"first and second intentions"; subjective designating the first, intuition, concrete substantiability, and objective the second, intention, or this thing as constituted through a mental operation (Kant, b. ii. 207; also the Index, note, for other similar uses of the term objective). Kant anticipated the modern usage of the term, using the phrase "subjective volunta, trust", and speaks of an objective reason, "rational object", which mediates real being to knowledge, "having two aspects, as it were, an external and an internal aspect" (Freund, iv. 145). Descartes is true to the scholastic use, objective with him meaning always present to thought (existing identical to intellect), and subjective which is really in the things themselves (Formalismus in spicis, Midd. iii.).

Kant (The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic Thought) gives instances of the use of the term in the 18th century prior to Kant. The reversal of meanings in Kant is not hard to understand. The proposition "I think" has transmuted; what it is to say, it is the function of the self-identity of thought, which, lying at the basis of the categories, is the fundamental a priori condition of all knowledge and experience. It cannot be reduced, however, as a thing, from substance, i.e. as soul. By this I or he or it is, that is the thing which thinks, nothing in reality beyond a transmuted subject of thoughts or, which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates (Critique of Pure Reason, 302, Mülle's trans.). It is, then, just the absolute subject of all judgment, the subject which must correctly enough connects the term with the Aristotelian and logical meaning. But the activity of this function, through the forms of sense and categories of understanding, is necessary to the constitution of objects in experience, the empirical as distinct from the transcendental object or thing-in-itself; then, epistemological sense, (which is not, historically, the purely,"I think," or subject has positive signification and value. Thus Kant says: "If we drop our subject, or the subjective form of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in time and space, any, space and time themselves, would vanish" (ibid., 33). Thus, all the part is played by mental activity in constituting empirical objects is repeatedly termed "subjective." A double sense is clearly contained in this term, one regarding the subject over against the objective, when things-themselves—reality in its intrinsic nature—are in which is the source of the phenomena, of that which has not unconditional validity—"I think" tending towards the ascertaining and sense of the term. But, on the other hand, it is constitutive of objects as experienced, and therefore the thing in actual activity; indeed, because of its universal and necessary character, it is not merely any law or object found in experience itself. Kant's successors, by abolishing the thing-in-itself, endeavored to do away with this ambiguity. They endeavored to give the term "I think," or unity of thought, a completely objective sense; Kant himself having, indeed, admitted the possibility of the transcendental object being at the same time the subject of thinking (ibid., 311). The subject thus becomes the activity which appears equally in mental processes and in the world of experienced objects. It differs from the real-substance against which Kant had made his polemic, in being essentially activity rather than substance, and hence by being conceptualized in its function, in the structure of the world of knowledge, morals, and art, rather than in its isolated essence; and as transcending the historical, or empirical, individual mind. Such is its use in Fichte. Kant and Hegel fixed the distinction in classic way in the introduction to his Phaenomenology (Werke, 14) by saying the truth, the absolute, was the object in subject, not as substance. But this technical sense is not merely formally passed over into a new function in which subject means mind, soul, though with more psychological implication and with more influence (often very vague, however) to the part played by mind in the process of knowledge. Sir William Hamilton was chiefly influential in making the Kantian distinction of subjective and objective at home in English thought. Caillois, in his "Religion of Man," which it could no longer it was not intended and understood as a sign. The pointing arm, however, is the subject of this proposition, usually indicates its object by virtue of this object, which general use as still, though it were not intended or understood as a sign. But when it enters into the proposition, it indicates its object that the proposition is in another way. For it cannot be the subject of the proposition, unless it is intended and understood to be so. It is the being an index of the flower is not enough. True, if the subject of the proposition, notions of these can mean, for it is the being an index of the flower is evidence that it was intended to be. In some sense, however, the propositions refer to this link, and there are at least three points.
common to all the circles osculating any given curve." The subject of a universal proposition may be so arranged that its truth will be dependent on the proposition about the subject of the proposition. The subject of a universal proposition is the term that is to be universally affirmed or negated. The subject of a universal proposition is the predicate of a universal proposition.

Subject — Subjective Sensations

Subjectivism — Subordination

This range and speak of the ear's own sound, and in general of the "own" sensations of the various sensory activity to the subject. As illustrating the German usage, cf. the "sensational" use of "sensation" in Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, II. 661.

Subjectivism [for deriv. see SUBJECT; Ger. Subjektivität; Fr. subjectivité; It. soggettivismo]. (1) The theory which denies the possibility of objective knowledge, which limits the mind to consciousness of its own states, such as, equivalent to subjective idealism. (2) Any theory which attaches great importance to the part played by the subjective factor in constituting experience, e.g. Kantianism in its doctrine of the subjective origin of the forms of perception (space and time) and the categories of conception.

The theory, in ethics, which conceives the aim of morality to be the attainment of states of feeling, pleasure or happiness (Kant, Int. to Ethics, sec. 14, 33). Cf. Subj. or C.S.C. (3) Subjective.

Subjective products of all sorts (not less than the products) are said to have "subjectivity." (4) Subjectivity (as in theology): Ger. Subjektivität; Fr. subjectivité; It. soggettivismo. This was given expression by Burke, Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful, 1757, and since then it has found a place in aesthetics, e.g. "The mathematical sublime," as a description of the "subjective experience of beauty." Subjectivity, in ethics, is a doctrine which holds the subject to be the origin of all moral values, and in aesthetics, the subject of all aesthetic values. Subjectivity is the doctrine of the "subjective" in art, and the "subjective" in ethics.

Subjective, generally speaking, is the term that is to be subject to a subjective proposition. The subject of a subjective proposition is the subject of a subjective proposition.

Subjective Selection. Subjective Selection is the process of selecting the subject of a subjective proposition. It is a subjective proposition, and it is the subject of a subjective proposition.

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