The reader is in general having the same sort of unity as that of the beloved son or of the merciful integrity for the colour of unilin red (magenta). But the moment you pass from the idea of a particular item of my experience, such as seeing a boat with a couple of men going over Niagora, to the slightest generalization of it, such as that of the memory of seeing the event, or the general conceptions of going over Niagora, the positive亲切ness entirely disappears.

Nevertheless, the word unity is seldom applied to this sort of memory, which goes by the name of consciousness. There is no individuality in a quality of immediate consciousness such as the memory or the sensation, because there is no setting of something over against subject, which is requisite before mere consciousness can be said to have reference to plurality (positive亲切ness thus involving duality); but positive consciousness is there any generality in the immediate consciousness, as long as it remains something more than what it first was. The same occurs does not involve the least reference to plurality, and is therefore not positively opposed to generalization, and is not destroyed when generalization takes place. But positive and intense awareness necessarily involves, or rather springs out of, the idea of duality, and distinctly denies it; so that the consciousness destroys it; it is the otherness of the otherness that constitutes the unity.

The idea which the word unity is primarily expressive of is essential to a general (in the most general sense in relation to particulars, which would be much more and only indirectly.

Unity is thus used, not to express pure consciousness, nor yet positive consciousness, but to express the negation of multitudinous in the object in which it is attributed. Thus it involves a distinctive reference to the possibility, not of duality merely, as positive consciousness does, but of plurality (the idea of more than two). The first unity might be named singularity of essence; the second is very appropriately termed individuality; the third, which is usually what Kant termed synthetic unity, is to have no other designation than totality or universality.

Unity in certain old books (as in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, book I, chapter 14) is divided into singular and universal, the former being the singular, the latter to universality. Singular unity is defined as that which belongs to the

singulars in so far as they are considered as units with individualizing difference, which is impossible to define individually, distinctness goes back to second or to one of a few so far.

Unity is divided by Kant into analytical and synthetic. He never defines or explains these terms; but if we remember that, in his use of words, multiplicity of elements is essential to unity, it is easy to see that what he means by analytical unity is the unity of which that which is given in its combined state and is analysed by ordinary reduction. Thus we perceive a fact; and in order to express it or think it, we analyse it, and the relation of the parts to the elements resulting from this analysis is very improperly called analytical unity. But when in the formation of the new concept it is this that has to be put together, so that ordinary thought cannot proceed from whole to parts, but an operation more or less ambiguous is supposed to manufacture the whole out of the parts, the relation of the whole to the parts is called synthetic unity. Three kinds of transcendental symbols are recognized in the first edition of the Kritik in return Versuch, each resulting in a synthetic unity; they are the synthesis of opposition in the judgement, which produces one representation; the synthesis of representation in the imagination; and the synthesis of representability in the concept, which gives the unity of the rule. The transcendental unity of syntheticity is similar to the unity of the object in the act of cognising from a correlative unity of consciousness. It is transcendental, objective, synthetic, and unity. The idea of such a kind of synthetic unity was a unity of conception and empirical and contingent. There are also different modes of conative unity, some spasm.

That which the Scholastics meant by transcendenal unity was a unity of the rule in which is said Quaestio est unum, that is self-consistent. We must not forget the three dualistic entities of time, place, and action, requiring the events represented to be in one day, in one sense, and all to relate to one place. Unity of action is set forth by Aristotle (Poetics, chapter 4, book 11) as a certain kind of Aristotelianism. Rational composition is either of those which differ by reason alone, or of those things brought together in one concept; it includes, 'in short, all the same, &c.; and so, in agreement to extent, external

causes. &c. Modal composition is composition from a thing and a cause. Most of the above is distinct from the above, and a few are still earlier.

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A unity in mathematics is a quantity which multiplied by any other gives that other. There can thus be but one unit in an algebra, although there may be many.

Aesthetic unity: singleness or congruity of effect immediately produced through sensuous presentation.

Formal and material unity: scholastic terms, derived from Aristotle. Material unity is that which pertains to an individual as such, and which cannot be alastrated even in thought from the individual; the material unity of Socrates, for instance, constitutes a formal unity. Cf. INTEGRAL (formal, and material).

Functional unity: a unity which consists not in the composition of elements or parts of structures as such, but in the composite or working together of these various parts—unity of value expressed—or termed teleological unity. The term ideal unity properly has the same meaning.

Logical unity: that which is constituted by the mutual support given to one another by a number of terms and propositions of such a nature as to render the reasoning in the process of establishing a conclusion valid.

Metaphysical unity: that whose identity is inherent, having within itself a principle of generation which makes it essential to all other beings.

Physical unity: that which is produced by a variety of matters co-operating intentionally and under the control of some conceiving principle, to bring about a particular result; in this sense the state, as well as the nature, of any material object may be a material unity.

Numerical unity: that the identity of which is external, rather than intrinsic; whatever is sufficiently marked off or separate from other things to be counted as one; also, numerical or scholastic unity. Cf. NUMBER (different topics).

Organic unity: a unity which is constituted in a manner through diversity, since it results from a manifold of parts or members which are mutually dependent upon one another; and its component parts or members are so organized in each part which is so homo- geneous with the other parts as to be capable of being itself a unity.

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That of co-operation to a single end. It relates to both form and content of the aesthetic object. A single absolute unity becomes eminently or predominantly of aesthetic interest, especially as the synthetic or transcendental unity of apprehension—and hence.

