tion to maintain that an infinite and absolute—that is, an ideally complete—experience is the necessary presupposition of an experience that is finite and fragmentary.

In the metaphysical field the principal questions under debate are (1) that of the relation of the concepts of religion to metaphysical principles. On the one hand, the phenomenalists or religious positivists, following the letter of Kant and denying the possibility of metaphysics, seek to construct a theism that shall rest exclusively on the evolution of humanity as a historic phenomenon. On the other hand, the sufficiency of this is denied, and it is contended that for an adequate basis of belief the notion of humanity must be related to that of an infinite and absolute ground; that otherwise the whole structure of religious knowledge is not secure against scepticism. (2) The second problem arises in the sphere of speculative theism, and concerns especially the relation of God to the finite individual. Assuming that God is the only absolutely real being, the problem is to find in his relation to the world an adequate ground of finite individuality. The older form of speculative theism attempted to conceive God's relation to the world under the categories of pure thought, and as a consequence found it difficult to vindicate any ground of reality for the individual. This difficulty has led to a profound modification of the position, by the incorporation of the category of will and feeling into the very constitution of the absolute. God is thus brought not solely into conceptual, but also into volitional and emotional relations with his creatures. The world thus becomes the object of the divine purpose and love, and inasmuch as these are elective, the individual finds a ground of reality or real justification in his relation to the absolute.

If now, going a step further, we represent the objective activities of the absolute as individuating in their very form and essence, so that no other than an individual result is to be expected, and if we connect this with the notion of the absolute stability and perspicacity of the divine activity, it would seem that we were in sight of a theistic conception in which it is possible to effect a synthesis between the notion of God as absolute reality and that of a perishable finite individual possessing the reality of a moral agent.

Cf. MEGATHREISM, PANTHEISM, and the various topics RELIGION.

Literature: AUGUSTINE, Conf. Adscend.; ANBRET, Prologium; HUME, Dialogues on Religion, and Natural Hist. of Religion; Kant, Rational Theology, in Critique of Pure Reason; and Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason; HEGEL, Philosophy of Religion; LOTZE, Outlines of Philosophy of Religion (Eng. trans.); BRINZER, German Theology and Religion (Eng. trans.); GIFFORD, Lectures on the Development of Theology; MAX MILLER, Gifford Lectures; and Chips from a German Workshop (Eng. trans.); F. W. TAYLOR, Theology; and act. Theism, in Encyc. Brit. (5th ed.); J. CAIRD, Philosophy of Religion; ROSS, Philosophy of Theism; J. MARTINEAU, A Study of Religion; WETSCH, A Clandest. Exam. of Theism; J. FRAZER, Cosmic Theism, in Cosmic Philosophy; and The Idea of God; H. SPENCER, The Unknown, in First Prin.; J. H. STIRLING, Philosophy and Theology; W. M. WESLEY, Contemp. Theol. and Theism; FLEETON, Philosophy of Theism, Gifford Lectures; P. L. PATTEN, Syllabus on Theism (printed, not published); ULRICH, Gott u. die Natur; ROWSE, The Conception of God; and The World and the Individual, Gifford Lectures; LEECH, STIRLING, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century; Sacred Books of the East, ed. by Max Müller; D'ROCHE, H. Théisme (1884). See the topics RELIGION. (A. T.)

Thema [Gr. θέμα, a deposit, sight, theme]. Gen. Themis; Fr. Thème; Ital. tema. A word proposed in 1623 by Bogerius in his Logic (L 1: § 1), for that "quod intellectual cogitandum propositum posuerit"; but what he seems to mean is what Aristotle sometimes vaguely expresses by ὑπόθεσις, the immediate object of a thought, a meaning.

