including body with reference to the included; and, hence, of course, where there is no body there can be no space. Spacially injurious is his statement (against the Atomists) that a body is an inclusion, but the void is incompatible with motion. The void would be to find absolutely homogeneous in all directions, without discontinuities of place, and there would be this in therefore, nothing which could give a body any definite movement (which implies place) and nothing to bring a body ever to rest. [Selkis, Greek d. prich, Pileta, it. 399-401). Stato agreed with Plato in his position against the Atomists, but still asserted the void as necessary to account for certain phenomena of light and heat. In short, no void, however, there is no empty space. The notion reversed this position. Space within the world is simply the limits of body, or the distance between the limits of a body; but beyond the world there exists an absolutely empty and infinite space. After this time, the conception is best treated in connection with that of zero, were to remark that Descartes, by identifying matter with extension, reduced the conception of the vacuum to a self-contradictory absurdity. In general, it may be remarked that the conflict regarding space and time is the prime of the logical construction of nature which tends to identify space with the medium of the material (as Plato and Descartes), and a mechanical-physical one, like Atomism; or, logically, it has to do with the relation of the discrete and continuous, metaphysically, with the question of finite and infinite.

Vagueness (in logic) [Lat. vagum, randling; indefinitio; Ger. Unbestimmtheit; Fr. vague; Ital. indeterminazione in intuizione. A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is not clear whether they are true or not; when it is uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the seer, he would have been more or less certain of our uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habit of language was indeterminate; so that none of his knowledge was transmitted as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet it may be need be understood, to have reference to what might be (temporarily) deduced from a perfect knowledge of his state of mind; for it is necessarily because these questions never did, or did not frequently, present themselves that his habit remained indeterminate. (C.S.)

Vagueness: see ORIGINAL PLATONISM (India).

Valentinus. Supposed to be an Egyptian, who lived in Alexandria and Cyprus. Knew in Rome, 140-65 B.C. He was founder of the most sect of Valentinians. He taught, among many others, Plato's, Plotinus, Origen, and the Cretans and Boudicca.

Validity [Lat. validus, strong; "live" (vestigium, Fr. validité; Ital. validità). The possession by an argumenation or inference of that sort of efficacy in leading to the truth, which it professes to have; it is also said to be the strength of it. Every argument or inference prefers to conform to a general method or type of reasoning, which method, it is held, has one kind of virtue or other in producing truth. In order to valid the argument or inference, it must really pursue that method it professes to pursue, and furthermore, that method must have the kind of truth-producing virtue which it is supposed to have. For example, an induction may conform to the formula of induction; but it may be conceived, and as it is conceived, that induction lends a probability to its conclusion. Now that is not the way in which it is defined in which induction lends to the truth. It lends no definite probability to its conclusion. It is an uncertain ball of probability of a law, as we could pick up a globe and find in what position of the law held, and, such a induction is not valid; for it does not do what it professes to do. Namely, if we make its conclusion possible. But yet if it had only preferred to do what induction done (namely, to compose a process which must in the long run approximate to the truth), the truth is infinitely more, to the purpose than what it professes it; it may not, or must not, be conformed with strength. For an argument may perfectly well and yet be perfectly weak. I wish to have a given on so is accurately made that it will turn up hands and tails in an approximately equal proportions. A therefore three-time and note the results, my three heads and two tails, and from this I conclude that the coin is approximately correct in its farm. Now this is a valid induction; but it is (C.S.)

Value (economist) [Lat. valere, to be worth; Ger. Wert; Fr. valeur; Ital. valore. An economic is of a commodity being also true. If this is so in fact, while the argument fails to make evident, it is a bad argument not only, yet it is valid, absolutely leads to the truth if the premises are true. It is thus possible for an argument to be valid, while in the premises it may be assumed to be familiar. A valid deductive argument is for the conclusions of precisely such arguments to avoid the premises; yet this must be true, in the long run, in a proportion of the probability which this valid argument assigns to its conclusion; for that this is all that is pretended, it is impossible to imagine independent argument upon independent premises to be true, about ten will probably be double, and it is not possible by the fact that a high number of just such and again, the innumerable instances of the conclusions would be true, and indeed ten would be immediately far beyond the actual number mean in the long run. In the theory of induction and to be true, for it is by no means true, and the conclusion actually drawn in any given case would turn out false in the majority of cases where precisely such a method was followed; but what is certain is that, in the majority of cases, the method would lead to some conclusion that was true, and that to the individual case in hand, if there were any error in the conclusion, that error will get corrected by simply persisting in the employment of the same method. The validity of an inductive argument consists, then, in the fact that it is possible to employ a method which, if duly persisted in, must in the very nature of things, lead to a result infinitely approximating to the truth in the long run. The validity of a presumptive argument is employed of a hypothesis for examination consists in this, that the hypothesis being such that its consequences are not only must be capable of being disproved by measurement, but also must be possible that the observed facts would follow from it in necessary conclusion, that hypothesis is already a fact, or is at least ultimately lead to the discovery of the truth, as far as the truth is capable of being discovered, with an indefinite approximation to accuracy. (C.S.)

Value: see Worth.

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