencies, &c.,
which no conscious antecedent can be
discovered; (b) the mechanism of complicated
movements, such as piano-playing; (c) the
appearance in 'memory' of ideas which seem
to have cropped up of themselves, i.e., have
no assignable physical or mental condition;
(d) the phenomena of 'secondary' Person-
ality (q.v.). (G.E.T.)

These distinctions are those of 'degree of
consciousness, as contrasted with that of
Grade (q.v.) of consciousness. It is impor-
tant that we separate clearly these functional
phases in consciousness of content, from the
generic phases in the evolution of mind, what-
soever analogies may be discovered between
them. The diagram given under PARALLEL-
SUMMARY (psychology) illustrates the two series
—the horizontal dotted line at each part has
its differences of degree, the vertical dotted
line gives differences of grades. In other words,
et every grade of consciousness we find distinc-
tions of degree. The term 'stage' (Stage) is
sometimes used for grades.

Subconscious (q.v.) generally are subconscious.
Particular instances often strike us, as when we are occupied with talking,
writing, &c., in which we become so
subsequently; at their occurrence they were
subconscious. The subsequent state shows
how these working, are working and, what the
previous condition. The terms 'subliminal' and 'marginal'
are used to characterize the subconscious, both
figuratively. That is subliminal which lies
below a theoretical Threshold (q.v.) of conscious-
ness; that marginal which is not
visible in the field (after analogy with
the field of vision, or field of attraction, or
Cognit. Psychol). Cf. Unconscious, and
Consciousness of the Pseudos.

To theories which accept 'unconscious'
mind, the subconscious is a transitional state
through which presentations pass in coming to
the focus (attention). The Herbartian 'mechan-
isms of associations' (or Desublimation)
did much to introduce the notions both of
the unconscious and of the subconscious.

The late years of 'unconscious' have been
dxaptopically to do many marvellous things;
art has been made the product of the
subconscious, the genius has been endowed
with a wonder-working 'subconscious'; all of
which means that certain mysteries of endow-
ment are not open to introspective analysis—
certainly to those of us who have them not—
and because they are not spread out on the
tablet of consciousness, the subconscious, it is
held, plays the greater part.

The terms 'semi'-' and 'half-conscious' are
loosely used for sub- or vague consciousness.

Subconscious [Latin sub, under, against] is
Gen. subjacent; Pr. subjacent; Ital. sub-
scendo. Two propositions having the same
subject and the same predicate, if so related
that they can both be true, but cannot both
be false, are said to be subcontraries; the rela-
tion is called 'subcontrary' Opposition (q.v.) with
its equivalents.

The ordinary doctrine is that 'Some S is P'
and 'Some S is not P' are subcontraries. This
means pheumex arise from their asson, and
'Some phoanix do not rise from their asson.' But
it is better to regard both as false when the
ex. (c.p.) are non-existent.

Subject (second) [Latin sub, under, against] is
Gen. subject, subjunct; Pr. subjunctus; Ital.
subjecto, subjectus. (1) The material or content of a thought or dis-

cussion from which that with which the
thought is concerned; or Oxen (q.v.), sub-
jectus. (2) Hense, the subjunctive, the real.

That which is the source and centre of
the process of thought, or, more widely, of all
the processes of the mind, is the distinc-
tion of its real form and its logical sense (of exten-
sion, of predication, Prato, loc. cit., III.
356). It is to Socrates' ideal of the distinc-
tion of subjective and objective in the
subjective, as the objective is as pertaining

to the external and material world; (4) that
which is merely mental; the illusion; that
which lacks validity; that which is not
universal, but confined to some one individual
and to him because of something accidental
in his make-up.

In aesthetics, subjective and objective
are often opposed to one another in two
types of criticism: the former, that into
which the personality of the author enters;
the latter, impersonal, impartial, and more or
less cold.

The term begins with a logical sense in
Aristotle, which, however, as is usual in
Greek thought, has an ontological meaning as well.
Logically, it is the subject of a proposition,
or of a discourse, that of which something is
asserted, 'tennes,' 'kra.' But Plato and Platonists
between 'as the subject and the predicate, to
the same being the noun or sub-
jectivit, the constant against the changing
verb, which thus connotes edo, essence
(Phron., 406, and Phot., 390). Aristotle
more explicitly distinguished the subject
with the substantiae (q.v.)—which,
indirectly, is only the Latin translation of his
'subjectibus.' This, as indeterminate subject,
is in a matter; but as determinate, it is specific
individual beings, persons being only secondary
subjects. It can be subject only, never pre-

dent. (c.p.) to that state (Prato, op. cit., 1.28-32; Trendl-
burg, op. cit., 221) the subject is one of the four
fundamental categories that are not being
without quality, and, therefore, the ultimate
subject of all judgment; the unqualified—
the pure universal. As such is it the receptacle in
which the formative or seminal reason works.

Here we have a complete fusion of the
logical and ontological senses. Aristotle
(Copulae, Prato, 283, 636) made the
terms subjectus and subjectiva as tech-
nical terms for the subject of a proposition
or judgment; while Boethius for the
first time (Prato, loc. cit., 1.686) made the
terms subjectivus and praedicativus.
In this form the terms appear not as
thought. As might be expected, we owe to
the nominalists, Ockham, the first exposition
of the process of thought, or, more widely, of all
of the processes of the mind, and the distinction
of its real form and its logical sense (of exten-
sion, of predication, Prato, loc. cit., III.
356). It is to Socrates' ideal of the distinc-
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