It is of the nature of a sign, and in particular of a sign which is rendered significant by a character which lies in the fact that it will be interpreted as a sign. Of course, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign; but the character which causes it to be interpreted as referring to its object may be one which might belong to it irrespective of its object and though that object had never existed, or it may be in a relation to its object which it would have just the same whether it were interpreted as a sign or not. But the thesis of Bogerius becomes a sign, which, like a word, is connected with its object by a convention that it shall be so understood, or else by a natural instinct or intellectual act which takes it as a representative
of its object without any action necessarily taking place which should establish a factotum connection between signs and object. If this was the case, the object of Bergsonism, his laws, is not to be the same as the present writer's symbol (C.S.R). 

Theocracy (Gr. ótheia, God, + oiné, com- mand): Ger. Theologie; Fr. théologie; It. teologia. Government by a god or gods.

The first known government, even when patriarchal was perhaps the Jewish. The Muhammadan governments and the govern- ment (ill lately) of the Papal States may be taken as modern instances. Theocracy is not involved in the mere recognition (as in classic Greece) of a divine power or powers over and above the political heads of the nation. In a theocracy the divine power, through his representative (the priests) or his word (or the Koran), takes part in the actual political government. It is not enough for the rule (as in ancient Rome) to be sometimes also the priest; in a theocracy it is the priest who is the ruler.

Theocracy (Gr. Ótheia, God, + oiné, mixing, a mingling with the divine); Ger. Teologie; Fr. théologie; It. teologia. Theology (Gr. théos, God, + logos, word or speech); Ger. Theologie; Fr. théologie; It. teologia. Theology is part of that philosophy or religious system which directs systematically the cult or worship, natural and moral, of a being who is the supreme reality. In the state where theology is a department of moral theology, and proceeding on the assumption of the absolute authority of Scripture.

Theology (Gr. théos, God, + logos, word or speech); Ger. Theologie; Fr. théologie; It. teologia. Biblical theology is the systematic treatment of the doctrines of the Old and New Testament as contained in the Bible and developed in the history of the Church.

In the general sense, theology is a department of general philosophy. Biblical theology is the application of principles of rational construction to the content of Christian revelation. Biblical theology is ordinarily divided into four branches: historical, dogmatical, systematical, and practical.


Theophany—Theory

The system of theological doctrine developed dogmatically; that is, by means of the ultimate, its essence, and its development; but to authority, either that of Scripture or of tradition and tradition combined. The epistemology of the Christian Church is the union of Scripture and tradition, while in the modern church, as a rule, the authority of tradition is rejected, and the dogma rests on the sole authority of Scripture.

Theology: See THEOLOGY. 

Theosophy: (Gr. Ótheia, God, + oineia, to impose); Ger. Theosophie; Fr. théosophie; It. teosofia. (i) General: the revelation of himself which the Deity makes through his works. (ii) Special: God's revelation of himself in Christophanic form in the Old Testament, in the Shekinah; in the New, in the incarnation, birth, baptism, and second coming of Christ. See CHRIISTIOLGY.

In the general sense, the whole world may be regarded as a theosophy or manifestation of the divine. In the special sense, God always appears in the person of the Son. 

Theosophists of Greece (c. 280 B.C.). A Greek philosopher, pupil of Aristotle, is thought to have founded Peripatetic School after the latter's death. See THOMAS.

Theorem (Gr. Ótheia); Ger. Theorem, Fr. theoreme, It. teoremo. A demonstrable theoretical proposition.

Theory (in science) (Gr. Ótheia, a conception, speculation); Ger. Theorie; Fr. théorie; It. teoria. General principles or formulae proposed for the purpose of explaining phenomena, the theory of gravitation, the Newtonian theory of light. In modern nomenclature it is confined to principles which have at least a large measure of plausibility, in contradistinction to a hypothesis, which is defined as a speculative explanation, the truth of which is to be verified or disproved by subsequent research.