We owe one of the main distinctions to Aristotle, who differentiated absolute and relative unity, the former being continuous and indivisible within itself, the latter complex and diverser, as of an orchestra. Unity proper is subdivided into five forms: first, that of contrariety, not due to contact; second, essential unity of form and figure—what is, that which is, not to the exclusion of another force; third, individual, that which is universally dispersed must be a real universal, that constituted by thought as present in a variety of objects—practically equivalent to the formal unity of the Scholastics.

But the philosophical interest of the idea of unity cannot be gathered from any cluster of formal definitions or distinctions. It attaches to the content of the idea. All philosophy is a search for unity, as, if this cannot be found, for nations; and it is the nature and quality ascribed to unity or unities, together with the reasons given for selecting it as such, that constitute the free philosophical history of the term. See METAPHYSIC, ONES AND MANY.

Nesitic unity: the Scholastics one of the three ultimate predicates of being, and is an axiom of philosophy that every being is unity, and every unity is a spiritual unity. Hence the standard and definition of unity and substances are the same. See SUBSTANCE, AND TRANSCENDENCE.

The whole question of the philosophical ground of unification (in the case of the logic and algebra) is conected with the question of unity.

Unity in Variability: the Scholastics of the dominion of life is one and not many, and that the distinction of the divine nature presupposes its sameness.

Unity of the principle of monism. The Scholastics ascribe to monism the notion that it is necessary to emphasize the unity of the divine nature. The Scholastics may be divided into those who consider the oneness of Jahuhr or of Jehovah as the same, and those who consider it as not the same, and the latter include the monistic conception of Jehovah or of Jehovah, which is said to be in opposition to the Scholastic conception of the same. See SUBSTANCE, PART AND WHOLE.

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under each of its simple forms. Now, if a universal proposition ascertaining the existence of a certain class of men is regarded as a simple form of proposition—e.g., for example, 'There are inhabitants of Mars who have red hair.'—its precise denotation would be a particular proposition not ascertaining the existence of the subject, which would be a mere singular, hardly ever wanted, and manifestly complex, such as, 'Either there is no inhabitant of Mars, or if there be, there is one at least who has not red hair.' It is obviously better to make the simple particular proposition ascertaining the existence of its subject, 'There is an inhabitant of Mars who has red hair,' when the universal form will not make the same assertion or imply it. 'What! All inhabitants of Mars there may be, must without exception, have red hair.'* If every particular proposition ascertaining the existence of its subject, then an affirmative particular proposition implies the existence of its predicate also. It would be a contradiction in terms to say that a proposition ascertaining the existence of its predicate, since that of which a proposition ascertains anything is its subject, not its predicate. Perhaps it is not quite accurate to say that the particular proposition ascertains the existence of its subject, at any rate, must not be understood as if, in each instance, existence were a predicate not implied in the proposition which does not make the assertion (see Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Sect. 350, ed. 596.)

Every proposition refers to some indefinite universal propositions to the universe, through the universal common to speaker and auditor, which is an index of what the speaker is talking about. Every particular proposition asserts that, with sufficient means in that universe would be found an object to which the subject term would be applicable, and to which further examination would prove whether the image called up by the predicate was also applicable. That having been ascertained, it is an immediate inference, though not exactly ascertained in the proposition, that there is some individuable object (i.e., something existing) which predicate itself applies to. So that the predicate also may be considered as referring to an index. Of course, it is perfectly legitimate, and in some aspects preferable, to formulate the particular proposition that 'There is something in, at once, an inhabitant of Mars, and the universe,' under this form: 'Everything that exists in the universe is, if an inhabitant of Mars, then red hair.' In this case, the universal proposition is converted into a natural premiss or class, it expresses the thought that he frequently alludes to the category of certain truths (that is, being propositions of necessary truth) against Locke's opinion, yet in only one place (the *Anastris Prosopos* of the *Tentamen Rationis*) distinctly adds the criterions of universality. Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that to which they may not be derived from observation, or probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (5), that is, an assertion to which a member of a general class without exception. The *abstract idea* argues that no legiti- 

*This is a continuation of the previous text, discussing universal propositions and their implications. The text is written in a formal, technical manner, typical of philosophical discourse about the nature of propositions and their relationships. The focus is on distinguishing between different types of propositions and their implications for the nature of existence and reality. The author references various philosophers, such as Kant, and quotes passages from their works to support the argument.*
Universal and Universality

The fact that all the logic of all these writings respectively Kant, requires the word 'universal' to be understood in that sense, yet there are, in the works of all of them, some passages in which a certain kind of essence to the stupid blunder of some interpreters who teach that by necessity they mean the irresistible psychological force with which the proposition demands our assent, and that by universality they mean the catachresis, i.e. the universal acceptance of one's own kind. But God and heaven order all sorts of results within us and in the same manner.

Universal: catachresis (see above).

Universal concepts: (see above).

Universal logic: the conversion of a proposition into a universal proposition. See Hummel, Leit. xxv.

Universal: In a sense of the logical breadth of a term, proposition, or argument.

Universal: in a sense of the unspecifiable nature of the proposition. See Hummel, Leit. xxv.

Universal concepts: see above.

Universal: consisting of the negative 'of any proposition.' The term is used as a technical term by epicureans, in the sense of the necessary character of a given subject and predicate. It has purely logical meaning—the necessity of thinking the proposition of such a way, and also logical necessity of holding it valid. This criterion is in effect that of the universal, which is defined as the universality of the proposition as such. See Hummel, Leit. xxv.