TRIVIUM — TRUTH AND FALSY

TRIVIUM [Gr. τριβᾶν, περίπερα]: 3 parts of education in the Middle Ages; grammar (Latin), rhetoric (oral art of speech), and dialectics (philosophical logic).

TRIVIUM, adj.: 1. Of or pertaining to the trivium. 2. Having a threefold character.

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TRUTH [Gr. ἀλήθεια]: 1. The state of being true. 2. The quality or characteristic of being true. 3. The correspondence of a statement with reality. 4. The faculty of discerning the truth. 5. The quality of being true, real, or genuine.

TRUTH [Lat. veritas]: 1. The state of being true. 2. The quality or characteristic of being true. 3. The correspondence of a statement with reality. 4. The faculty of discerning the truth. 5. The quality of being true, real, or genuine.

TRUTH [Lat.: auctoritas]: 1. The state of being true. 2. The quality or characteristic of being true. 3. The correspondence of a statement with reality. 4. The faculty of discerning the truth. 5. The quality of being true, real, or genuine.

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in some relation of words to what they signify, or even to another one, has indeed been seriously held at various times; and that the fact that it seems necessary to anyone any longer to discuss that view, perhaps makes it in advance 

in the conception of the term. The view that truth consists in relation to a symbol over its symbolic of Kant's theory of appearances, which appears to make the objectivity of a judgment consist in the fact that its subject is related to other objects, and does not clearly distinguish objectivity from truth. It should, perhaps, be noted that even if false belief has been frequently held to consist, not in consciousness of something different from the truth, but merely in absence of consciousness of the truth or of the whole truth—a view which naturally follows as one of the alternative inferences from the premise that false = not true, and from the premise that consciousness of the truth or the whole truth—a view which naturally follows as one of the alternative inferences from the premise that false = not true, and from the premise that consciousness of the truth or the whole truth—a view which naturally follows as one of the alternative inferences from the premise that false = not true, and from the premise that consciousness of the truth or the whole truth—a view which naturally follows as one of the alternative inferences from the premise that false = not true, and from the premise that consciousness of the truth or the whole truth—a view which naturally follows as one of the 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But truth is also used in senses in which it is not an affection of a sign, but of things as things. Such truth is called transcendent truth. The Scholastic maxim was festum, vera, scientiam. Among the senses in which transcendent truth was understood was that in which it was said that all science has for its object the investigation of truth, that is to say, of the real characters of things. It was, in other senses, regarded as a subject of metaphysics exclusively. It is sometimes defined as to be indistinguishable from reality, or real existence. Another common definition is that truth is the conformity, or correspondence, of things to reason. Another definition is that truth is the conformity of things to their essential principles.

(1) Truth is also used in logic in a sense in which it inheres only in subjects more complex than propositions. Such is formal truth, which belongs to an argumentation which conforms to logical laws. (q.b.)

Psychological. The psychological criticism of the notion of truth seems to be reducing it to that of truth, and in so far as being making it difficult to put the 'correspondence' theory of truth in any tenable form. If in its essential, no less than in its general, meaning, truth is that which consciousness somewhere and somehow finds it possible to believe as true, then it is a vicious circle to define truth as that which corresponds to or that which approximates to reality. The truth-coefficient, it seems safe to say, can be attached to this or that mental content only through the acceptance of the latter by consciousness for practical or other purposes; and when we come to ask for something which can be considered the irreducible character of truth, we find it to be, so far as the conscious recognition of it is concerned, also its acceptance for practical or other purposes.

The fundamental difficulty with a 'correspondence theory' is that it assumes a reality with which that which claims to be true may be compared, in order to find out whether it really is true or not. This is to say that we have a system of realities which have not been derived through the processes of selection in which alone just those tests arise which constitute them truths. Genetic analysis shows that by our active accommodations to whatever is in accommodation to we select out bits of workable experience, hypostatize them under the name of reality, and thus, through gradual accretion to the store—both the individual and the racial store—we enlarge the range of truth with the reflection of it pari passu which constitutes reality. It would then be necessary to say, as the positivist writer (Psychol. Rev., Jan., 1898, 6, 1) has said in common with a German writer (Simmel, Arch. f. syst. Philos., i, 34 (f)), 'truth is not selected because it is true to reality': it is true because it has been selected.' And it might be said with equal justification: reality is not that to which truth must correspond; truth, on the contrary, is that to which reality must correspond.

The genetic reasons for the common-sense view—and also for the logical view (see above, Logica)—that goes by the term 'correspondence' appear to be plain. By the historical growth of tradition, authority, science, etc., and by the reflection of great standard formulas in the conceptual equipment of individuals, a system of realities is recognized into which all are educated and to which all minor statements and beliefs are made to conform. This body of established truths has certain characters—permanency, consistency, compelling quality, etc.—which in our hypothesizing of reality come to be criteria of truth. According as new formulations, items, reported facts stand tests by these criteria, they are brought into correspondence with the reality of which each test is a function; so that they are said to be, and they are able to claim, true. In so far, therefore, the correspondence view has grounds to rest upon, and in this sense it applies to a very wide series of cases. But it still remains that, if these considerations are true to psychology, for purposes of definition, truth is the ultimate and reality the derived term.

Literature: that of EPISTEMOLOGY, and LOGIC: EHRLEIN, B. 1, 2, 3, 4. C. 2, 3, 4; citations under SELECTION THOUGHTS. (J.M.B.C.F.)

Truth (in theology): Ger. Wedekind; Fr. sacré; Ital. verità (di Dio, etc.—C.M.A.). Truth as a divine attribute is to be understood as the exact correspondence between the divine thought and reality; or the exact correspondence between the divine promise and its fulfillment. Cf. ATTRIBUTES (of God).

Tschenhausen, Graf von, Walther. Hynfried, Herr von Kisslingswalde und Kleinzenberg, (1691-1709) Studied at Leyden, chiefly mathematics. Volunteer in Holland, where he met Heygboeck and became...