The whole aim of science is to find out certain regular relations among the facts, and to work out a satisfactory theory of the relations. The theory is not necessarily a fact, it has its status in the history of thought. The facts to which it refers are not necessarily a fact, and do not necessarily have the same relation as pure mathematical forms. A theory is properly a result of systematic scientific con-

Theology: See THEOLOGY.
are multiplied the observed ratio will indifferently approximate to the true ratio. This sort of induction, therefore, has no other validities than such as belongs to a hypothesis which suits the facts as far as we yet know them. If it be called an induction, it is a degenerate induction differing every little from hypothesis. It may properly be said, then, that even a pure mathematical theory is developed out of hypothesis.

No theory to the positive sciences can be supposed to satisfy every feature of the facts. Although we know that the laws of gravitation is one of the most perfect of theories, yet still, if bodies were to attract one another inversely as a power of the distance whose exponent were not 2, but -2, the only observable effect would be a very slow rotation of the lines of apsides of each planet. Now the lines of apsides all do rotate in consequence of perturbations, which virtually do alter slightly the sun's attraction, and thus such an effect would probably only produce slight discrepancies in the values obtained for the masses of the planets. In very many cases, especially in practical problems, we deliberately go upon theories which we know are not exactly true, but which have the advantage of a simplicity which enables us to deduce their consequences.

Thus, the doctrine of almost every branch of philosophy is used by engineers of all kinds. The most extraordinary departure from the known facts occurs when hydrodynamics is applied, where the theory in in striking opposition to facts which themselves determine upon every aspect of nautical moving water. Nevertheless, even in this case, the theory is not useless.

In all the explanatory sciences theories for more simple than the real facts are of the utmost service for enabling us to analyse the phenomena, and it may truly be said that physics could not possibly deal even with its most simple facts without such analytic procedure. Thus, the kinetical theory of gases, which is the first developed, was obliged to assume that all the molecules were elastic spheres, which nobody could be true to be. If this is not necessary even in physics, it is still more indispensable in every other science, and is, in fact, in the moral sciences, such a political economy. Here the same method is to begin by considering persons placed in situations, and some similarity, in the utmost contrast to those of all human society, and animated by motives by and by reasoning powers of the wish, not to be carried by the consequences of their actions. This, in this way alone can be a base obtained from which to proceed to the consideration of the effects of different complications. According to the necessity of making theories far more simple than the true facts, we are obliged to be content with them, and to be also upon our guard against any extraneous ideas of them based upon such extreme consequences.

Whereas makes a great point of the relativity of the distinction between theory and fact. This is an important point that ought not to be overlooked. Every fact involves an element supplied by the mind, which if not, properly speaking, theory, is analogous to the words. On the other hand, serious errors of logic will result from not taking account of the difference between the intellectual elements already involved in the perceptual facts and scientific theories. A theory is a result subject to criticism, meaning by criticism, not the consideration of whether or how an object is beautiful, useful, or the like, but the passing of a judgment as to whether the object ought to be as it is or as it is supposed to make it. If this judgment is adverse, the theory can and will be altered; and it will not be maintained by anybody until it is put into a shape to withstand his criticism. But it is perfectly false, in this sense of the word, for anybody to criticize what he cannot understand; and that the perplexing and unsatisfactory practice, it is also highly perplexing. Now the statements made as scientific truth in framing a percept and a perception, and judgment is beyond our control, and therefore not subject to logical criticism. It simply has to be accepted. Kant, perhaps, did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that we are under the power of the chief models as forms of space, time, unity, reality, etc., but, after all, his doctrine of the categories is merely in outcome that knowledge cannot be imperceptible.

Perceptual judgments are, for the purposes of logical criticism, absolute facts without any admixture of theory. If a theory does not square with perceptual facts it must be changed. But the impressions of sense in which it is supposed to have been constructed are matters of theory. If the perceptual square with the impressions of sense, it would not be the perceptions that would have to be reformulated, for they cannot novate; but the contrary, that the perceptions are constructed out of impressions of sense, that would have to be modified. (C.S.